Quality, Affordable Health Care for All: Moving Beyond the Employer-Based Health-Insurance System by unknown
Comm
Committee for Economic Development
2000 L Street N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036
202-296-5860 Main Number
202-223-0776 Fax
1-800-676-7353
www.ced.org
A Statement by the 
Research and Policy 
Committee of the 
Committee for 
Economic Development
iA Statement by the 
Research and Policy 
Committee of the 
Committee for  
Economic Development
Quality, Aﬀ ordable Health Care for All
Moving Beyond the Employer-Based Health-Insurance System
 
Includes bibliographic references 
ISBN #0-87186-187-9
 
First printing in bound-book form: 2007 
Printed in the United States of  America
 
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
2000 L Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington,  D.C., 20036
202-296-5860
 
www.ced.org
iii
Contents
Purpose of Th is Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Executive Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
  Why Another CED Statement on Health Care?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
  Is the U.S. Health-Care System Failing?  Performance Standards for a Nation’s Health-Care System . . 10
   Does the American Health-Care System Meet Th ese Standards? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
  Why Is Employer-Based Health Insurance Declining?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
    Th e Causes of High and Rising National Health Expenditures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     EBI Costs Cause Major Problems for Employers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     Employer Responses to Date Have Not Solved the Problem  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     Buyers Cannot Hold Th eir Health Expenditure to Sustainable Growth Rates. . . . . . . . . . . . 16
  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
II. Why 35 Years of “Band-Aids” on a Fundamentally Flawed System Did Not Work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
  Why One Popular Idea – the Consumer-Directed Health Plan – Will Not Work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     Consumer Direction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     High-Deductible Health Insurance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
  Why Canada’s “Single-Payer” System or “Medical Care for All”
  Will Not Solve Our Health-Care Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
  Many Other Current Favorite Ideas Are Being Oversold as Solutions in
  Th emselves; Others Would Not Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
III. What Might an Equitable, Eﬃ  cient, Universal Health-Care Financing and Delivery System Look Like? . . . 33
   Goals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   Sustainability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     Incentives Alignment and Eﬃ  ciency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     Continuous Improvement and the Learning Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     Integration and Coordination of Care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
iv
     Match Resources Used to the Needs of the Population Served  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
     Supply-Chain Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
     Market Reorganization to Streamline Administration and Customer Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
   Quality and Eﬀ ectiveness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
    Reorganize Around Medical Conditions, Not Medical Specialties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
     Reorganize for Chronic-Care Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
     Health Promotion and Disease Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
     Regional Centers for Complex Care  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
     End-of-Life Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
    Core Competencies Th at Are Not Encouraged by the Traditional
    Model Are Urgently Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
     Eﬀ ectiveness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
   Access to Quality Coverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
IV. Essentials of Market-Based Universal Health Insurance with Consumer Choice of Health Plan  . . . . . . . . . . 41
  Competitive Insurance Markets and Exchanges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
     Th e Need for a Market Organizer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
     What the Market Organizer Must Do. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
  Universal Premium Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
  Health-Care Financing and Delivery Systems Pursue Quality and Aﬀ ordability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
  Th e Cost of a Reformed Health-Insurance System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
  Eﬀ ects on the Health-Care Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
     Care Providers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
     Insurers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
     Employers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     Labor Unions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     States and Localities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
V. How Might We Get Th ere? A Path to Consumer-Choice-Driven 
 Universal Health Insurance in Feasible Incremental Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
  Phase I: Building the Foundations for Responsible Choice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
v  Phase II: Progressively Expand Coverage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
  Phase III: Achieve Market-Based Universal Health Insurance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Appendix A. CED’s 2002 Policy Statement – Has It Made a Diﬀ erence for Health-Care Reform?  . . . . . . . . . . . 65
  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Appendix B. Th e Traditional Fee-for-Service-Indemnity Model of Health-Care Finance Is a
Major Cause of Rising Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
 How the Fee-for-Service Model Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
 Inappropriate Care and Variation in Practice Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
 FFS Is Inadequate for Treating Chronic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
 Error, Fraud and Abuse  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
 Lack of Performance Tracking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Appendix C. Potential Alternative Delivery Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
 Tiered High-Performance Networks (THPN) Combined with 
 Capitated Primary Care Networks (CPCN). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
 Individual Practice Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
 Prepaid Group Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
 Large Multi-Specialty Group Practices Evolving Toward PGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
 Roles of Academic Health Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Appendix D. Management of Universal Health Insurance by the “Health Fed”  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
 Reconciling the Beneﬁ t Package, the Prices of the Low-Priced Plans, and the Government
 Tax-Financed Fixed-Dollar Contributions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
 Managing Wide Regional Variations in Price-Adjusted and 
 Disease-Adjusted per Capita Spending  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
 Managing the Problems Created by the Failure of Eligible Persons to Enroll in a Health Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendix E. Functions of the Institute for Medical Outcomes and Technology Assessment (IMOTA). . . . . . . . 83
Memoranda of Comment, Reservation or Dissent  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Glossary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Endnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
vi
Chairmen
PATRICK W. GROSS
Chairman
Th e Lovell Group
WILLIAM W. LEWIS
Director Emeritus
McKinsey Global Institute
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
Members
IAN ARNOF
Chairman
Arnof Family Foundation
ALAN BELZER
President & Chief Operating Oﬃ  cer 
(Retired)
Allied Signal
LEE C. BOLLINGER
President
Columbia University
ROY J. BOSTOCK
Chairman
Sealedge Investments, LLC
JOHN BRADEMAS
President Emeritus
New York University
BETH BROOKE
Global Vice Chair, Strategy, 
Communications and Regulatory Aﬀ airs
Ernst & Young LLP
DONALD R. CALDWELL
Chairman & Chief Executive Oﬃ  cer
Cross Atlantic Capital Partners
DAVID A. CAPUTO
President Emeritus
Pace University
GERHARD CASPER
President Emeritus
Stanford University
MICHAEL CHESSER
Chairman, President & CEO
Great Plains Energy Services
CAROLYN CHIN
Chairman & Chief Executive Oﬃ  cer
Cebiz
KATHLEEN COOPER
Dean, College of Business Administration
University of North Texas
W. BOWMAN CUTTER
Managing Director
Warburg Pincus LLC
KENNETH W. DAM
Max Pam Professor Emeritus of American 
and Foreign Law and Senior Lecturer, 
University of Chicago Law School
Th e University of Chicago
RONALD R. DAVENPORT
Chairman of the Board
Sheridan Broadcasting Corporation
RICHARD H. DAVIS
Partner
Davis Manafort, Inc.
RICHARD J. DAVIS
Senior Partner
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
WILLIAM DONALDSON
Chairman
Donaldson Enterprises
FRANK P. DOYLE
Executive Vice President (Retired)
General Electric Company
W. D. EBERLE
Chairman
Manchester Associates, Ltd.
ALLEN FAGIN
Chairman
Proskauer Rose LLP
MATTHEW FINK
President (Retired)
Investment Company Institute
EDMUND B. FITZGERALD
Managing Director
Woodmont Associates
HARRY FREEMAN
Chairman
Th e Mark Twain Institute
PATRICK FORD
President & CEO, U.S.
Burson-Marsteller
CONO R. FUSCO
Managing Partner - Strategic Relationships
Grant Th ornton
GERALD GREENWALD
Chairman
Greenbriar Equity Group
BARBARA B. GROGAN
Founder
Western Industrial Contractors
RICHARD W. HANSELMAN
Former Chairman
Health Net Inc.
RODERICK M. HILLS
Chairman
Hills Stern & Morley LLP
EDWARD A. KANGAS
Chairman & Chief Executive Oﬃ  cer, 
Retired
Deloitte & Touche
JOSEPH E. KASPUTYS
Chairman, President & Chief Executive 
Oﬃ  cer
Global Insight, Inc.
CHARLES E.M. KOLB
President
Committee for Economic Development
BRUCE K. MACLAURY
President Emeritus
Th e Brookings Institution
WILLIAM J. MCDONOUGH
Vice Chairman and Special Advisor to the 
Chairman
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
LENNY MENDONCA
Chairman
McKinsey Global Institute
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
ALFRED T. MOCKETT
Chairman & CEO
Motive, Inc.
NICHOLAS G. MOORE
Senior Counsel and Director
Bechtel Group, Inc.
DONNA S. MOREA
President, U.S. Operations and India
CGI
CED Research and Policy Committee
vii
M. MICHEL ORBAN
Partner
RRE Ventures
STEFFEN E. PALKO
Vice Chairman & President (Retired)
XTO Energy Inc.
CAROL J. PARRY
President
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Associates
PETER G. PETERSON
Senior Chairman
Th e Blackstone Group
NED REGAN
University Professor
Th e City University of New York
 JAMES Q. RIORDAN
Chairman
Quentin Partners Co.
DANIEL ROSE
Chairman
Rose Associates, Inc.
LANDON H. ROWLAND
Chairman
EverGlades Financial
GEORGE E. RUPP
President
International Rescue Committee
JOHN C. SICILIANO
Partner
Grail Partners LLC
CED Research and Policy Committee
SARAH G. SMITH
Chief Accounting Oﬃ  cer
Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
MATTHEW J. STOVER
Chairman
LKM Ventures, LLC
 VAUGHN O. VENNERBERG
Senior Vice President and Chief of Staﬀ 
XTO Energy Inc.
 JOSH S. WESTON
Honorary Chairman
Automatic Data Processing, Inc.
 JOHN P. WHITE
Lecturer in Public Policy
Harvard University
viii
CED Subcommittee on Health Care
Co-Chairs
roBert B. chess
Chairman
Nektar Therapeutics
Jerome h. Grossman
Senior Fellow and Director of the Harvard/
Kennedy School Health Care Delivery 
Project
Harvard University
Trustees
roB duGGer
Managing Director
Tudor Investment Corporation
trevor fetter
President and CEO
Tenet Healthcare Corporation
Patrick W. Gross
Chairman
The Lovell Group
roderick m. hills
Chairman
Hills Stern & Morley LLP
charlene dreW Jarvis
President
Southeastern University
charles e.m. kolB
President
Committee for Economic Development
William W. leWis
Director Emeritus
McKinsey Global Institute
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
John c. loomis
Vice President, Human Resources
General Electric Company
lenny mendonca
Chairman
McKinsey Global Institute
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
david r. nachBar
Senior Vice President, Human Resources
Bausch & Lomb Inc.
douG Price
Founder 
Educare Colorado
landon h. roWland
Chairman
Everglades Financial
ian sPatz
Vice President, Public Policy
Merck & Co., Inc.
harold Williams
President Emeritus
Getty Trust
Josh Weston
Honorary Chairman
Automatic Data Processing, Inc.
kurt e. yeaGer
Former President and Chief Executive 
Officer
Electric Power Research Institute
steven zatkin
Senior Vice President, Government Relations
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
Guests
amee chande
Vice President, New Business Development
Wal-Mart
victor fuchs
Professor of Economics & Health Research  
& Policy, Emeritus
Stanford University
alan GarBer
Founding Director, Center for Health Policy 
& Center for Primary Care and  
Outcomes Research
Stanford University
ruth liu
Senior Health Policy Consultant
Kaiser Permanente
Paul meyer
Senior Director, Public Policy
Pfizer Inc.
Gaylon morris
Senior Director, Public Policy
Wyeth
susan reGan
Consultant
Visiting Nurse Service of New York
Jack rodGers
Managing Director
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
sally s. WelBorn
Vice President, Corporate Benefits
Wells Fargo & Co.
stefanos zenios
Professor, Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Project Director
alain c. enthoven
Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public & 
Private Management, Emeritus
Stanford University 
CED Staff
JosePh minarik
Senior VP and Director of Research
Committee for Economic Development
ix
xTh e Committee for Economic Development is an 
independent research and policy organization of over 
200 business leaders and educators. CED is non-proﬁ t, 
non-partisan, and non-political. Its purpose is to pro-
pose policies that bring about steady economic growth 
at high employment and reasonably stable prices, 
increased productivity and living standards, greater 
and more equal opportunity for every citizen, and an 
improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must have the ap-
proval of trustees on the Research and Policy Com-
mittee. Th is committee is directed under the bylaws, 
which emphasize that “all research is to be thoroughly 
objective in character, and the approach in each in-
stance is to be from the standpoint of the general 
welfare and not from that of any special political or 
economic group.” Th e committee is aided by a Re-
search Advisory Board of leading social scientists and 
by a small permanent professional staﬀ .
Th e Research and Policy Committee does not attempt 
to pass judgment on any pending speciﬁ c legislative 
proposals; its purpose is to urge careful consideration 
of the objectives set forth in this statement and of the 
best means of accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive discussions, 
meetings, and exchange of memoranda. Th e research 
is undertaken by a subcommittee, assisted by advisors 
chosen for their competence in the ﬁ eld under study. 
Th e full Research and Policy Committee participates 
in the drafting of recommendations. Likewise, the 
trustees on the drafting subcommittee vote to approve 
or disapprove a policy statement, and they share with 
the Research and Policy Committee the privilege of 
submitting individual comments for publication.
Th e recommendations presented herein are those of the 
trustee members of the Research and Policy Committee 
and the responsible subcommittee. Th ey are not necessarily 
endorsed by other trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee 
members, advisors, contributors, staﬀ  members, or others 
associated with CED.
Responsibility for CED Statements on National Policy
xi
Purpose of This Statement
Health care is perhaps the major public policy ques-
tion mark hanging over this nation’s future, in terms of 
both our prosperity and the quality of our lives.
Th e United States spends signiﬁ cantly more of its 
gross domestic product on health care than any other 
developed nation, but our quality of health – as mea-
sured by improvements in longevity, the prevalence of 
chronic disease, or infant mortality, for example – is 
mediocre at best.  Some of this result undoubtedly 
comes from “life-style” choices, but some clearly comes 
from the nature of our health-care system.  Lives are 
shortened and people suﬀ er because our health dollars 
do not buy the care that we need.
Furthermore, the growing cost of health care threatens 
the budgets of households, businesses, and govern-
ments at all levels.  Health insurance is beyond the ﬁ -
nancial reach of many American families, leaving them 
unprotected and often wanting for necessary care.  
Businesses strain to continue paying the insurance pre-
miums for the coverage that their workers have come 
to expect.  Important public issues are crowded out of 
government ﬁ scal plans by the costs of health care for 
the elderly and the needy.  If those costs continue to 
grow at current trends, they will soon consume all of 
the revenues now devoted to our national, state and 
local priorities. 
Th e health-care crisis looms so large that it is natural 
to wonder which part of the problem to tackle ﬁ rst.  
For some years, the Washington policy community 
has focused its greatest concern on the cost of Medi-
care and Medicaid, linked as those programs are to the 
aging of the baby-boom generation.  Budget analysts 
have noted, as has CED, that the conﬂ uence of the 
rising costs in those programs alone will make the cur-
rent federal budget structure unsustainable.  However, 
CED has long believed, and the consensus of opin-
ion now appears to agree, that policy cannot achieve 
enduring reform of the public health-care programs 
taken by themselves.  Because our health-care system is 
an interdependent whole that treats public and private 
patients side-by-side, sustainable reform must em-
brace the entire system.  And the core of that system is 
employer-based health insurance.
Th e largest segment of our population – persons of 
working age and their dependents – customarily has 
obtained its health-insurance coverage through em-
ployment.  Yet that part of our health-care system is 
failing.  It is fully as deﬁ cient as the government-run 
and ﬁ nanced sector – just as ﬁ nancially unsustain-
able and ineﬃ  cient, if not more so.  Private budgets 
are just as threatened as public budgets, businesses are 
hard-pressed to maintain their health-insurance com-
mitments to their employees and remain competitive, 
and the health of those privately insured is not what 
it should be, given the power of this nation, and the 
amount we pay.  Th e lack of secure care for those with-
out insurance is a threat to their health and ﬁ nances, 
and in the long run, to those of the entire population.
CED recognized the crucial role of the employer-based 
health-insurance system in our 2002 policy statement, 
A New Vision for Health Care: A Leadership Role for 
Business.  In it, we presented our recommendations for 
private employers to restructure their employees’ insur-
ance for greater quality and sustainable cost.  However, 
we have seen little progress toward the implementa-
tion of the recommendations of that statement, while 
quality, aﬀ ordability and access to insurance have 
continued to deteriorate.  Accordingly, we undertook 
a new project to review the issue, and determine what 
is needed for our working-aged population and their 
dependents to achieve aﬀ ordable health care – as a ﬁ rst 
step toward quality and sustainability for the entire 
health-care system.
Our fundamental problem is two-fold.  We as individ-
uals can demand more and more health-care services 
without directly feeling their extra costs; and the dy-
namics of the health-care industry do not work to close 
the enormous gap between the most eﬃ  cient providers 
of health care and the ineﬃ  cient ones, as occurs natu-
rally in the rest of our economy.  Th is new CED policy 
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statement ﬁ nds that employers acting alone or even 
in voluntary consortium cannot achieve the kind of 
systematic change to ﬁ x this problem and for which we 
had hoped in our previous policy statement.  Instead, it 
recommends a new approach that marries market forc-
es with appropriate government structures and incen-
tives to drive improvements in coverage, quality, and 
value.  Th e statement explains that such public-policy 
action is needed to head oﬀ  the ongoing deterioration 
of quality, aﬀ ordability and access that threaten both 
the health and prosperity of our entire society now and 
for decades to come.
CED does not support either a government-run 
command-and-control system, or a so-called consum-
er-directed system under which individuals would 
take at least implicit responsibility for choosing their 
own therapies and treatments.  Instead, the statement 
recommends market-based consumer choice among 
competing insurance and care-delivery plans that meet 
quality and coverage standards.  A key recommenda-
tion is that this consumer choice must be responsible 
– that is, the consumer, informed by mandatory and 
standardized reporting of quality and performance 
by insurers, must be able to save money by choosing a 
less-expensive plan.  Another key recommendation is 
the establishment of an independent regulatory agency, 
fashioned after the Federal Reserve and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, to report on the state of 
the health-care sector in terms of inﬂ ation and aﬀ ord-
ability, and ensure the eﬃ  ciency and fairness of the 
insurance market.  In the system’s ultimate form, after 
an ambitious but measured phase-in process, every 
consumer would receive a premium credit that would 
purchase the low-priced plan that met rigorous qual-
ity standards.  CED believes that such a reform of our 
health-care ﬁ nancing system would lead insurers and 
providers, through market competition, to restruc-
ture fundamentally the health-care delivery system, 
improving both quality and aﬀ ordability.  Th us both 
universal coverage and ﬁ nancial sustainability would 
be achieved.
We hope that these ﬁ ndings will stimulate a construc-
tive, nonpartisan debate of this truly crucial public-
policy issue.
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1Th e U.S. employer-based health-insurance system is 
failing.  Fewer American workers have insurance now 
than did seven years ago; and fewer American ﬁ rms are 
oﬀ ering health insurance now than did then.  Many 
people do without care because they are not covered, 
or fear – with justiﬁ cation – that one illness or the 
loss of a job will cost them their coverage.  Th e com-
petitiveness of American ﬁ rms is threatened by the 
cost of health insurance.  Public budgets at every level 
of government are eroded by the costs of health care, 
including costs that previously were paid by employ-
ers.  Th ough the United States is the wealthiest nation 
in the world and arguably has the best care for per-
sons with dire health needs who do have coverage, our 
overall health status is mediocre at best.  We believe 
that our health-insurance system is in crisis, and needs 
immediate attention to stop steady erosion that may 
become sharp, quantum deterioration.
Is the U.S. Health-Care System Failing?  Perfor-
mance Standards for a Nation’s Health-Care Sys-
tem.  Th e standards by which to judge the overall 
performance of a health-care system are cost, quality, 
and access.  “Cost” is the usual shorthand term for the 
amount a society spends on health care.  Do health in-
surance and health care remain within reach for fami-
lies of moderate means?  Can health-insurance premi-
ums ﬁ t within the total compensation that is aﬀ ordable 
by the employers of most or all people?
“Quality” has many meanings.  Are Americans likely 
to receive recommended care – that is, those interven-
tions that are well supported by clinical evidence and 
are known to beneﬁ t patients?  How likely are patients 
with serious chronic conditions to get the care they 
need?  How likely are they to get appropriate care – 
that is, care of the kind and in just the amount that 
confers maximum beneﬁ t, but no more?
“Access” is shorthand for people’s ability to obtain ap-
propriate care, including having health insurance that 
makes care reasonably aﬀ ordable to people who need 
it, and whose provisions, like coinsurance and deduct-
ibles, do not deter people from obtaining care that is 
important for their health.  It also means having geo-
graphic and transportation access to a facility and to 
professionals who will provide appropriate care.
For all of our country’s wealth and power, our health-
care system demonstrably fails to meet these basic 
criteria.  On cost, the price of an average family insur-
ance policy – $11,500 per year for a family of four in 
2006 – is almost 20 percent of the earning power of 
the median household, and the cost is growing about 
2.5 percentage points per year faster than GDP.  Th us, 
health insurance is pricing itself out of reach.  On qual-
ity, authoritative studies document numerous errors of 
prescription and treatment, and inappropriate and un-
necessary surgery and hospitalization, that cause un-
necessary suﬀ ering, illness, injury and cost.  Th ere are 
wide variations in medical practices from one commu-
nity to another, and even among doctors in the same 
community.  Moreover, a 2003 study by RAND found 
that consumers are receiving only about 55 percent of 
the care called for under generally accepted standards 
of medical practice.  But perhaps most seriously, on 
access, 47.0 million Americans were without health 
insurance in 2006, up from 38.7 million in 2000.
Employer-Based Health Insurance Is in Decline.  
Most insured Americans get their coverage through 
employment, either theirs or a family member’s.  But 
the number and percentage of Americans covered by 
employer-based health insurance (EBI) is declining.  
From 2000 to 2006, the absolute number of people 
covered by EBI fell from 179.4 million to 177.2 million; 
and the covered percentage of the population under age 
65 fell from 68.3 percent to 62.9 percent.  From 2000 
to 2007, the percentage of ﬁ rms oﬀ ering health bene-
ﬁ ts fell from 69 percent to 60 percent, reﬂ ecting mainly 
small employers dropping EBI.  Th ere are underlying 
forces, especially the rapidly increasing cost of health 
insurance and small employers locked out by pre-exist-
ing conditions, that make this trend likely to continue.
Executive Summary
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nancing system rests on inﬂ ationary foundations.  Th e 
incentives and the organization of health care work 
against aﬀ ordable care.
Th e causes are several.  However, the heart of the prob-
lem is that the vast majority of employers oﬀ er their 
employees no choice; they oﬀ er either no insurance at 
all, or one plan.  For ﬁ rms that oﬀ er coverage, having 
just one plan is administratively simpler.  Insurers also 
prefer to cover all of a ﬁ rm’s employees, because that 
minimizes per-worker administrative cost and obviates 
the risk of enrolling only the sickest employees.  Be-
cause employees, understandably, want to choose their 
own doctors, employers tend to oﬀ er one insurance 
plan that oﬀ ers access to as many doctors as possible; 
and the only way to reimburse doctors under such wide 
access is fee-for-service payment.
Th erefore, the vast majority of employees have no 
opportunity or incentive to choose a cost-eﬀ ective 
high-quality health plan, and health-care insurers and 
providers have no inducement to provide the quality, 
aﬀ ordable care that consumers want.  Employers, not 
patients and consumers, make the decisions that shape 
the U.S. health-care system, from ﬁ nancing to delivery 
of care.  And multiplied over tens of thousands of em-
ployers, those decisions dictate a dominant system of 
fee-for service medicine for the entire population.
Fee-for-service medicine presents the worst incen-
tives: the more services, the more fees.  Patients want 
all the services that might deliver any beneﬁ t, however 
small; doctors and hospitals are predisposed to provide 
those services, at least in part because they are paid 
for each service they provide.  Providers actually make 
more money when they are slow to diagnose and treat 
a problem: they are paid for more “services” that way.  
Th ere is little or no incentive to utilize cost-saving tech-
nological advances such as health information tech-
nology and electronic patient records.  Indeed, in this 
“cost-unconscious” environment, there is little incentive 
to ﬁ nd a less-costly way to solve any health problem.  
On the contrary, costly new discoveries, though often 
highly beneﬁ cial, can be deployed at great expense and 
considerable risk even before they are fully evaluated.
Alternative health plans might oﬀ er lower cost by 
choosing providers who wish to practice in integrated 
networks, taking advantage of technology and other 
eﬃ  ciencies.  However, such integrated systems would, 
in eﬀ ect, dictate the choice of providers to employees.  
Employees would not want such an absence of choice, 
especially if they had no sense that they would share in 
the ﬁ nancial savings.
Compounding these structural problems, there has 
been a large increase in the prevalence of chronic dis-
ease and our ability to treat it – and the cost of doing 
so.  Twenty medical conditions accounted for 67 per-
cent of the per capita growth in private health-insur-
ance costs between 1987 and 2002.  Th e health-care 
system is not oriented to early detection and treatment 
or to chronic disease management, but rather to a visit 
to the doctor and the collection of a fee for a service to 
treat symptoms when they arise.
Also, largely because of the fee-for-service method of 
payment to doctors in which millions of individual acts 
must be billed and paid for, improper billing because 
of fraud, carelessness, or error is a huge problem.  Th e 
Oﬃ  ce of the Inspector General of the Department of 
Health and Human Services estimated that in 1996, 
the Medicare Program made about $23.2 billion in im-
proper payments.  As the Inspector General’s Report 
said:  “Th e Medicare program is inherently vulnerable 
to incorrect provider billing practices.”  Th e same could 
be said of all insurance under fee-for-service medicine.  
EBI Costs Cause Employers Major Problems.  Em-
ployers, the primary purchasers of health insurance, 
must deal with the insurance market as it exists; they 
cannot themselves change the structure of the entire 
system.  EBI costs give employers a powerful incentive 
to try to avoid this growing burden – which employers 
do, in part, by tightening restrictions on who is eligible 
for EBI, and by increasing required employee contri-
butions so that low-paid workers do not choose to pay 
their share and participate.  Or, employers can simply 
close the plant or oﬃ  ce and obtain the services from 
lower-cost labor overseas, or from low-cost employers 
in this country who do not provide health insurance.  
Th ese policies may mitigate employer problems, but 
they cause serious human problems, and they do not 
help forestall the decline in EBI.
Employer Responses to Date Have Not Solved the 
Problem.  Because merely shifting costs to employees 
is a clearly visible dead end, ﬁ rms also have experi-
mented with wellness programs, preventive care, and 
3management of chronic conditions, backed up with 
ﬁ nancial incentives.  Firms have tried bargaining with 
providers, using health records to promote “evidence-
based medicine” to choose the best treatments, and 
creating “high-performance networks” of physicians 
with strong records of cost-eﬃ  cient care.  However, 
none of these eﬀ orts would change in any fundamental 
way the practice of medicine, or the arguably cost-inef-
ﬁ cient adoption of new and ever-more-expensive health 
technologies.
In sum, the entire U.S. health-care system is built on 
inﬂ ationary foundations – worse still, with limited in-
centives to keep people healthy.
Proposed Solutions – Past and Present – 
Do Not Work
“Band-Aids.”  For at least 35 years, there has been a 
slowly building realization that our health-care system 
is not sustainable.  Public policymakers and private ac-
tors have tried to respond, yielding a discouraging his-
tory of espousing and adopting simplistic and partial 
“solutions” ranging from utilization reviews, or attacks 
on “waste, fraud and abuse,” to “managed care” – veri-
table “Band-Aids” on top of a fundamentally ﬂ awed 
system.  Some of these contained germs of good ideas, 
and some could be part of a rational comprehensive 
solution; but none came close to addressing our funda-
mental problems.  Likewise, new ideas such as health 
information technology and digital health records 
would help, but would not solve the fundamental, sys-
temic weakness in health-care delivery.
Consumer-Directed Health Plans (CDHPs).  
CDHPs are claimed to be something close to a com-
plete answer for the problems of the nation’s health-
care system.  CDHPs are insurance plans with high 
deductibles, which the consumer must pay before in-
surance coverage begins.  Consumers may have health 
savings accounts (HSAs), funded either by themselves 
or by their employers, to pay for care under the deduct-
ible.  Because of the high deductible, the premium can 
be lower.  Also because of the high deductible, consum-
ers would be expected to engage in preventive care; and 
then, when illness or injury strikes, to use the latest in-
formation technology to ﬁ nd the most economical and 
eﬃ  cient therapies and treatments, to minimize their 
out-of-pocket spending under the CDHP deductible, 
and to protect the balance in their HSAs.  In this way, 
it is claimed, total health-care costs would be brought 
under control.  Th ough CDHPs are better than 
no coverage at all, they are not a complete solution.  
Health expenditures are very concentrated on relative-
ly few people.  In any given year, well over 80 percent of 
health expenditure dollars will be spent on people who 
have exceeded their deductibles or can safely expect to 
do so, for any level of deductibles that is reasonable.  
Many people with chronic conditions can expect to 
reach their deductibles, as can anyone who has been an 
inpatient in a hospital, or is likely to enter a hospital.  
Once CDHP enrollees have reached their deductibles, 
they will in eﬀ ect be in cost-unconscious fee-for-service 
medicine.  CDHPs will be advantageous to those who 
are both healthy and wealthy, because they can both 
aﬀ ord the higher deductibles and take the most advan-
tage of the health savings account tax shelter (which 
beneﬁ ts most those in the highest tax-rate brackets, but 
is worth next to nothing to the worst-oﬀ  taxpayers who 
face a very low or even zero-percent tax rate).  Th e loser 
may be the fairness of our private health-care ﬁ nancing 
system – not to mention the viability of health insur-
ance for those who are not fortunate enough to beneﬁ t 
from CDHPs.
Single Payer, or “Medicare for All.”  Another “big 
idea” for health-system reform is a “single-payer” 
system, like Canada’s.  Probably at the federal level, 
government would serve as the single health insurer, 
cover everybody, and pay all the bills according to 
a government-determined or negotiated fee sched-
ule.  Another name could be “Medicare for all;” every 
American would be covered by the Medicare program 
or something very similar.  In the United States today, 
this model has features with great appeal, like univer-
sal coverage and one billing system.  However, the U.S. 
single-payer system, Medicare, is locked into uncoor-
dinated, fragmented fee-for-service medicine; it has 
proven practically impossible for Medicare to break 
out, with the law allowing patient access to any willing 
physician.  Medicare fee-for-service has built-in incen-
tives for delivering volume, not quality.  It motivates, or 
is compatible with, a great deal of over-use, under-use, 
and misuse of services.  Studies show that Medicare 
patients in the last six months of life in Florida get 
several times as many doctor visits as similar patients 
in Minnesota, while reporting less satisfaction with 
their care.  Th us, a single-payer system might provide 
universal coverage for a time, but costs would surely 
4continue spiraling out of control – as they are in Medi-
care today – threatening everyone’s coverage.
What Might an Equitable, Effi cient, 
Universal Health-Care Financing and 
Delivery System Look Like?
Th e heart of the solution for health care is competi-
tion to serve cost-conscious buyers, and incentives for 
providers to create and run high-quality, but aﬀ ord-
able, health-care systems.  Competition motivates in-
novation and eﬃ  ciency improvement.  For virtually the 
entire non-health-care economy over the history of the 
nation, competitive pressures have increased quality 
and tempered prices.  Th e improvements could not be 
predicted in advance.  Consumer choices signaled price 
standards and preferred product and service attributes 
to the marketplace, and suppliers improved their pro-
cesses and methods to meet and then to surpass those 
standards, thereby setting new ones.  Even given the 
unique nature of health care, competition provides the 
best hope for aﬀ ordable, quality health care.
Our goal should be adaptive delivery systems that 
move toward the attributes of the modern ﬁ rm in 
virtually every other industry: from unaccountable 
to accountable; from uncoordinated to coordinated; 
from wasteful and inﬂ ationary to eﬃ  cient (seeking 
maximum value for money for patients), with incen-
tives for value-enhancing innovation; from provider-
centric to patient-centric; a system focused on keeping 
people well, at work, and out of the hospital; in short, a 
system committed to improving health outcomes and 
reducing health system expenditures, bringing expen-
diture growth into line with income growth.  Delivery 
systems that approximate most of these attributes do 
exist.  True competition among insurers and providers 
will encourage the entire industry to improve in all of 
these dimensions.
Also, to correct the problems created because many 
people lack health insurance, everyone should have in-
formed, responsible (that is, cost-conscious) choices of 
health insurance programs that are ﬁ nancially sustain-
able.  To have eﬃ  cient delivery systems, there must be 
a market for them – that is, a demand for eﬃ  ciency.  
Today, there is virtually no demand for eﬃ  ciency.  If 
all or most people had a reason to choose eﬃ  cient 
systems, care providers would ﬁ nd it necessary to cre-
ate and oﬀ er them.  Th us, engaging both patients and 
providers to align incentives is a necessary condition 
for an eﬃ  cient delivery system.  Once the incentives 
truly are aligned, we can expect improvements along 
the following fronts.
Health-care providers who need to satisfy cost-con-
scious consumers must organize their systems for 
chronic-care management.  As of September 2004, 133 
million people, almost half of all Americans, live with 
a chronic condition.  Almost half of these people have 
multiple chronic conditions.  In 2001, the care given to 
people with chronic conditions accounted for 83 per-
cent of health-care spending.  Today’s health-care and 
payment systems are designed to manage and pay for 
acute episodes, not chronic conditions.  Fee-for-service 
generally pays for episodes such as doctor visits or pro-
cedures, not for on-going preventive and chronic care 
such as counseling sessions.
Chronic disease often arises from the failure to engage 
in good health behaviors – such as obesity-prevention, 
exercise, diabetes-control, smoking-cessation, and pre-
vention methods such as cancer screening.  Resources 
could be saved in the long run by systems that empha-
size primary care, disease prevention and early detec-
tion and treatment.  Fee-for-service generates unusual 
income opportunities for doctors in specialties such as 
oncology and radiology, and poor pay for primary care 
– leading progressively fewer graduates of American 
medical schools to seek careers in primary care.  Th e 
other stages of the continuum of health-care delivery, 
procedures, catastrophic care, and end-of-life care, also 
could be improved in quality and cost in the same way 
– through system coordination across teams and error 
avoidance.
Although the share of health spending on patients 
in their last year of life has often been exaggerated, it 
remains signiﬁ cant: it is about 30 percent of Medicare, 
and Medicare is about 17 percent of national health 
expenditures.  Th ere is substantial regional variation.  
Th e high-spending regions spend 60 percent more per 
patient and provide more services than the low-spend-
ing regions, but Medicare enrollees in higher-spending 
regions do not experience better health outcomes or 
satisfaction with care.  Providers in a cost-conscious 
system will need to develop more-humane alternatives 
for end-of-life care that are less specialist- and ICU-
intensive than the acute inpatient setting.
5Th e huge ﬂ ow of medical information (over 10,000 
randomized trials are published each year) is beyond 
the grasp of solo or small group practitioners.  A suc-
cessful system must translate this information into 
up-to-date science-based best-practice guidelines and 
conveniently integrate them into actual care delivery.  
Health information technology can include caregiver 
support tools – such as shared comprehensive electron-
ic health records, guidelines, prompts, and reminders 
– to monitor performance and take corrective actions.  
Care should be delivered in the least-costly appropri-
ate settings, considering total system costs, not just 
costs and revenues associated with one setting – with 
smooth transitions and hand-oﬀ s between care set-
tings, so that, for example, outpatient providers are 
well-informed on inpatient care (and vice versa).
Although this restructuring would radically change 
America’s health-care delivery system, each of these 
expectations is nonetheless reasonable on its face – no 
more than what one would reasonably expect from a 
well-run world-class competitive company that adapts 
to technology and market challenges and opportunities 
in any other sector of the economy.
Essentials of Market-Based Universal 
Health Insurance with Consumer Choice of 
Health Plan
We propose a system of market-based universal health 
insurance – which eliminates the current system’s 
distortions by giving each consumer a choice of dif-
ferent plans and a ﬁ xed-dollar credit to purchase the 
plan of his or her choice.  With this system, consumers 
have an incentive to be cost-conscious.  We believe that 
competition among private insurance plans, to attract 
informed, cost- and quality-conscious consumers, is 
the only way to achieve sustainable, aﬀ ordable, quality 
health care for all Americans.  By reforming the ﬁ nanc-
ing system for health coverage, we can create the incen-
tives that will drive insurers and providers to reform 
the health delivery system.
Th e nation can achieve such a market for quality, af-
fordable health care through two key steps:
In the ﬁ rst step, the federal government should es-
tablish independent regional “exchanges” that would 
provide a single point of entry for each individual to 
choose among competing private health plans.  Th e 
markets for health insurance and health-care delivery 
are unique.  Competition is possible, but the nature of 
these markets does mean that the competitive process 
needs rules – much as do the markets for other insur-
ance products or for securities, for example – to be 
eﬃ  cient and fair.  To provide those rules, we propose a 
health-insurance “exchange,” which would improve on 
the current Federal Employees Health Beneﬁ ts Plan 
(FEHBP) – the system that also covers members of 
Congress.  Every individual would be guaranteed the 
right to choose one from a range of private insurance 
plans.  Every plan would be required to meet the com-
prehensive standards set by the exchange; only qual-
ity plans with broad coverage may compete.  Health 
insurers and providers would be free to use alternative 
delivery system models.
It would be essential that wide-access PPO plans be 
available, so that everyone who wanted to continue with 
such coverage and with his or her own physician could 
do so; every consumer could “keep what he (or she) 
has.”  Plans could charge no diﬀ erence in premium 
for age or preexisting conditions (unlike the current 
individual insurance market).  Th ese exchanges would 
set standards for plans to ensure quality, comprehen-
sive coverage, and consumer protection through stan-
dardized “ﬁ ne print.”  Each exchange would provide 
side-by-side plan comparisons, and would organize an 
annual open season at which individuals could change 
plans – introducing competition into the marketplace 
for health insurance and care.  Each exchange would 
“risk-adjust” premium revenue to insurers – that is, 
pay more to insurers that cover relatively more people 
with expensive conditions.  Risk adjustment is already 
undertaken by insurers in some private systems that 
resemble what we propose and has just been adopted 
for the private Medicare insurers.
Th e exchanges would be supervised by a “Health Fed,” 
modeled on the independence and structure of the Fed-
eral Reserve, which would be established at the outset 
to guide and facilitate the creation of the exchanges.  
Th e Health Fed would be funded independently (as 
is the Federal Reserve), by a small surcharge on insur-
ance premiums; its independent funding is essential, to 
ensure that it is insulated from politics, and that it can 
react quickly to market challenges and opportunities 
and to technological change.  Th e Health Fed would 
collect initial data to evaluate proposed insurance plans 
and to establish and improve risk adjustment.  It would 
6set standards for performance disclosure by plans and 
providers.  Th e Health Fed would create an Institute 
for Medical Outcomes and Technology Assessment to 
evaluate the comparative costs and beneﬁ ts of technol-
ogies and care practices, and report to health providers 
and the public.  Th ere would be an option of national 
(not just state) regulation of health insurance plans 
to facilitate competition and innovation.  In sum, the 
exchange system would perform a role very similar to, 
but we believe improving upon, that now performed by 
the Oﬃ  ce of Personnel Management for the Federal 
Employees Health Beneﬁ ts Plan.
Second, subject to progress of the exchanges and the 
willingness of the public to provide the ﬁ nancing, every 
household would receive a ﬁ xed-dollar credit suﬃ  cient 
to purchase the low-priced quality health plan oﬀ ered 
in its region.  Every individual, therefore, would be 
able to buy quality health insurance at no out-of-pocket 
cost, and coverage would be universal.  As an alterna-
tive to the low-price plan, an individual or household 
could choose to purchase a more-expensive plan by 
paying the additional cost above the low-priced plan, 
using after-tax dollars.  Such ﬁ xed-dollar contributions 
have been used with success in the employer context 
by Hewlett Packard, Wells Fargo, the University of 
California, and Stanford University, and the states of 
Washington, Wisconsin, and California.  Th e ﬁ xed-
dollar credit would be ﬁ nanced by eliminating the 
current exclusion for employer-provided insurance, and 
by broadly based tax revenues – for example a payroll, 
value-added or environmental tax.  In eﬀ ect, every 
individual in the nation would contribute toward the 
health-insurance program, and every individual would 
be entitled to insurance – without costly “mandates” or 
means-testing.
With every individual assured access to a quality in-
surance plan, and able to pocket the full savings from 
choosing a low-priced plan, insurers would for the ﬁ rst 
time have an incentive to organize with health provid-
ers to oﬀ er quality, aﬀ ordable care that people – not 
their employers – want.  Together, the health-insurance 
exchange and the ﬁ xed-dollar contributions to indi-
viduals would lead naturally to a competitive market-
place among health-care providers and insurance plans. 
Every consumer would have insurance and an incentive 
to choose the plan that provides what he or she be-
lieves to be the best combination of quality and value 
for money, because he or she would be responsible for 
costs beyond the ﬁ xed-dollar contribution.  Consum-
ers could change plans freely at annual open seasons 
if they were dissatisﬁ ed.  Th erefore, to attract and 
to keep customers, plans would need to be adaptive 
to pursue eﬃ  ciency and quality, which would create 
meaningful competition in the health-care market-
place, driven by fair rules to reward quality and cost-
eﬀ ectiveness, rather than denying care and selecting 
risks.  Rules-based competition has driven progress in 
every other industry in our economy and around the 
world, and competition shows the greatest promise 
of turning health care from its current path of unsus-
tainable cost growth, mediocre quality, deteriorating 
health, and declining coverage.
With health plans competing to attract cost-conscious 
consumers, we can expect our health-care system to 
change for the better.  Health providers would be ac-
countable for quality and cost.  To remain aﬀ ordable 
while maintaining quality for their customers, pro-
viders would move away from fee-for-service episodic 
treatment to emphasizing primary care, health pro-
motion, disease prevention, early detection and treat-
ment, chronic disease management, and cost-reducing 
innovation and process improvement – which would 
include eﬃ  cient use of technology, such as electronic 
medical records, knowledge management, and comput-
erized caregiver support tools; better use of physicians’ 
time, in part through team practice with non-M.D. 
professionals; matching resources to the needs of the 
populations served; and regional concentration of com-
plex care, to achieve expertise and economies of scale.  
To control costs, providers would need to avoid con-
ﬂ icts of interest, and use the best possible evaluation of 
the eﬃ  cacy of treatments and therapies. 
Th is design would focus competition on value for 
money in the informed best judgment of consumers, 
and not in any way pick winners and losers in advance.  
Th e competitive market would do that, over time.  Th e 
system should encourage diﬀ ering delivery modes to 
foster competition and innovation.  In the end, some 
existing models might be winners in the competitive 
marketplace, or the winners might be entirely new, as-
yet-unimagined models.  One thing would be certain: 
the outcome would be better than what has gone be-
fore because the incentives and opportunities for con-
sumers to make economizing choices, and the need for 
insurers and providers to seek improvement to satisfy 
consumers, would be enormously increased.
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tem.  Universal coverage would increase the number of 
people seeking services, but cost-conscious consumers 
would gradually migrate toward less-expensive plans; 
and all plans would seek eﬃ  ciencies to reduce their 
premiums.  CED plans further research, including a 
full actuarial assessment of our recommendation in de-
tail.  However, basically similar legislation proposed by 
Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Robert F. Bennett 
(R-UT) (which does diﬀ er in some signiﬁ cant details) 
is estimated to reduce total national health-care spend-
ing by a small percentage in the ﬁ rst year, rising to 7.7 
percent in the tenth year.  Th e savings would be the net 
of costs for additional services for the newly insured, 
more than oﬀ set by savings from the incentives of price 
competition for consumers and insurers, and addition-
al savings in administration.  In other words, under a 
system of responsible, cost-conscious consumer choice, 
the issue is not how much the nation spends on health 
care, but who pays a smaller total; if the nation can use 
the resources that are now devoted to health care – by 
employers, households, and governments – then it can 
aﬀ ord coverage for all, with money left over, and the 
savings would grow over time.  However, mobilizing 
all of the resources now used for health care would be a 
non-trivial task.  We believe that a ﬁ nancing solution is 
attainable, and we plan further research.
Eﬀ ects on the Health-Care Industry.  Th e health-
care industry is now about one-sixth of the U.S. 
economy.  Any marked change in the structure of that 
industry would have correspondingly large impacts.  
In the broadest sense, improvements in the eﬃ  ciency 
of delivering health care, like those for any other good 
or service, would make the economy and the nation 
as a whole better oﬀ .  Process improvement in health-
care delivery likely would reduce (or reduce the rate of 
growth of) the 16 percent of the GDP that is now de-
voted to health care.  However, every dollar of that 16 
percent of the GDP is income to those who work in the 
industry today.  If that share declines, some people’s in-
comes will decline, and some people may lose their jobs 
altogether.  Society should be sensitive to these eﬀ ects, 
but concern about those dislocations should not pre-
vent progress for all.  Th e deteriorating current system 
has left growing millions of people without insurance 
coverage, to the detriment of their health and of the 
health-care system.  Inaction would merely extend that 
deterioration.
In fact, many segments of the health-care sector would 
beneﬁ t from reform.  Physicians and other providers 
of health care would be better oﬀ  having more people 
covered as users (and reliable payers) for their prod-
ucts and services.  At the same time, of course, those 
ﬁ rms and individuals would face greater competition, 
and more scrutiny of the eﬃ  cacy of treatments and 
procedures.  But in sum, the outlook for stable growth 
would be much improved under a system of sustain-
able and universal coverage.  Th ose individuals and 
ﬁ rms willing to compete should welcome such reform.  
Other sectors of the economy – insurers, employers, 
and state and local governments – would be aﬀ ected 
in varying ways, but in the end beneﬁ ted by a sound 
health-care system.
How Might We Get There? A Path to 
Consumer-Choice-Driven Universal Health 
Insurance in Feasible Incremental Steps
Our political process much prefers incremental move-
ment to sudden, large, discontinuous changes whose 
consequences cannot be foreseen.  Still, the problems 
of cost, quality and access have become so serious that 
the needed changes to our health-care ﬁ nancing and 
delivery system are fundamental and far-reaching.  
Such restructuring through a political process that val-
ues stability would require bold but feasible incremen-
tal steps that could produce steady progress, and in the 
end get us to Market-Based Universal Health Insur-
ance.  We recommend a three-step process.
Phase I: Building the Foundations for Responsible 
Choice.  To create an administrative structure, mod-
ernize and adapt the FEHBP into a framework for a 
national system of health-insurance exchanges.  Use 
ﬁ xed-dollar contributions to encourage responsible 
choice; introduce risk adjustment; establish a mini-
mum beneﬁ t standard for all plans; and allow premi-
ums to vary by region.  To ease market entry in many 
locations across the country, to make the system more 
competitive and less costly, and to eliminate conﬂ icts 
between state and federal health-insurance regula-
tion, modernize and simplify health insurance regu-
lation by creating an alternative federal regulatory 
system that participating multi-state health plans can 
choose instead of being regulated by states.  To per-
form such regulation, build a new independent agency 
– a “Health Fed” – patterned on the Federal Reserve 
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provide authoritative scientiﬁ c information about 
the value and costs of clinical interventions, create a 
national institute for medical outcomes and technology 
assessment.  And to reverse the recent growth in the 
number of the uninsured, expand existing safety-net 
programs, especially the State Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program (SCHIP), pending the availability of 
true universal coverage.
Phase II: Progressively Expand the Availability of 
Coverage.  To begin transforming the employment-
based insurance system into a wide range of respon-
sible choices of carrier and delivery system, include 
all small employers (up to 50 or 100 employees) in a 
new exchange system, building on the FEHBP.  Small 
employers need the most help to provide coverage to 
their workers, and will beneﬁ t from participation in 
the exchange.  To maintain a large, sound risk pool, 
require that those small ﬁ rms purchase their insurance 
through the exchange to keep the tax exclusion for 
employer premiums.  Include the self-employed, and 
even entire states that choose to opt in.  Progressively 
expand the ceiling for the new system until all employ-
ers are included.  To create cost-consciousness, and to 
save billions of tax dollars to help low-income people 
buy insurance, cap the tax exclusion for employer 
health beneﬁ ts at the level of an eﬃ  cient health plan 
in each region.  Further, to maintain cost-conscious-
ness, prohibit employers from selectively subsidizing 
the purchase of more-expensive health plans by their 
employees.  Employers must give any such subsidy 
to all of their employees, not only those who choose 
more-expensive insurance; and employers must al-
low their employees to take the subsidy in cash, rather 
than insurance premiums, if they so choose.  Finally, 
expand the functions of the “Health Fed” to include 
setting standards for performance disclosure and risk 
adjustment.
Phase III:  Achieve Market-Based Universal Health 
Insurance.  To complete the transition to universal 
health insurance, replace all employer contributions 
with universal ﬁ xed-dollar contributions paid for with 
broad-based tax revenues.  To help ﬁ nance this, elimi-
nate any tax break for employer-paid health insurance.
Conclusion
Th e program outlined here has the greatest prospect of 
achieving the three goals of restraining health-care ex-
penditures, achieving universal insurance coverage, and 
improving quality.  It relies on incentives for individu-
als to choose both plans and providers that oﬀ er what 
those individuals judge to be the best combination 
of quality and price.  In response, insurers and care 
providers will have the strongest incentive to increase 
quality and restrain prices, creating a new dynamic 
toward improvement.  Th ose consumers who prefer 
today’s model of care would be able to keep it, if they 
were willing to pay any diﬀ erence in price.  However, 
by current indications, most people would be happy to 
consider new, evolving, and improving delivery modes 
that emphasize maintaining health through preventive 
care and healthy behavior, early intervention against 
and sustained control of chronic diseases, and use of 
contemporary digital technology and communications.
Merely extending coverage – even to universal cover-
age – under the current system would not solve the 
core problem, because with the cost of coverage grow-
ing faster than the economy’s capacity to pay it, no 
coverage is secure.  Command-and-control systems 
have a poor track record in modern economies; and 
medical care is too complex to devolve all authority to 
the individual patient.  Market-based universal health 
insurance, with individuals choosing the health plans 
and delivery systems that they deem best, shows great 
promise – much greater than any alternative.
9Chapter One: Introduction
Th e U.S. employer-based health-insurance system is 
failing.  Fewer American workers have insurance, and 
fewer American employers are oﬀ ering health insur-
ance, than did seven years ago.  Many people forgo care 
because they are not covered.  Many fear – with justi-
ﬁ cation – that one illness or the loss of a job will cost 
them their coverage.  Th e competitiveness of Ameri-
can ﬁ rms is threatened by the cost of health insurance.  
Government budgets at every level are strained by the 
costs of health care, including costs that had been paid 
by employers.  Th e failing employer-based insurance 
system is dragging down the entire health-care delivery 
system.  Th ough the United States is the wealthiest na-
tion in the world, with what may well be the best care 
for persons with dire health needs who do have cover-
age, our overall health status is mediocre at best.
CED believes that our entire health-care ﬁ nance and 
delivery system is in crisis, and in need of immedi-
ate attention – to stop steady erosion that may soon 
become a sharp deterioration.  As employers, we are 
concerned for the health and ﬁ nancial well-being of 
our employees; but our concerns reach much further.  
Th e lack of care and the costs suﬀ ered by those Ameri-
cans without insurance are a national blight.  Th e com-
pounded expense of emergency care for their neglected 
illnesses is a burden on those with insurance coverage.  
Furthermore, the growing cost of care for those with 
coverage is a threat to the health care of all Americans.
CED believes that business must play an important 
role in the future of health care.  Since World War 
II, more by accident than design, business has accu-
mulated most of the responsibility for, and much of 
the expertise on, the ﬁ nancing and the structure of 
the health-care system for the working-aged popula-
tion and their dependents.  Th e subsequent deteriora-
tion of the health-care system has handicapped busi-
ness in international competition and in meeting the 
needs of its employees.  Business has been entrapped 
in the problem, and business needs to be a part of the 
solution.
Furthermore, CED believes that business oﬀ ers unique 
insight to ﬁ nd the solution.  Government ﬁ at cannot 
for long maintain aﬀ ordable, quality health coverage.  
To summarize, we believe that the continuation of the 
dominant uncoordinated, small-practice fee-for-service 
model of health-care delivery, largely sheltered from 
competition and therefore lacking innovation in organi-
zation and process, has increased cost without improv-
ing access or most dimensions of quality.  We believe 
that competition among private insurance plans, to 
attract informed, cost- and quality-conscious consum-
ers, is the only way to achieve sustainable, aﬀ ordable, 
quality health care for all Americans.  By reforming the 
ﬁ nancing system for health coverage, we can create the 
incentives that will drive insurers and providers to re-
form the health delivery system.  In sum, CED believes 
that the competition by which business lives every day, 
carefully channeled to reward only the delivery of qual-
ity care at aﬀ ordable prices, holds the best promise of 
meeting the health-care needs of every American.
Th is introduction will explain why the current health-
care system is plagued with high and rising costs and 
mediocre quality.  Th e second chapter will show why 
purported remedies, past and present, have not worked 
and will not work.  Th e third chapter will outline the 
improvements in care that would be possible with a 
market-driven system.  Th e fourth chapter will de-
scribe such an incentive-oriented system, and the ﬁ nal 
chapter will lay out a road map to get there.
Why Another CED Statement on Health 
Care?
Five years ago, the Committee for Economic Develop-
ment issued a policy statement entitled A New Vision 
for Health Care: A Leadership Role for Business.a  Th at 
a A detailed summary of that statement and an evaluation of subsequent developments are included in Appendix A.
10
statement presented major recommendations for large 
businesses, and for businesses in conjunction with 
government.  Th e statement decried “…the closely en-
tangled problems of escalating costs, uneven and poor 
quality, and inadequate access,” and stated that the 
“recommendations…, taken together, would address 
these problems and improve the system’s eﬃ  ciency and 
equity… Th is report is a call to action.  We challenge 
our own members, the business community at large, 
public policymakers, and other sectors of society to 
join us in taking the diﬃ  cult steps necessary to create 
an eﬃ  cient system that will provide access to high-
quality health care for all Americans.”1
Although we continue to believe that the recommen-
dations in that statement are sound, we see no signs 
of employer action.  Th e number of Americans with 
employer-sponsored health insurance, and the number 
of employers who oﬀ er health coverage, have continued 
to decline.b  Meanwhile, the retirement of the baby-
boom generation, with its demography-driven pres-
sure on the nation’s health-care system, has drawn ever 
closer.  A national poll has found that sixty percent of 
Americans believe that the federal government should 
guarantee health insurance to every American, and are 
willing to pay higher taxes and forgo future tax cuts to 
achieve universal coverage.2
Th e nation’s health-care problems are becoming criti-
cal.  Rising health costs strain both public and pri-
vate budgets, and make many American businesses 
less competitive.  Care needed by rich and poor alike 
is wanting.  We conclude that even more-aggressive 
public-policy action is needed.  Th e remainder of this 
chapter will explain why.
Is the U.S. Health-Care System Failing?
Performance Standards for a Nation’s 
Health-Care System
What are reasonable standards for the overall perfor-
mance of a health-care system?  Th e usual answer in 
health-policy circles is “cost, quality and access.”
“Cost” is the shorthand term for health-care expendi-
tures – that is, the amount a society spends on health 
care, measured either per capita or as a percentage of 
the gross domestic product (GDP).  It makes sense 
that an aﬄ  uent society, as it grows still more aﬄ  u-
ent, would choose to devote some (or even much) of 
its extra income toward its health.3  But beyond the 
question of whether growing expenditures buy im-
proved care, or rather are merely a rear-guard action 
against the ill eﬀ ects of unhealthy lifestyles, we must 
care about aﬀ ordability.  Do health insurance and 
health care remain within reach for families of moder-
ate means?  Can health-insurance premiums ﬁ t within 
aﬀ ordable total compensation of employees?  Finally, is 
the trajectory of health expenditures sustainable – that 
is, growing no faster than the GDP, or not much faster 
than aﬀ ordable total compensation of employees?  In 
these terms, cost as a percentage of the GDP measures 
a share of people’s earning power.
Th ose costs that do not impose on family budgets are 
paid by government.  More than 60 percent of na-
tional health expenditures (NHE) now passes through 
public-sector budgets (including the tax exclusions for 
employer-paid health beneﬁ ts, and insurance costs for 
public employees) and is therefore a drain on govern-
ment ﬁ nances, leading to higher deﬁ cits or taxes, and 
crowding out other vital public services.4  If health 
insurance is not aﬀ ordable to people with low incomes, 
is there room in public-sector budgets for subsidies to 
help those people purchase health insurance?
“Quality” has many meanings.  Americans like to 
think that we have the highest quality health care in 
the world.  Th at may be true in the sense of the most 
advanced medical technologies for well-insured people.  
But other concepts of quality have gained attention 
lately.  How likely are Americans to receive recom-
mended care – that is, those interventions that are 
well-supported by clinical evidence and are known to 
beneﬁ t patients?  How likely are patients with serious 
chronic conditions to get the care they need?  How 
likely are they to get appropriate care – that is, care of 
the kind and in just the amount that confers maximum 
beneﬁ t, but no more?  Inappropriate care is the medi-
cal term for what is often called “unnecessary care.”  
How many people are in the hospital unnecessarily, 
or for a condition that could have been prevented by 
less-costly and less-invasive outpatient care?  How 
many operations do people have that are not the best 
for their health?  Is American medical care safe?  How 
b A more detailed evaluation of the evidence is included later in this statement.
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often is the wrong limb amputated?  How likely are 
Americans to die or suﬀ er from hospital infections or 
errors in hospitals or in medications?  And ﬁ nally, is 
quality improving as a consequence of better-organized 
care, or is it suﬀ ering from increasing fragmentation of 
care delivery?
“Access” is shorthand for people’s ability to obtain ap-
propriate care, and it has a ﬁ nancial component and a 
delivery-system component.  Th e ﬁ nancial component 
generally refers to health insurance that makes care 
reasonably aﬀ ordable to people who need it, and whose 
provisions, like coinsurance and deductibles, do not 
deter people from obtaining care that is important for 
their health.  Th e delivery-system component refers to 
having geographic and transportation access to a facil-
ity and to professionals who will provide appropriate 
care, which can be a special problem in rural areas.
Financial access is usually evaluated in terms of the 
number of people who do not have health insurance – 
which is arguably the most important single criterion 
of success.  It is in everyone’s interest that everyone has 
health insurance.  Th e uninsured go without needed 
care.  What care they receive is often in emergency 
rooms, which is very costly and lacking the continu-
ity of care needed by the growing number of people 
with chronic conditions.  Some uninsured adults with 
chronic conditions who forgo proper care become 
disabled and end up on public programs.  Th e lack of 
health insurance causes ﬁ nancial hardship, loss of sav-
ings, and in the extreme, medical bankruptcies.5  Hos-
pitals bear ﬁ nancial burdens because they are required 
by law to treat uninsured persons in urgent need of 
care.  Th is burden is shifted to those who do have 
health insurance, thereby raising the cost of insurance.  
Determining eligibility for public programs, including 
credit and collection expense, leads to large admin-
istrative costs.  Finally, doctors and hospitals provide 
charity, or free, or “uncompensated” care, and they 
argue that they must be protected from competition 
because they are disadvantaged by this burden of un-
insured patients.  Without this burden, which would 
be lifted by universal coverage, unleashed competitive 
market forces could drive greater eﬃ  ciency without the 
unintended side eﬀ ect of further denying care to unin-
sured people.
Does the American Health-Care System Meet 
These Standards?
For all of this nation’s wealth and power, our health-
care system demonstrably fails to meet these basic 
criteria.
On the question of cost, NHE have been growing 
about 2.5 percentage points per year faster than GDP 
over the past 25 years.  NHE in 2006 were about 16.5 
percent of the GDP.6  If these rates continue, NHE 
will reach about 28 percent of GDP by 2030.  Th e 
price of an average family insurance policy, $11,500 
per year for a family of four in 2006, can be weighed 
against typical family earning power.7  Th e median 
family income in the United States in 2006 was less 
than $60,000.8  Th us, a family health-insurance pre-
mium in 2006 – not including other out-of-pocket 
health-care costs – is almost 20 percent of the earning 
power of the median family.  And in 2004, the govern-
ment share of health-care cost was about one-third of 
the total of federal, state, and local budgets.c  Once the 
baby-boom generation begins to retire, public health-
care costs (especially for Medicare) will grow even 
faster.  Th us, if health outlays are not unbearable to-
day, they soon will be.  Both public and private health-
insurance purchasers have been unable to constrain 
their shares of NHE to sustainable growth rates.  
When it comes to quality, the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) of the National Academy of Sciences reported 
that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die annu-
ally in hospitals from medical errors.9  A recent IOM 
report estimated that at least 1.5 million Americans 
are sickened, injured, or killed each year by errors in 
prescribing, dispensing, and taking medications.10  
Drug errors cause at least 400,000 preventable injuries 
and deaths in hospitals each year, more than 800,000 
in nursing homes and facilities for the elderly, and 
530,000 among Medicare recipients treated in outpa-
tient clinics.  A 2003 RAND study found that only 
about 55 percent of the care called for under generally 
accepted standards of medical practice was actually be-
ing delivered.11  Adopting technologies to improve this 
situation has been very slow.12  RAND studies also 
have documented considerable overuse of care.  Dart-
mouth studies have shown wide geographic variations 
c  Government health outlays (and the revenue cost of tax exclusions) at all levels were about 10 percent of GDP.  In 2004, all government receipts at 
the federal, state and local levels were about 30 percent of GDP.  
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in medical decisions such as the frequency of hospital-
izations and surgery per capita.d  Th us, strong evidence 
indicates that some people are getting too much (that 
is, unnecessary or unhelpful) care, and others too 
little.13  
Still, the failure of our health-care system in terms 
of access may be the most serious.  According to an 
August 2007 Census Bureau report, 47.0 million 
Americans lacked health insurance in 2006, up from 
38.7 million in 2000.14  Th e uninsured have worse 
health outcomes than similar people with insurance.15  
Th is situation is clearly contrary to our nation’s values.  
People should not suﬀ er and die for lack of ability to 
pay.e
America has numerous patchwork public programs 
to compensate for the lack of universal insurance 
coverage.f  It would be simpler – and a lot cheaper 
– to make sure everybody had at least ﬁ nancial ac-
cess to appropriate care.  As just one indication of the 
potential savings from broader coverage with sound 
primary care, the New York Times recently reported 
that a Texas hospital found that it could actually save 
money by providing free preventive outpatient care to 
diabetics, instead of more expensive emergency hospi-
talization which the hospital was obligated to provide 
without reimbursement.16
Is universal coverage a utopian, socialistic dream, or 
is it a practical, economically and morally compelling 
goal for our society?  Most other advanced democra-
cies have achieved it, and we could do so too – with a 
system built on our own history and consistent with 
our own values.
Why Is Employer-Based Health Insurance 
Declining?
Most insured Americans get their health coverage 
through employment, either theirs or a family mem-
ber’s.  But the number and percentage of Americans 
covered by employer-based health insurance (EBI) are 
declining.  Th e Employee Beneﬁ ts Research Institute 
(EBRI) found that the percent of all workers with 
EBI fell by 2.8 percentage points between 1987 and 
1999.17  Another survey showed a decline from 1999 
to 2004 of 3.5 percentage points.18  Linking the two 
series implies a decline of about 6.3 percentage points 
from 1987 to 2004.  Data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics suggest a greater decline for full-time work-
ers in the private sector – a decrease in coverage of 15 
percentage points from 1989-90 to 2003.19  From 2000 
to 2006, the absolute number of people covered by 
EBI fell from 179.4 million to 177.2 million.  And the 
covered percentage of the population under age 65, the 
percentage of workers in all ﬁ rms and their dependents 
who were covered by EBI, fell from 68.3 percent to 
62.9 percent.20  From 2000 to 2007, the percentage of 
ﬁ rms oﬀ ering health beneﬁ ts fell from 69 percent to 60 
percent, reﬂ ecting mainly small employers dropping 
EBI.21  Th e rapidly increasing cost of health insurance 
makes this trend likely to continue.  Falling EBI 
coverage shifts the costs of the health-care system onto 
those employers that do provide insurance, and onto 
government.
Health-insurance premiums are rising faster than 
the aﬀ ordable increases in total compensation, and 
therefore, faster than incomes.  Premiums in 2007 are 
estimated to be almost double those of 2000.22  Health 
insurance is pricing itself out of reach.  Of course, the 
real problem is not the insurance policies themselves 
but the underlying cost of health-care services.
The Causes of High and Rising National Health 
Expenditures
Rapid health expenditure growth is widespread.  
Th ough other advanced industrialized nations have 
lower levels of health-care spending as shares of their 
GDPs, their expenditures are rising over the long term 
at faster rates than their GDPs (though somewhat 
slower than in the United States).23  So health expen-
diture increases are a global phenomenon.  Within the 
United States, government health programs such as 
Medicare and the Federal Employees Health Beneﬁ ts 
Program (FEHBP) are aﬀ ected as much as employer-
based insurance.
d  Th ese studies adjust for diﬀ erences in the characteristics of the diﬀ erent populations.
e  Nor should others refuse to buy insurance they could aﬀ ord and then impose their health costs on other people, either by presenting themselves for 
free care, or by trying to sign up for insurance after they already are ill.
f  Th ese programs include the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), the law requiring hospitals to care for uninsured 
people; disproportionate share payments by the federal government to hospitals in areas that have above-average proportions of the uninsured; Med-
icaid; the State Children’s Health Insurance Program; Ryan White for AIDS; Maternal and Child Health; and so on.
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Th e following causes of rapid health-cost growth inter-
act with each other.
First, there is cost-unconscious demand.  In the United 
States, we have created a system in which most people 
– patients and providers alike – have little direct per-
sonal interest in making the most cost-eﬃ  cient health-
care choices, and often little opportunity to do so.
Health care-delivery in the United States is dominated 
by fragmented, uncoordinated, small-practice fee-for-
service medicine (FFS), under which patients have a 
wide choice of doctors, and insurers pay piece-by-piece 
for every service the patient receives.  Th is system is 
ﬁ lled with cost-increasing incentives, and rewards and 
encourages such ineﬃ  ciencies as wasteful duplication 
of tests.  It is poorly organized for overall economy and 
safety, systematic improvement, or even performance 
measurement.  It lacks incentives for cost-saving inno-
vations such as health information technology, which 
often are not in the economic interest of individual 
providers.24  FFS leaves insured patients cost-uncon-
scious, because they are not responsible for the cost 
of any extra service.  FFS even reduces the incomes of 
providers who innovate to reduce the need for services.  
Indeed, providing patients with more services, even if 
they have little or no medical value, results directly in 
greater incomes for providers.g  Unfortunately, FFS 
also sets the standard for economic performance in the 
non-FFS sector.  For example, Medicare payments to 
health-maintenance organizations (HMOs) are tied to 
FFS costs in the same geographic areas, and so prepaid 
group practices have been able to raise their prices in 
step with FFS-based insurance.h
Cost-unconsciousness is exacerbated by tax policy, in 
particular the exclusion of employer contributions for 
employee health care and insurance, without limit, 
from the taxable incomes of employees.  Depending 
on the tax rates of the diﬀ erent states, this tax break 
means that an extra $100 in health beneﬁ ts may cost 
many employees only $60 to $70 in after-tax income, 
or in extreme cases as little as about $50.i  Th is factor 
too biases choices in favor of more-costly health care.
Second, expenditures are increased by the extensive 
deployment of new medical technologies that benefit 
people’s lives, in some cases greatly.  People want them, 
their doctors want to provide them, and society does 
not want to deny them.  Consumption of these tech-
nologies has been increasing, often at double-digit 
rates.25  Examples include joint replacements and 
invasive cardiology procedures.  Th ere are costly new 
biologics that correct inherited enzyme deﬁ ciencies.  
Cerezyme, a biologic to treat Gaucher’s disease, now 
costs some $200,000 to $600,000 per patient per year 
depending on weight-related dosage.26  New drugs for 
some blood-clotting disorders can exceed $1 million 
per year, and some cancer drugs are also very costly.  
Cost-unconscious demand encourages the development 
and deployment of many costly new technologies.  Pro-
viders are often rewarded with prestige, patients and 
revenue for using them.  Conversely, under FFS, there 
is little demand for expenditure-reducing technologies.  
Technology developers know that patients and their 
doctors will not weigh costs and beneﬁ ts.  Indeed, the 
Medicare program is prohibited by law from consider-
ing costs in coverage decisions.  Doctors are essentially 
reimbursed for cost, and so save nothing for themselves 
or their patients by rejecting new and more expensive 
technologies.  Many of the new technologies have been 
evaluated and improve health outcomes.  Others go 
into widespread use without thorough evaluation and 
may not be more beneﬁ cial than existing, less-costly 
technologies, or may even be harmful on balance.27
American culture values advanced medical technol-
ogy and has great faith in it – witness, for example, the 
optimism surrounding the emerging ﬁ elds of stem cell 
research and genetic medicine.  A culture with such 
enthusiasm can regard cost reduction as unworthy.  
One young physician reported: “In training, we were 
taught that if you really care about cost, you are not a 
good doctor.”  Who wants to be, or to go to, the “low-
priced doctor?”
Th ird, there has been a large increase in the prevalence 
of chronic disease and our ability (and expenditures) 
to treat it.  Among adults aged 20 to 74 over the last 
g  A detailed analysis of the failings of the fee-for-service system is presented in Appendix B.
h  Th ough Medicare HMO pricing is now on a risk-adjusted basis.
i  Th ese hypothetical computations take into account the federal income tax (with rates as high as 35 percent), the federal payroll tax (with a rate of 
15.3 percent for the self-employed), and state income taxes.
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20 years, obesity has doubled; and diabetes, which is 
clinically linked to obesity, has increased by about half.  
Twenty medical conditions have accounted for 67 per-
cent of the growth in per-capita health insurance costs 
over the same period.28  Th is problem is exacerbated by 
a health-care system that is not oriented to early detec-
tion or to chronic disease management, but rather to 
the treatment of symptoms when they arise.  
Th e prevalence of chronic conditions and the cost of 
their treatment are of fundamental importance to the 
structure and focus of the health-care ﬁ nancing and 
delivery system.  Th e Johns Hopkins University center 
called Partnership for Solutions studies the prevalence 
and cost of chronic conditions and ﬁ nds that 133 mil-
lion Americans in 2005 had a chronic condition.29,j  
Th e number is growing faster than the population 
in general, because the population is aging, and also 
because medical advances have transformed formerly 
deadly diseases into costly chronic conditions, as in the 
case of HIV/AIDS.k
Th e most prevalent chronic conditions are hyper-
tension, arthritis, respiratory diseases, cholesterol 
disorders, chronic mental conditions, heart disease, 
eye disorders, asthma and diabetes, some cancers, 
congestive heart failure, and end-stage renal disease.  
In 2001, care given to people with chronic conditions 
accounted for 83 percent of total health-care spend-
ing, and 62 percent of all health-care spending was on 
behalf of people with two or more chronic conditions.l  
As the Johns Hopkins report concludes, “…the care 
provided in the current acute, episodic model is not 
cost-eﬀ ective and often leads to poor outcomes for 
patients with chronic conditions.”  Th is problem led 
the IOM to recommend “[c]are based on continuous 
healing relationships,” which is particularly diﬃ  cult to 
achieve when workers so frequently change jobs, and 
as a result, change or even lose health insurance and 
health caregivers.30
And fourth, most health-care delivery is local, and 
there are local insurer, hospital or system monopolies.  
Anti-trust policy at the local level is weak and unfo-
cused or does not exist at all.
EBI Costs Cause Major Problems for Employers.  
Employers have a powerful incentive to avoid grow-
ing EBI costs, while continuing to pay attractive cash 
wages.  Th ey do so by tightening restrictions on who is 
eligible for EBI, and by increasing required employee 
contributions so that low-paid workers do not choose 
to pay their share and participate.  Th us, only about 79 
percent of employees in ﬁ rms oﬀ ering EBI are actually 
eligible for coverage, and only about 82 percent of those 
eligible actually participate.31  Th ese policies may miti-
gate employer problems, but they cause serious human 
problems, and they do not help forestall the decline in 
EBI.  
Rising EBI costs confront employers with unpleasant 
choices.  When general inﬂ ation is high, employers can 
mask increased EBI costs with wage increases less than 
the inﬂ ation rate.  But when inﬂ ation is low, as it is now, 
employers must reduce either beneﬁ ts, for example by 
raising deductibles and shifting costs to employees, 
or cash pay – either of which (particularly the latter) 
evokes employee dissatisfaction.  Or, employers can 
simply close the plant or oﬃ  ce and obtain the services 
from lower-cost labor overseas.  Or, they can selectively 
outsource services overseas, or to low-cost employers in 
this country who do not provide health insurance.  
Employers are constrained by the insurance that is 
available; they must deal with the market as it exists.  In 
today’s health insurance market, there is little demand 
for economical care.  One or a small group of employers
cannot create competition and will not achieve the 
competitive health-care delivery system that would 
result if all employers acted together.  Th e great diver-
sity of interests, circumstances and views about health 
insurance among employers, however, has precluded 
j  Th ey deﬁ ne chronic conditions as those that “last a year or longer and limit what one can do and/or require ongoing medical care.”
k  Th e anti-retroviral therapy for HIV/AIDS costs roughly $18,000 per year in the United States.
l  Th is does not necessarily mean that that much of the care was for chronic conditions – only that it was for people having chronic conditions.
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collective action to create a market open to competition 
from eﬃ  cient delivery systems.32,m
Many employers use health insurance as a tool in the 
labor market to compete for employees, and oﬀ er or 
maintain more generous beneﬁ ts which make employ-
ees even more cost-unconscious.  A sustainable market 
system requires cost-conscious consumers.
Employer Responses to Date Have Not Solved the 
Problem.  Employers have tried to control their costs 
and to innovate in the delivery of insurance and health 
care generally to their employees.  Th e incentive to 
innovate can be strong, because individual U.S. ﬁ rms 
can become less competitive relative to each other, 
and producers of tradable goods and services can lose 
market share to foreign ﬁ rms.  Because merely shifting 
costs to employees is a clearly visible dead end, ﬁ rms of 
suﬃ  cient size have experimented with wellness pro-
grams, preventive care, and management of employees’ 
chronic conditions, backed up with ﬁ nancial incen-
tives, and with on-site exercise and basic-care facili-
ties.  Firms have tried bargaining with providers; using 
health records to promote “evidence-based medicine” to 
choose the best treatments; and creating “high-perfor-
mance networks” of physicians with strong records of 
cost-eﬃ  cient care.33  On the other side of the transac-
tion, retailers have created quick-access low-cost health 
facilities, and cut-priced strategies for dozens of basic 
prescription drugs.
All of these approaches are helpful.  However, it is 
not clear that any one, or even a carefully selected 
combination among them, would do more than achieve 
admittedly welcome one-time savings – because none 
would change in any fundamental way the practice of 
medicine, or the pursuit and arguably cost-ineﬃ  cient 
adoption of new and ever-more-expensive health-care 
technologies.
One approach toward changing insurance and health 
care more fundamentally, Consumer-Directed Health 
Plans (CDHPs) (sometimes called High-Deductible 
Health Plans (HDHPs)), involves some valuable ele-
ments, such as greater transparency in quality and 
prices, and greater consumer responsibility.n  However, 
CDHPs are not, over the long run, a complete answer 
to the cost problem.
Some ﬁ rms oﬀ er CDHPs as aﬀ ordable insurance 
for their lower-wage workers.  Th e CDHP premium 
can be lower because the cost of care below the high 
deductible is paid by the employee if and when care 
is needed.  In the short run, CDHPs are one way for 
hard-pressed ﬁ rms to shift the burden of EBI to 
employees, or “rebalance the compensation portfolio.”  
However, in the long run, such shifting will not miti-
gate the problem of expenditures growing faster than 
aﬀ ordable total compensation, because health-care 
expenditures are very concentrated on few people – the 
most-costly 10 percent use 70 percent of the resources 
– so most spending will be on people who already have 
exceeded their deductibles, or can reasonably expect 
to do so.  To those persons, the marginal cost of more 
care will be at or near zero.34
Th e high-deductible approach has other problems.  
Many people do not have much money in the bank, 
if they even have bank accounts.  Th ey may lack the 
funds to pay the deductible expenses, and so have 
an incentive to forgo necessary care, leading to more 
costly future medical needs.  Some HDHPs attempt 
m  In theory, large employers could try to go into the health-care management business and organize their own delivery systems, as did Kaiser Indus-
tries.  But today, that would be very diﬃ  cult.  Th e building of the Kaiser system was long and diﬃ  cult, at a time when health care was much cheaper 
than it is today.  Only the largest employers, or very cohesive coalitions, could consider such a process.  Generally, employer work forces in any one 
geographic area are small compared to the size (several hundred thousand members) that eﬃ  cient delivery systems need to achieve economies of scale. 
Few, if any, employers have enough employees in any given area to support one integrated delivery system, much less the two or three that would be 
needed to create competition.  Since Henry Kaiser, few employers have attempted this, and usually with poor results.  Organizing eﬃ  cient health-
care delivery is complex, and not part of the core competence of most employers.
      Alternatively, several employers could try to collaborate to create an eﬃ  cient health-care system of suﬃ  cient size.  Th e Minnesota Buyers’ Health 
Care Action Group (BHCAG), originally formed in 1991 by 14 large, self-insured employers in the Twin Cities, is a rare example.  In 1997, BHCAG 
oﬀ ered employees of participating employers a broad choice of “care systems” built around groups of primary-care physicians and aﬃ  liated specialists 
and hospitals.  Each “care system” set its own price for covering an employee of standard risk, and its own provider fees.  Th is was the best private-
sector implementation of the principles of rational economic incentives.  Its enrollment reached about 150,000 employees and dependents.  With 
changes of key personnel and of company ownership through acquisitions, it proved diﬃ  cult to sustain employer commitment, and attempts to ex-
port this model to other cities were not successful.  Some of the success in the Twin Cities could be ascribed to special features of that market, such as 
the presence of multi-specialty group practices and national ﬁ rms’ headquarters.
n  Th ese valuable elements are included in other ideas as well, including CED’s own 2002 statement.  We will discuss CDHP and HDHP in greater 
detail in the next chapter.
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to mitigate this by exempting preventive care ser-
vices from the deductible.  Th e long-run success of 
this strategy is uncertain.  Another tool to pay for 
large deductibles is the health savings account (HSA).  
However, persons with low incomes, facing low or zero 
marginal tax rates, have correspondingly low incentives 
and limited means to contribute to the accounts, and 
the employers of low-wage workers may not contribute.
In an alternative approach, some large employers have 
oﬀ ered employees a wide range of health-care delivery 
systems with responsible choices.  Th at is, employees 
save by choosing less-costly plans and are responsible 
for the additional cost of more-expensive plans.o  
However, such employers are usually not large enough 
in any area to change the whole delivery system.  And 
many employers that do oﬀ er choices also contribute 
some high percentage (often 80 or 100 percent) of the 
premium of any plan of the employee’s choice.  Th ough 
apparently generous, these contributions subsidize 
the ineﬃ  cient systems and bias choices toward more 
costly plans.  Many of these employers are constrained 
by collective bargaining agreements and union 
demands that the employer pay the whole premium, as 
illustrated by the Detroit car companies.  Ironically, it 
is not unheard of for employees who are confused by 
alternative complex insurance agreements, and who 
will pay little or nothing whichever they choose, to 
pick the most expensive, on the assumption that the 
costliest must be the best.
To illustrate the eﬀ ect on the insurance market, 
consider a health plan that is competing in a group 
where the employer pays 80 percent of the premium.  
Th e health plan management asks:  “Should we make 
the eﬀ ort to cut costs and premiums by $1.00 to attract 
more customers?”  Th e answer is:  “Probably not; the 
customers considering choosing us will get to keep only 
20 cents before taxes, and maybe only 12 to 14 cents 
after taxes.  It would be better to spend the dollar on 
other things that would attract customers more.”  Th us, 
there is a strong incentive to increase, not decrease, 
costs.  Markets cannot discipline prices when consum-
ers will pay any price (a condition that economists call 
“price-inelastic demand”).
Buyers Cannot Hold Th eir Health Expenditure to 
Sustainable Growth Rates.  Th e biggest problem with 
EBI is that employers, acting individually, collectively, 
or in concert with government, in more than 50 years 
of trying, have been unable to conceive and execute any 
strategy to achieve sustainable expenditure growth.
Employers have been unable to create market com-
petition so that more-eﬃ  cient delivery systems can 
compete and take market share from the dominant 
fragmented, uncoordinated FFS small-practice model.  
Remarkably, alternative delivery systems cannot market 
superior eﬃ  ciency through lower premiums; there is 
practically no market in which eﬃ  cient systems com-
pete to serve premium-price-sensitive consumers.  
As one example of this market failure, a highly 
regarded RAND study found that Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget Sound, a leading prepaid group 
practice, delivered high-quality care for 28 percent 
fewer resources than did the local FFS sector.35  Yet, 
neither Group Health nor similar providers have 
been very successful in that market.  Group Health 
Cooperative could not use its eﬃ  ciency advantage 
to expand market share, and therefore force other 
providers to improve their eﬃ  ciency.  Instead, employer 
policies forced Group Health to become more like the 
ineﬃ  cient providers.  Employers preferred a network of 
FFS solo-practice doctors to provide “full replacement” 
coverage – that is, one plan serving a whole employ-
ment group.  In this way, employer policies actually 
destroyed value by forcing an eﬃ  cient delivery system 
to revert to a less-eﬃ  cient delivery model.
It is most unusual to see a “market” in which producers 
oﬀ ering more value for money cannot translate this 
advantage into a large and growing market share.  Upon 
reﬂ ection, however, it should be clear why greater 
eﬃ  ciency has not been rewarded in the health-care 
marketplace.  
To create a market in which the eﬃ  cient providers 
can drive the others to achieve greater eﬃ  ciency, the 
great majority of employers would have to oﬀ er their 
employees responsible choices of delivery systems and 
aﬃ  liated health-insurance plans, such that employees 
who chose lower-priced, more-eﬃ  cient plans could 
o  We discuss this important incentive in more detail in our own proposal in chapter four.
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keep the resulting savings.  Fixed-dollar employer 
contributions would allow eﬃ  cient insurance plans to 
pass their eﬃ  ciencies on to customers through lower 
premiums.  Employers should oﬀ er plans that select 
providers based on quality and eﬃ  ciency, as well as 
plans that include virtually all physicians.  
However, most employers do not oﬀ er such choices.  
And one employer changing to this model would not 
get the beneﬁ t of a fully competitive health-care system 
so long as most other employers did not do the same.
Instead, the prevailing practice is that a health insurer 
will ask, or demand, that an employer give that insurer 
100 percent of its business.  Insurers dislike “slice busi-
ness,” where they must compete for some employees 
within a small group, because of an understandable 
concern over high administrative costs per insured 
worker, and the instability that can be caused by 
“adverse selection,” when one competing carrier winds 
up with all of the sick employees in the small pool.  
Employers, in turn, appreciate the administrative 
simplicity and savings that come from dealing with 
only one insurance carrier.p  However, those employers 
are caught on the other side of the transaction by 
employees who want to be able to choose their own 
doctors, rather than being dictated to by their employer 
or insurer.  Th ese demands of a single insurer and 
employees who want to choose their own doctors leave 
the employer with no options.  Th e one type of plan 
that can satisfy both the insurer and the employees 
is a wide-access fee-for-service plan.  Multiplied over 
thousands of employers, this conundrum dictates that 
fee-for-service medicine dominates the delivery of 
health care.
In such an environment, devoid of competition, the 
dominant FFS system contains incentives for over-use, 
under-use and misuse of medical technology.36,q  Other 
than revenues, there is no market-driven measure of a 
provider’s performance, and so there is no monitoring 
and no incentive for quality improvement.  FFS pays 
for the volume of services, not for quality, not for actu-
ally curing the patient promptly.  It actually pays more 
to providers – hospitals as well as physicians – who 
cause complications or are slow to make a diagnosis, 
because they provide more “services” along the way.  
Th e employer, the decision-making purchaser of the 
insurance, is not a cost-conscious consumer, but rather 
a middleman trapped between the demands of insurers 
and employees.r
To provide some measure of “choice,” some ﬁ rms give 
all their business to one insurance carrier, but the 
carrier oﬀ ers two or three “plan designs” (for example, 
a Preferred-Provider Organization or “PPO”, and an 
HMO, or an HDHP).  However, most often, all of 
these plans market the services of the same unaﬃ  li-
ated FFS doctors.  Th is choice of “plan designs” is not 
competition either among carriers or delivery systems 
and does not increase the eﬃ  ciency of uncontrolled 
FFS.  For example, such “carrier HMOs” stand in the 
diﬃ  cult position between patients who want to receive 
more services, and FFS doctors who want to perform 
more services, trying to impose restraint.  Carrier 
HMO costs simply rise with industry costs.
Th e absence of meaningful choices of health plans 
extends across ﬁ rms of all sizes.  Small businesses 
can be locked out of insurance altogether because of a 
pre-existing health risk, or because of high prices, or 
because of the high per-worker cost of plan administra-
tion; and small-employer work forces are not large 
enough to be attractive risk pools for insurers.  Only 
42 percent of workers in ﬁ rms with 3 to 24 employees, 
and only 51 percent in ﬁ rms with 25 to 49 employees, 
are covered by their employer’s health beneﬁ ts.37  
Medium-sized ﬁ rms, and small businesses that do 
manage to oﬀ er coverage, are usually constrained to the 
p  Th e tendency of insurers to demand and receive 100 percent of each employer’s business has a perverse side eﬀ ect, in that it makes it more diﬃ  cult 
for new insurers and providers to enter the business and enhance competition.  A potential new entrant runs the risk of failing to win any one of the 
small number of large employer contracts, and thus never getting oﬀ  the ground.  In contrast, if individuals chose their own insurers and providers, it 
would be more likely that a new ﬁ rm could attract enough business to have a chance at success.
q  See Appendix B for a detailed background and analysis of FFS.
r  Traditional FFS has largely been replaced by wide-access “preferred-provider organizations” (PPOs).  PPOs are nearly all-inclusive networks of 
FFS providers who do not set their own fees, but rather accept the network’s negotiated fees as payment in full.  But the PPO is a change more in 
form than substance; PPOs do not increase the eﬃ  ciency of the delivery system or hold down prices.  Usually, employers oﬀ er a single PPO so that 
every employee can choose any doctor.  Because providers know that these networks must include them to give customers their choice of doctors, the 
networks are not in a position to drive hard bargains; they cannot exclude many providers.  Th e premium of a PPO reﬂ ects the eﬃ  ciency of all the 
participating providers in the community, not just the eﬃ  cient ones.
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services of one insurance carrier because of insurers’ 
aversion to “slice business,” described above.  Even large 
ﬁ rms sometimes oﬀ er employees only one plan, or one 
carrier (including arrangements under self-insurance), 
often because of past collective bargaining agreements.  
And even large ﬁ rms that do oﬀ er distinct choices, as 
noted earlier, sometimes cover a high ﬁ xed percentage 
– 80 percent, or even 100 percent – of the premium 
of whatever plan the employee chooses, again often 
driven by collective bargaining.
In sum, most employers oﬀ er a single insurance carrier, 
because insurers give them incentives or even require 
them to do so – through minimum participation 
requirements or oﬀ ers of better prices if they can cover 
the entire group.s  Employers with a single carrier are 
often constrained to oﬀ er a single wide-access FFS 
plan.  As a result, there is no reward to insurers to 
provide good coverage at low prices – and little or no 
consumer pressure for them to do so.  With limited 
incentives for better performance, it is not surprising 
that the health-care sector has seen rising prices with 
little or no improvement in health outcomes.  Further-
more, and fundamentally, it is really employers who 
choose the health plans for their employees.  With all 
of the good will in the world, there is no reason why 
employers, rather than the employees themselves, 
should be choosing health-care coverage.   If employees 
had choices, and if they could reap the savings of a 
choice of a less-expensive plan, it is likely that insurers 
and health-care providers would try to ﬁ nd more-
eﬃ  cient ways of providing better health-care results, 
and the kinds of coverage that employees – rather than 
their employers – want.
Employers like the state of Wisconsin, the University 
of California, Wells Fargo and Hewlett-Packard, 
which oﬀ er their employees fully cost-conscious choices 
among delivery systems, often ﬁ nd that 75 to 80 
percent choose among the least-expensive plans which, 
in these cases, are group-practice-based HMOs.  With 
a price-sensitive choice, many people choose a delivery 
model other than FFS – unlike most other employer 
arrangements in which employees have no choice of 
carrier or little or no incentive to choose a lower-priced 
plan.  Th e federal government’s experience as an 
employer is similar.t  Under the FEHBP, which gives 
employees multiple choices of health plans and also a 
semi-ﬁ xed-dollar contribution, delivery systems other 
than FFS often do well in their localities.u
Conclusion
Th us, the current employer-based health-insurance 
system is devoid of competition and incentives to 
improve eﬃ  ciency.  It is not surprising that costs have 
risen faster than quality, and it is not likely that this 
outcome will change on its own.
Since World War II, the United States has experi-
enced pressure for health-care reform every ten to 
ﬁ fteen years.  Th e current episode, however, may be 
the most serious.  More Americans now recognize that 
their health-care coverage is fragile – that the loss of a 
job, or the terms of a ﬁ rst job, or the onset of an illness 
s  Employers often evaluate insurance carriers on their administrative costs and proﬁ ts, or “retentions,” apparently not realizing that some administra-
tive investments, such as in provider proﬁ ling and incentives, practice guidelines and information technology, can yield cost savings in the long run.
t  Th e federal government also purchases health care for the elderly, and for current and former military personnel.  In contrast, to the FEHBP ex-
perience, FFS predominates in Medicare, with no politically acceptable way to subject FFS to eﬀ ective competition from more eﬃ  cient alternatives.  
Th e Veterans Administration Health System (VAH) and DOD TriCare have operated their own integrated delivery systems for some time – and 
there has been great innovation, especially in the Veterans Administration, in such areas as chronic disease management and adoption of electronic 
health records.  In the latter case, the VAH clearly leads the private sector. 
u  Th ere is an important deﬁ ciency and inﬂ ationary bias in the structure of the FEHBP.  Th e government, as employer, contributes an amount set at 
70 percent of the average price of the largest plans in the system.  If a plan were to come in with a premium below the contribution level, the employee 
would get to keep 25 percent of the diﬀ erence while the government would keep 75 percent.  After tax, the employee would keep less, perhaps as little 
as 15 percent.  So there is not much incentive for a plan to oﬀ er prices below the average and attempt to attract more customers.  Also, there is an 
artifact in the pricing scheme that works to the disadvantage of HMOs in the FEHBP.  Th e program contains several nationwide fee-for-service plans 
whose premiums reﬂ ect costs averaged over the whole nation, including many low-cost areas.  HMOs, on the other hand, are local entities, and those 
in high cost metropolitan areas must bear the costs associated with doing business in those areas.  HMOs tend to be in metropolitan areas.  Th e pro-
gram would do a better job of promoting competition if it used regional pricing.
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can lead to loss of coverage and ﬁ nancial ruin, if not the 
lack of necessary care.
Why has this happened?  Under our current health-
care delivery system, dominated by FFS solo-practice 
medicine, costs are growing unsustainably, and quality 
and access are unacceptable.  We pay more of our 
GDP for health care than any other country around 
the world, but our nation’s health outcomes are far 
below average.  Certainly, something must change.  
Arguably, continuing the FFS model, largely sheltered 
from competition and therefore lacking innovation 
in organization and process, has contributed to cost 
increases without improving access or most dimensions 
of quality.
Many Americans hope to continue to receive health 
care through the traditional health-care delivery 
model.  Although technological innovation might 
make that possible, the unaltered status quo is not an 
option.  Ignoring the mounting costs will result in the 
loss of access – and hence severe harm – to an unfortu-
nate segment of our population that is already too large 
and growing rapidly.
In virtually every other sector of the U.S. economy, 
competition has led to great and unpredictable change, 
but in the end to greater value for the consumer.  
More-eﬀ ective competition in the health-care sector 
could only be expected to do the same.  Although we 
cannot predict precisely what new health-care delivery 
models might emerge – perhaps even a revitalized FFS 
model – we can predict that consumers, empowered 
with choices and information about both cost and 
quality, will drive the health-care sector toward better 
outcomes – and perhaps avoid the three-way collision 
of cost, access and quality that now appears imminent.
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Over at least the last 35 years, there has been a slowly 
building realization that our health-care system is not 
sustainable.  Costs are growing so rapidly that at some 
not-far-oﬀ  date, our economy will no longer be able 
to bear them.  Even those who are satisﬁ ed with their 
current health-insurance arrangements have become 
less secure for the future.  Even those who are most 
conﬁ dent that their own health insurance is secure 
must see that more and more people have no cover-
age, to the detriment of our entire society.  And even 
hardworking practitioners must see that the current 
system eventually must change.
Public policymakers and private actors have tried to 
respond, but today’s health-care system provides no 
incentive to individual doctors and patients to pursue 
cost-eﬃ  cient medicine.  Accordingly, America has a 
discouraging history of patching the fundamentally 
ﬂ awed system with simplistic, partial “solutions” – 
veritable “Band-Aids” – each of which was supposed 
to solve, or signiﬁ cantly mitigate, our uncontrolled 
health-expenditure growth.  Some of these approaches 
contained germs of good ideas, and some of them could 
contribute to a rational comprehensive solution; but 
none of them came close to addressing our fundamen-
tal structural problems.
Th e basic problem has been and remains that the 
whole health-care ﬁ nancing system rests on inﬂ ation-
ary foundations.  Th e incentives and the organization 
of health care work against aﬀ ordable care in both the 
public and private sectors.  In the private-employment 
sector, most employees have been locked into fee-for-
service (formerly indemnity insurance, now PPOs) 
without a choice.  Medicare, also, is predominantly 
fee-for-service.  As explained in Chapter One and 
Appendix B, FFS rewards the delivery of more services, 
regardless of quality or eﬃ  cacy.  Few employers oﬀ er 
employees choices among delivery systems, and if they 
do oﬀ er a choice, they often systematically pay more 
on behalf of the more costly plans (often fee-for-service 
plans) than on behalf of the less costly plans (usually 
integrated-delivery systems).  Both of these employer 
practices deny employees the opportunity to save 
money and pay lower premiums by choosing less-costly 
health-care systems.
Furthermore, our traditional health-care system is 
oriented toward acute episodes, where people go to the 
doctor when symptoms arise, and pay for the services 
delivered at that time, with little emphasis on follow-
up and continuing care.  But health expenditures are 
now dominated by the care of people with chronic con-
ditions, and this traditional system does not provide 
the incentives or the ﬁ nancial foundation to build an 
infrastructure for chronic disease prevention and man-
agement.  Th is failing is exacerbated as people change 
jobs with increasing frequency, and then ﬁ nd that they 
must change both health insurers and providers.
Th ere was and is little understanding of the basic 
problems of incentives and organization.  Indeed, in 
the 1970s, most people thought that ﬁ nancial incen-
tives and organization were irrelevant to health care.  
Legislatures and citizens were reluctant to address 
the fundamental problems and eager to ﬁ nd painless 
incremental solutions – veritable “Band-Aids.”  Here is 
a list of some of them, in roughly chronological order:
Waste, fraud and abuse (WFA) was the perceived 
villain in 1972.  Hence, the solution would be more 
lawyers, inspectors, and penalties for fraud.  WFA is 
still present on a large scale more than 30 years later.  
It received honorable mention in the Medicare Pre-
scription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act 
of 2003.  Th e very structure of the traditional model 
invites it.  Harvard’s Malcolm Sparrow characterized 
fee-for-service as “a license to steal.”38  Action against 
WFA had some successes, but rapid health-care cost 
growth continued.  If the root problem of our health-
care system truly were outright fraud and abuse, it 
would be relatively easy to solve, because it would 
require only the identiﬁ cation and apprehension of 
a comparative few practitioners whose motives were 
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outright greed.  Unfortunately, the problem is far more 
complex, involving well-intended behavior within a 
system that provides every incentive for over-utilization 
and no incentive for cost-consciousness.
Th en the problem was identiﬁ ed as excess capacity, so 
the new “big thing” became Certiﬁ cate of Need (CON) 
laws and “health systems agencies” to prevent building 
unnecessary capacity.  Th ese measures failed because 
there was no incentive to match capacity to need.  
Regulators could not stop building in the teeth of eco-
nomic incentives to do more with the facilities that al-
ready existed.  If a doctor and a patient believed that a 
marginal test or procedure might provide some beneﬁ t, 
however small, and the facilities to provide that test or 
procedure were available, the facilities would be used – 
therefore demonstrating the “need” for those facilities, 
and the “need” to build more.  Studies showed CON 
had no eﬀ ect on overall spending.39
Th en President Richard Nixon imposed price controls.  
But experience showed that the doctors made up the 
lost income by increasing volume.  Th e system implod-
ed in complexity over the requirement that regulators 
use due process and just compensation.  “Just compen-
sation” becomes a fair rate of return, which becomes 
cost reimbursement, and providers have the ultimate 
power to increase costs by providing more services.  
President Carter wanted price controls on hospitals 
but could not get them enacted.  Th e hospital asso-
ciations and the medical associations opposed them 
vigorously.  One of their proposed alternative weapons 
against cost growth was “the voluntary eﬀ ort” (“the 
VE”).  Providers of health care would solve the prob-
lem by voluntary action.  Th e voluntary eﬀ ort had no 
lasting eﬀ ect.  
Th en the problem was identiﬁ ed as excess utilization 
of services, and the answer became Utilization Review 
and Professional Standards Review Organizations 
(PSROs).  PSROs were local non-proﬁ t physician 
cooperatives that were supposed to detect overuse and 
admonish overusers.  Th ey failed, because there was no 
incentive for local doctor groups to curtail local spend-
ing when so much of the money came from elsewhere.  
A dollar saved in Des Moines was a dollar returned 
to Washington.40  Why would anyone in Des Moines 
want to do that?  Moreover, and probably more impor-
tantly, meaningful standards of appropriate utilization, 
based on medical evidence and persuasive to doctors, 
simply did not exist.
Th en the Congress created Peer Review Organizations 
– contract police forces to challenge over-utilization.  
Th ey failed, partly for the same reasons as PSROs: it is 
hard to second-guess the doctor’s care for the patient, 
especially after the fact, and especially if one is not a 
doctor caring for similar patients.  Cost-eﬃ  cient medi-
cine requires a system that involves the doctor prospec-
tively – not merely a set of rules, or worse still a single 
reviewer, imposed upon him or her after the fact.  
Th en came what could have been a signiﬁ cant part of a 
genuine solution, the Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion Act of 1973.  Importantly, it sought reﬁ nement of 
delivery systems, and competition among alternative 
systems, to achieve greater cost-eﬃ  ciency.  At the time, 
the leading alternative modes of organization were 
group practice HMOs and individual practice HMOs.  
In those days, “HMO” referred to a delivery system, 
not just to an insurance contract.  Competition from 
HMOs helped, but it failed to achieve its potential be-
cause employers and government failed to create wide-
spread cost-conscious individual consumer choice so 
that there would be a market for cost-eﬀ ective care.  In-
stead, the vast majority of individual health-care con-
sumers either did not have a choice of a more-eﬃ  cient, 
less-expensive health-insurance plan, or, if they had 
the choice, would not keep the savings from choosing 
the more-eﬃ  cient system.  Many employers fulﬁ lled 
the HMO Act’s legal requirement not to discriminate 
against HMOs by paying the same 80 to 100 percent 
of the premium of the plan of the employee’s choice, 
whether it was fee-for-service or HMO.  Th is deprived 
HMOs of the opportunity to market cost-eﬀ ective-
ness, because the employee who chose a lower-priced 
HMO would save either nothing (if the employer paid 
100 percent of any premium) or only 20 percent (if the 
employer paid 80 percent) of the diﬀ erence.  Policy-
makers simply assumed that there would be a market 
for economical health care without carefully examining 
employer practices.  Th e HMO Act should have been 
accompanied by more-fundamental and far-reaching 
reform of the EBI system, but there was not the vision 
or the felt need at that time.
Th e Prospective Payment System (PPS) for Medicare 
payments to hospitals was a logical and signiﬁ cant 
step toward a more-economical health-care system: it 
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improved incentives for hospitals by requiring them 
to accept responsibility for managing at least a signiﬁ -
cant part of the cost of care.  Under PPS, hospitals are 
paid a pre-determined fee for each Medicare admis-
sion, based on the diagnosis.  Th us hospitals would not 
increase their income by providing marginal services, 
and would save money by increasing eﬃ  ciency.41  It was 
a big success for a time after its introduction in 1983.  
However, it is limited to inpatient care, and much care 
escapes the limits on inpatient services.  It does not 
include physician inpatient services (which the Neth-
erlands has included in its version of PPS for some 
years).  Also, it does not reward the prevention of inap-
propriate care, or of the need for hospitalization in the 
ﬁ rst place.  Th e latter point is especially important.  As 
was documented in Chapter One, chronic conditions 
are perhaps the key driver of health-care costs, and this 
is particularly true of Medicare.  In 1987, 31.0 percent 
of beneﬁ ciaries were treated for ﬁ ve or more chronic 
conditions; in 2002, it was 50.2 percent.  Chronic ill-
ness is responsible for virtually all Medicare spending 
growth.  In 1987, beneﬁ ciaries with ﬁ ve or more chron-
ic conditions accounted for 52.2 percent of all Medi-
care spending; in 2002, it was 76.3 percent.42  Persons 
with, or at risk of acquiring, several important chronic 
conditions need far-more-coordinated treatment and 
counseling than is provided by the traditional medical 
model, under which the patient chooses to see the doc-
tor only when symptoms arise.43  Although PPS was 
successful on its own terms, the unsustainable growth 
of Medicare is very much still with us.
In the early 1980s, “competition” became the “magic 
bullet,” but government and employers did not change 
the market to make consumers cost-conscious, and so 
competition did not happen.  President Reagan advo-
cated “free markets” and dismantled ineﬀ ective regula-
tion, but he did not act to create a functioning market 
of competing delivery systems.  His administration 
even let expire the provision in the HMO Act that 
required employers to oﬀ er choices of HMOs, which 
had at least encouraged some competition among 
diﬀ erent modes of organizing care.  And the Reagan 
administration rejected strong recommendations to 
cap the exclusion of employer contributions for health 
insurance from employee taxable income.  “Competi-
tion” was assumed to be whatever happened in the 
health-care market, however ﬂ awed that market might 
be.
Th en Congress adopted the resource-based relative 
value scale governing Medicare fees for doctors, in a 
sense expanding PPS from the hospital segment of the 
program.  Like PPS, this was a good idea with limited 
reach.  Its goal was a rational basis for Medicare fees, to 
take excess proﬁ t out of some services, especially proce-
dures, and to assure adequate payment for evaluation 
and management services.  But Medicare is still fee-for-
service, and doctors increase volume to protect them-
selves from loss of income when fees are cut.  In fact, 
Medicare has an oﬃ  ce whose mission is to estimate the 
volume response to fee cuts.  In any case, government 
simply cannot set all of the hundreds, or even thou-
sands, of prices at eﬃ  cient levels.  In addition, govern-
ment control makes such prices political prizes.44
In the 1990s, many had great hopes for “managed 
care,” which promised to improve the mode of organi-
zation of medical care.  However, what transpired was 
mostly insurance companies marketing the services of 
solo-practice fee-for-service doctors in “carrier HMOs,” 
under a comprehensive-care contract characteristic of 
HMOs, without reorganizing the fragmented, uncoor-
dinated delivery system.a  As under traditional fee-for-
service medicine, the doctors wanted to do everything 
they could for their patients, and the patients wanted 
anything that might help them; so the insurance com-
panies found themselves in the uncomfortable position 
of standing between wanting patients and willing doc-
tors.  A backlash followed because employers forced 
many people into “managed care” without a choice and 
without visible sharing of the savings, and without 
much explanation of what was happening or why.  
Understandably, people want to choose their doc-
tors.  Th ey do not believe their employers should make 
that choice for them.  Delivery systems that seek to 
a  Some of the “carrier HMOs” were mostly about restraint, not about reorganizing care, though some, like Prudential, actually built delivery systems 
of group practices, and others like Health Net, Paciﬁ Care, and Blue Shield and Blue Cross of California contracted on a per capita prepayment basis 
with existing multi-specialty group practices that were willing to accept responsibility to manage care and costs.
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increase eﬃ  ciency typically select doctors.  So people 
must have a choice among delivery systems that limit 
the choices of providers, or a choice of whether to be in 
such plans at all.  Research has shown that the dissat-
isfaction with managed care was concentrated among 
people who were assigned to it without a choice.45  To 
assign people to HMOs without a choice is to invite 
a backlash or to force HMOs to have very wide all-
inclusive networks.  Doing the latter reduces managed 
care to FFS in states with “any-willing-provider” laws.  
Managed care was not allowed to “interfere” with the 
way medicine was practiced, and it was not allowed to 
select providers.  If managed care is forced to mimic 
FFS, it cannot innovate and develop systems diﬀ erent 
from FFS, and there is no reason to expect that it can 
sustain any signiﬁ cant cost reduction.  
Why One Popular Idea – the Consumer-
Directed Health Plan – Will Not Work
President Bush and some in the Congress have favored 
High-Deductible Health Plans (HDHPs), also known 
as Consumer-Directed Health Plans (CDHPs).  Th is 
approach is sometimes billed as close to a complete 
answer for the problems of the nation’s health-care sys-
tem, and some ﬁ rms have introduced plans along these 
lines.  Will these plans help to close the gap between 
NHE growth and GDP growth?
Firms have acted well to use the CDHP model to ob-
tain coverage for their employees who otherwise would 
have none.  CDHP coverage clearly has value.  How-
ever, we are skeptical that CDHP will stop the deterio-
ration of employer-based insurance and the unsustain-
able growth of health-care costs.
Fundamentally, CDHP is not one variation on exist-
ing mainstream health insurance, but a combination of 
two.  It is helpful to analyze those two parts separately, 
and then to consider the implications of putting them 
together.
Consumer Direction.  Many experts have argued for 
some time that consumers must accept more responsi-
bility for their health, including both managing their 
habits (diet, smoking, alcohol, exercise) and choosing 
their providers and treatments.  Consumer-directed 
health plans generally assume an increased measure of 
such responsibility relative to conventional insurance.  
Th e assumed increased consumer involvement in medi-
cal-care choices is probably the more critical element.
To some degree, this assumption is probably based on 
the computer revolution.  CDHP anticipates that, as 
in other phases of life, consumers will use the Internet 
and other information resources to make more-cost-
eﬃ  cient health-care choices: shopping for the cheapest 
provider, learning about the implications of alterna-
tive treatments and therapies, and so on.  CDHP calls 
for providers to release comprehensive information on 
their quality and prices, which would be incontrovert-
ibly desirable, but would require a major change from 
current practice.  Th e availability of computer-based 
health records would facilitate consumer responsibility. 
First recommended in the Institute of Medicine report, 
“Crossing the Quality Chasm,” this advance gives the 
consumer access to and control over his or her entire 
life-long medical record.  Such records generally do not 
now exist.  Th e coming evolution of consumer choice 
of treatments and therapies, and the opportunities sur-
rounding personal computerized health records, are 
both uncertain.
Th is kind of information could be used to plan health 
care under any kind of insurance policy.  Would it 
work to control costs in a CDHP?  Consider the other 
element in this model.
High-Deductible Health Insurance.  CDHPs require 
the insured to pay the ﬁ rst dollars (usually $1,000 to 
$2,500) of health-care expense (that is, the “deduct-
ible”) before the insurer begins to pay the bills.  Some 
CDHPs are associated with health savings accounts 
(HSAs), a new tax break in the Medicare Moderniza-
tion Act of 2003 intended to encourage the choice of 
high deductibles by equalizing the tax treatment of 
out-of-pocket spending and spending through tax-
favored insurance.  In some instances, the employer 
makes deposits into the HSA for the employee, either 
independently or as a match; in other instances, the 
employee alone is responsible for funding the HSA.  
Employer contributions to HSAs are tax-free, and 
employee contributions are tax-deductible, even if the 
employee does not itemize other deductions.b  Th e 
limit on tax-sheltered savings is the deductible in the 
health-insurance plan, up to $5,650 (for families) 
b  Th at is, employee contributions are excluded from adjusted gross income (AGI) independent of the decision to itemize deductions.
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in 2007.  Th e balance in an HSA can be withdrawn 
without tax to pay for care up to the high deductibles 
associated with the CDHP insurance policy.  Unspent 
balances in HSAs can be rolled over from year to year 
without tax.c
Th e rationale for CDHPs is that the incentive of the 
high deductible will induce the consumer to economize 
on health care; after all, it is the consumer’s money.  
Having an HSA is expected to mitigate any cost 
problems in meeting the deductible for consumers of 
modest means.  In addition, many CDHPs waive the 
deductible for preventive care, which is supposed to en-
courage consumers to keep close tabs on their health.  
Th us, putting the two elements together, the result is 
somewhat analogous to the shift from a deﬁ ned-beneﬁ t 
pension plan to a deﬁ ned-contribution plan.  Under 
conventional health insurance, individuals undertake 
less risk (and can choose to have less responsibility for 
their treatment choices), and pay higher premiums 
so that others take on those responsibilities.  Under 
CDHP, individuals are at risk for the deductible, and 
might be expected to be more involved in treatment 
choices for that reason, while paying a lower pre-
mium in exchange for taking on those responsibilities 
themselves.
In other words, consumers would be expected to en-
gage in preventive care; and then, when illness or injury 
strikes, to use the latest information technology to 
ﬁ nd the most economical and eﬃ  cient therapies and 
treatments, to minimize spending under the CDHP 
deductible, and to protect the balance in the HSA.  In 
this way, it is claimed, total health-care costs would be 
brought under control.
Is this outcome likely?  Th ere are several reasons to 
be skeptical.  First, it is unlikely that health-insurance 
deductibles in the realistic $1,000 to $2,500 per-year 
range (any higher amount would likely force many 
families without employer contributions to HSAs 
and with modest incomes and health problems to go 
without care) would provide any meaningful incentive 
to reduce total health-care costs.  It certainly would 
be desirable for people to know the quality of medical 
services and what they cost, and to have some personal 
reason to care, as they would to the degree that they 
had to shop and pay for the ﬁ rst $1,000 to $2,500 of 
annual expenditure.  However, health expenditures are 
very concentrated on relatively few people.46  In 2002, 
as noted in the previous chapter, 80 percent of health 
expenses were incurred by people with costs exceeding 
$3,219.  Th us, in any given year, well over 80 percent 
of health expenditure dollars will be spent on people 
who have exceeded any reasonable level of deductibles 
or can safely expect to do so.  Recalling that 83 percent 
of health expenditures are on people with one or more 
chronic conditions, many people with chronic condi-
tions will expect to reach their deductibles.  Certainly, 
anyone who has been an inpatient in a hospital, or is 
likely to enter a hospital, will have reason to believe 
that he or she will exceed any insurance deductible.47  
For those who expect they will exceed their annual 
deductibles, the marginal cost of more care will be 
small, probably zero – depending on whether their 
plans involve co-payments (which are usually relatively 
small percentages – if not zero – for spending above 
their deductibles).  In any event, the marginal cost will 
certainly not be enough to aﬀ ect their decisions once 
they are hospitalized.  Th e RAND experiment to test 
the eﬀ ects of coinsurance found that once people were 
hospitalized, coinsurance had no eﬀ ect on spending.48
Second, once CDHP enrollees have reached their 
deductibles, they will in eﬀ ect be in fee-for-service 
medicine – to be precise, usually in wide-access PPOs, 
which are fragmented, uncoordinated FFS arrange-
ments.  Th ere is no expenditure restraint in such 
systems, only incentives to give and receive more care.  
Some have argued that once consumers have built 
the habit of shopping for price within the amounts 
of their deductibles, they will continue to try to cut 
costs even when they exceed their deductibles, and 
their insurance reimburses 100 percent of further 
costs.  Although it is impossible to rule out such behav-
ior, clearly there would be no economic incentive for 
consumers to do so – especially given that high health 
expenditures can indicate serious health problems, for 
which consumers likely would want all of the best pos-
sible care.
c  Apart from the word “health” in the name, HSAs can for some aﬄ  uent persons be mainly a tax deferral device.  If withdrawn for non-medical 
purposes, the withdrawals are subject to income tax plus a 10 percent penalty.  However, if the balances are not used until the owner becomes eligible 
for Medicare, the 10 percent penalty is waived.  If the owner passes away, the balances can be bequeathed to the individual’s heirs, and the 10 percent 
penalty is waived.
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Th ird, the main appeal of CDHPs is to consum-
ers who have reason to believe that they will remain 
healthy, and thus will be able to build their HSAs.  To 
that extent, the resulting migration of healthy people 
from the remaining pool of risks will shift the costs 
mainly to people with chronic conditions who will not 
choose CDHPs because they would expect to exhaust 
their deductibles.
CDHPs will be especially advantageous to those who 
are both healthy and wealthy, because they can both 
aﬀ ord the higher deductibles and take the most advan-
tage of the HSA tax shelter.  For high-bracket taxpay-
ers, those most likely to receive such large employer 
contributions, the tax savings on HSAs will be worth 
over $1,900 a year, plus possibly additional savings 
from state income taxes, plus tax-free accumula-
tions – a very attractive opportunity to shelter income 
from taxes.  Because the HSA is an exclusion from 
adjusted gross income, the tax beneﬁ t is most valu-
able to the best-oﬀ  taxpayers who are in the highest 
tax-rate brackets, but is worth next to nothing to those 
households with lower incomes who face low or even 
zero-percent tax rates, who are also less likely to receive 
employer contributions to HSAs.  In 2005, 35 percent 
of ﬁ rms oﬀ ering HDHPs made no contribution to 
the employees’ HSAs.49  Healthy, well-oﬀ  persons in 
CDHPs also beneﬁ t from the lower premiums and can 
escape pooling risks with their less-fortunate fellow 
employees.  Favorable risk selection will help CDHPs 
to grow rapidly, while leaving the higher risks behind 
in the standard low-deductible plans.  But the loser 
may be the fairness of our private health-care ﬁ nancing 
system – not to mention the viability of health insur-
ance for those who are not fortunate enough to beneﬁ t 
from CDHPs.
Fourth, about 83 percent of health-care spending is 
associated with the 133 million Americans who suf-
fer from chronic conditions: hypertension, arthritis, 
asthma, cancer, heart disease, AIDS, diabetes and 
its consequences including renal failure, etc.50  Th ese 
persons need to be, in the words of the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM), in “continuous healing relationships” 
with their health-care system.51  Obesity is epidemic, 
which will lead to many problems of heart disease, 
diabetes, etc.52  Th e costs will ultimately be borne by 
all of us through Medicare, Medicaid, and disabil-
ity insurance.  Our health-care delivery system must 
teach and motivate these patients to adopt healthier 
life styles and behavior, support them in their eﬀ orts, 
and monitor their medications.  Health-care organi-
zation and ﬁ nance should provide the foundation for 
disease-management infrastructure.  However, CDHP 
assumes that a key to economy is keeping people away 
from the doctor, which might be true for acute care in 
uncoordinated fee-for-service, but is not for the many 
people having and developing chronic diseases.  CDHP 
moves in the wrong direction – attempting to keep 
people away from health care rather than reaching out 
to support them in improving their lifestyles and man-
aging their conditions to keep them out of the hospital 
and away from more costly complications.
To be fair, many advocates of CDHP would exempt 
preventive care from deductibles and co-pays.  But in 
equal fairness, it is by no means clear that such exemp-
tions would work in a system whose entire philosophy 
is to keep people away from their physicians.  For 
example, it is far from certain that those who enroll 
in CDHPs because they cannot aﬀ ord the higher 
premiums for conventional insurance, but equally 
cannot aﬀ ord the high CDHP deductibles, will go to 
the doctor for exempt preventive care when they know 
that they cannot aﬀ ord any non-exempt treatments or 
therapies that the doctor might recommend.  If people 
forgo prevention, it could lead to under-funding of 
primary care, and could reinforce the present trend of 
young American doctors not going into primary care.  
Primary-care physicians could have increased diﬃ  culty 
collecting their bills, because those costs would be the 
ones to which deductibles would most likely apply.  
Interestingly enough, 22 percent of large employers 
now oﬀ er in-house clinics to their employees, to make 
access to the doctor more convenient, while CDHPs 
seek to discourage doctor visits.53  Alternatively, advo-
cates of CDHP have expressed concern that common 
low-deductible policies have led to over-utilization, and 
yet Americans still have under-utilized preventive care.  
Should we expect that CDHPs would yield more use 
of preventive care, when the CDHP’s terms for that 
care are no more generous than those under current 
low-deductible policies?
Fifth, CDHP emphasizes the decisions of informed 
consumers, a model that may seem to ﬁ t well with a 
population of professors in universities with medical 
schools whose families have enough free time to keep 
up with the medical literature, but that makes less 
sense for others.  Th ese consumers are supposed to 
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shop conﬁ dently for doctors and negotiate with them 
over prices and treatments.  However, medical care 
is very complex and uncertain.  John E. Wennberg’s 
research has documented remarkably wide variations 
in physician practice patterns, indicating that most 
doctors do not have a very well-informed idea of the 
best practice.54  Typical Americans are surely no better 
informed.  Only recently, the most famous heart 
bypass graft patient in America, former President Bill 
Clinton, living in the state with the best outcomes-
related information, chose the hospital with the high-
est risk-adjusted mortality in the state.55  His choice 
arguably did not ﬁ t well with the CDHP model.  More 
broadly, the experience in New York has been that 
the publication of such quality-related information 
did not drive changes in market share.d  Arguably, the 
information requirements for choices among individual 
providers and treatments are much greater than those 
to make an informed choice of a care system.  Th us, it 
makes more sense to ask consumers to shop based on 
standardized, published quality information during 
a routine open season for a cost-eﬃ  cient health-care 
plan, rather than to require them to shop perhaps in a 
time of crisis when they need an expensive and poten-
tially life-saving treatment or therapy.e
Why Canada’s “Single-Payer” System 
or “Medicare for All” Will Not Solve Our 
Health-Care Problems*
Beyond Consumer-Directed Health Plans, another 
health reform idea with substantial support is a “single-
payer” system, of which Canada’s is a prominent 
example.  Many people think that the logical replace-
ment for the employment-based system would be a 
Canadian-style system.  Th at is, government, probably 
at the federal level, would serve as the single health 
insurer, cover everyone, and pay all bills according to 
a government-determined or negotiated fee schedule.f  
Another description of this approach is “Medicare for 
all;” in other words, every American would be covered 
by the Medicare program or something very similar.g  
In 2006, the California Legislature passed a single-
payer bill.  Single-payer proposals have also appeared as 
ballot initiatives in California, but they usually have not 
fared well.  Th at could change, and probably will if the 
consequences of soaring insurance costs are allowed to 
play out.
As an alternative in the United States today, this 
model has features with great appeal.  For one thing, 
everyone is covered in the most familiar models, 
eliminating the complexities of determining who is 
covered, and by which program.h  Th ere would be huge 
administrative simpliﬁ cation.  All providers would bill 
the government, or its agent, on a uniform claim form 
and be paid a uniform fee.  In Canada, doctors bill 
the province on a claim form that looks like a credit-
card charge slip.  Canadians and American Medicare 
beneﬁ ciaries have access to practically every doctor in 
the jurisdiction, with no network restrictions, although 
that is changing as doctors decline to take new 
Medicare patients in response to Medicare fee reduc-
tions.  Th ere would be no marketing and underwriting 
expenses of insurance companies dealing with many 
individual employers, because there would be no more 
insurance companies (other than as claims processors 
or vendors of supplemental insurance).  Health insur-
ance would be removed as a factor in the labor market.  
Employers could eliminate their bureaucracies for 
dealing with health insurance and forget about health 
care (except when they paid their taxes).  Altogether, 
some 15 percent to 20 percent of the costs associated 
with health insurance could be eliminated, including 
the costs of brokers and agents, and employer costs of 
retaining staﬀ s and consultants to help manage health-
coverage purchasing.  
*See Memorandum, page 84.
d  What changes in performance there were apparently came from extra-market forces such as state regulation, or the threat of it, and from the pro-
fessional aspirations of doctors and hospital managements and boards, most of whom wanted to be among the best.
e  Physicians in prepaid group practices take part in systems that accept responsibility to manage total per capita expenditure of their enrolled mem-
bers.  Th ere is a great deal of evidence that they do the best job.
f  In Canada, hospitals are paid prospective “global budgets.”
g  Th ere are many alternative ways for government to play a role in health insurance that might be characterized as “single payer.”  Th e Canadian-style 
or “Medicare for all” approach is the most prominent, and the most widely understood.  We do not consider a system under which the Federal gov-
ernment would collect premiums (or taxes) and pay them to a multiplicity of private insurers who accepted the risks of coverage to be a “single-payer” 
system in this sense.
h  Th is aspect of single-payer plans can be more complicated if aliens or non-working non-elderly adults are not covered.
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Single-payer models are generally based on fee-for-
service payment because, if there is only one system, 
then all physicians must be allowed to participate, and 
most are in small or solo practice which is most conve-
niently reimbursed by FFS.  In a sense, government, as 
the sole provider of health care, would ﬁ nd itself in the 
same position as an individual employer:  Because its 
constituents want an unconstrained choice of physi-
cian, the only single plan that meets that constraint is 
a wide-access fee-for-service system.  Indeed, govern-
ment’s ability to restructure the health-delivery system 
could be even less than a typical employer’s.  Because 
of “ job lock,” an employer has at least some theoreti-
cal ability to impose its health-care decisions on its 
employees.  In contrast, because of elections, public 
policymakers can be ﬁ red if a signiﬁ cant bloc of their 
constituents believes that their choice of physician has 
been constrained.  As experience under Medicare has 
demonstrated, any U.S. single-payer system is likely 
to maintain fee-for-service medicine as the dominant 
delivery mode.i
Depending on one’s point of view, the continued domi-
nance of fee-for-service would be an advantage or a ma-
jor disadvantage.  It would be familiar, and administra-
tive processes exist.  Most doctors and medical groups 
are paid that way today and prefer it.
However, for the organization of medical care and its 
impact on economy and quality, locking in uncoor-
dinated, fragmented fee-for-service would be a major 
disadvantage.  As noted above and in Appendix B, fee-
for-service has built-in incentives for delivering volume, 
not quality.  It motivates, or is compatible with, con-
siderable over-use, under-use, and misuse of services.  
It would leave in place existing medical organization, 
with all the deﬁ ciencies of quality and economy dis-
cussed in the previous chapter.  It would continue to 
be oriented to acute episodes – rather than chronic 
disease management, where most of the cost occurs.  It 
would deny us the beneﬁ ts of any potential new and 
better-organized delivery systems.  In sum, all of the 
organizational ﬂ aws that have rendered the current 
system inﬂ ationary and unsustainable would remain.
Th ere are other problems with single-payer systems.  
Perhaps the next most important one is the entangle-
ment of provider payment with politics.  Th e medical-
industrial complex already is a huge source of political 
money.  Medical device companies and drug companies 
employ persons in many Congressional districts, either 
directly or through contractors.  Every Congressional 
district has doctors and hospitals.  If all of their reve-
nues ﬂ owed through government, attempts to inﬂ uence 
the allocation of funds through lobbying and political 
contributions would intensify.  Payment by govern-
ment would become, literally, a matter of life and death 
to health-care providers.
Some think that a single payer would be able to con-
trol health expenditures.  But government today is 
having a very diﬃ  cult time controlling the costs of its 
existing health commitments to Medicare and Med-
icaid.  Merely regulating prices cannot control health 
expenditures.  Expenditures are the product of prices 
and quantities, and squeezing down on prices moti-
vates a “volume response” – that is, doctors react to a 
reduction of prices by increasing the volume of ser-
vices they provide.  Experience with Medicare bears 
this out.56  Congress has responded with a “sustainable 
growth rate” formula:  What the doctors take collec-
tively through increased utilization will be recaptured 
through lower fees across the board.  Obviously, that is 
hardly an optimal system.  It punishes the frugal along 
with the prodigal.  It remains to be seen if it will be 
sustained.  So far, its implementation has been post-
poned each year because of the objections of the medi-
cal profession.
Government simply cannot know how to set so many 
and such complex prices, taking account of local mar-
ket conditions.  Congress must and does use across-
the-board rules for setting prices, and those rules have 
proved hard to change.  For example, Medicare has 
created a boom in cardiology procedures by overpaying 
and making them more proﬁ table than other kinds of 
care, which in turn is leading to a boom in heart hospi-
tals that the Congress is now seeking to curb.57
i  It has proven practically impossible for Medicare to break out of fee-for-service, even though Congressional leaders have long said that they want to 
oﬀ er choice to beneﬁ ciaries.  Medicare does oﬀ er HMOs, called “Medicare Advantage” plans, but the amount Medicare pays to those plans is tied to 
the prevailing fee-for-service per-capita costs (risk-adjusted) in each geographic area.  Canada’s Medicare system destroyed their prepaid group prac-
tices because the dominant payment system left no opportunity for Canadians to save money by joining more-eﬃ  cient delivery systems.
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Government appears unable to discriminate among 
providers.  It is very unlikely that government could 
refuse to deal with providers who appear to be costly 
or ineﬃ  cient, if some beneﬁ ciaries – that is, voters – 
demand their services.  To date, Medicare’s attempts 
at incentives for complex-care patients to go to regional 
centers of excellence have foundered.  Non-discrimi-
nation by any payer is a principle for which provider 
organizations will ﬁ ght.
Also, government cannot “ just say no” to costly new 
technologies.  In fact, Congress will not allow Medi-
care administrators even to consider costs in relation 
to beneﬁ ts in decisions of whether or not to cover new 
technologies.  Th ere is evidence that competing private 
health-care delivery systems do a better job of cost-ef-
fective deployment of new technologies, and targeting 
them where they will be really eﬀ ective.58
Canada is suﬀ ering from long waiting times from 
primary-care referrals to specialist treatment.59  Global 
budgets do not create incentives for eﬃ  ciency, which 
could ameliorate the problem.j  It is interesting that the 
British are moving in the direction of market models 
and incentives reform.  
Single-payer systems, like Medicare, are touted as 
having great administrative eﬃ  ciency.  Medicare, for 
example, has been estimated to spend 3.6 percent of 
billings on administration, whereas private insurers 
spend 11.5 percent.60  However, this is not unalloyed 
good news for Medicare.  Because Medicare is mostly 
fee-for-service, it entails enormous numbers of billings, 
with the result that there is considerable opportunity 
for error and abuse.  As was noted earlier, the Oﬃ  ce 
of the Inspector General of the Department of Health 
and Human Service identiﬁ ed signiﬁ cant excessive 
and erroneous Medicare payments.61  Th us, the low 
administrative cost likely results from serious under-
administration of the program.  Single-payer systems 
have had diﬃ  culty encouraging alternatives to fee-for-
service delivery, but some alternatives – including, but 
by no means limited to, capitated prepayment – can 
reduce administrative cost without necessarily creating 
opportunities for abuse.k
In short, for all of its appeal, the single-payer model 
suﬀ ers from serious, probably fatal, weaknesses.  Al-
though other nations with single-payer systems spend 
smaller shares of their GDP on health care than the 
United States does, those shares are rising just as in-
exorably.  Measures of dissatisfaction with single-payer 
systems abroad are growing, just as they are with our 
system.  And our own single-payer systems – Medicare 
and (in some degree) Medicaid – already have their 
own problems, which are not solely assignable to their 
responsibility for the elderly and other groups with 
disproportionately ill health.  CED concludes that a 
single-payer system would not solve our health-care 
problems – and in fact may make them even worse.
Many Other Current Favorite Ideas 
Are Being Oversold as Solutions in 
Themselves; Others Would Not Work
Consumer-Driven Health Plans and single-payer 
health systems are probably the two biggest “big new 
things” in the dialog on health reform, but there are 
many other popular ideas that are smaller in scope.  
Some would have positive eﬀ ects, but are often over-
sold as total answers to the health-care cost problem – 
which they are not.  Other ideas would have no favor-
able eﬀ ect, or even would be retrograde.  Th ese ideas 
are the successors to the “Band-Aids” of the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s.
One idea that has generated much excitement is In-
formation Technology (IT).  Th is seems like a safe 
course for politicians; it oﬀ ers glitter without appar-
ently threatening any important interests.  IT is being 
ascribed magical powers.  In fact, information tech-
nology will surely be indispensable in any reformed, 
modern, high-quality delivery system, which is why 
the major integrated delivery systems are spending 
billions to roll it out in their practices.l  But merely 
superimposing a veneer of IT on top of the current 
mal-constructed health-care system will not solve the 
underlying problems.  IT will not help if the delivery 
system is not reorganized to take advantage of it.  In a 
fundamentally dysfunctional and disorganized delivery 
j  In Canada, government has limited expenditure growth by limiting hospital budgets, leading to growing waiting lines and shortages of specialist 
care.
k  Capitated prepayment is a ﬁ xed periodic per-patient fee to providers, regardless of services delivered.
l  Th e Veterans Administration Health System, Kaiser Permanente, the Mayo Clinic, and the Palo Alto Clinic, among others, are leaders in the 
development and application of health IT.
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system, IT may merely give an ineﬃ  cient system an 
electronic means of communication to automate inef-
ﬁ cient practices.  One perceptive analysis pointed out 
that deployment of IT is not in the interest of the doc-
tors, hospitals, and laboratories in the uncoordinated 
FFS sector, which probably explains why it is happen-
ing so slowly there.62
To illustrate, consider that a well-organized solo 
primary-care practice has no particular need for IT for 
itself.m  Th e real beneﬁ t from IT adoption in that of-
ﬁ ce would accrue to the health-care system as a whole, 
in better informed specialists to whom the patient 
is referred, with fewer wasted visits, more produc-
tive visits, less time lost on history taking or tracking 
down lost information, better coordination between 
the specialists and the primary-care physician, and 
fewer lost or duplicated test results.  But these system 
beneﬁ ts would not be beneﬁ ts to individual FFS physi-
cians, who would experience less revenue from fewer 
visits and tests.  And the primary-care practice itself 
would bear all of the costs of implementing the IT 
system.  No wonder there is slow or no adoption of IT 
in the solo-practice FFS sector.  Some might mandate 
the adoption of IT, but this mandate would raise the 
same questions as all other government mandates; and 
adoption would surely be halfhearted, if there were 
only compulsion and no positive incentive to make the 
system truly work.
Comprehensive Electronic Health Records would be 
an important output of health IT, and a foundation of 
eﬃ  cient integrated delivery systems.  Prepaid group 
practices kept longitudinal comprehensive records 
from the outset, and are now converting them to elec-
tronic form.  Th ey are potentially very important, and 
they could be very helpful for quality and eﬃ  ciency, 
but they will not make fragmented fee-for-service af-
fordable.  Th ey may be defeated by the unwillingness 
of FFS doctors to expose their work to competitors 
who might criticize it.
Pay for Performance (P4P) was started in Califor-
nia by the Integrated Healthcare Association, to 
encourage insurers who paid doctors through capitated 
prepayment to use common measures of the quality of 
preventive services and patient satisfaction as the basis 
for additional bonus payments to those doctors.n,63  
P4P could establish a single measure of practice quality 
and get away from confusing “dueling report cards.”  
Its main limitation is that it is based largely on process 
measures and not on medical outcomes, which are far 
more diﬃ  cult to measure fairly.o  P4P made sense in 
its original context because the physicians involved had 
already accepted responsibility for the cost of treating 
their patients.  But now, P4P is being interpreted as 
something that might help limit expenditures in the 
uncoordinated fee-for-service context.  In fact, it might 
even be cost-increasing.  With a fundamental shift to 
a market based on responsible consumer choice and 
competition among physician organizations to pro-
duce value for money, performance information can be 
helpful.  
With the prominence of costly chronic conditions, 
Disease Management is already an integral part of 
prepaid group practices, whose ﬁ nancing through capi-
tated prepayment provides both the incentive and the 
up-front funds for successful disease management.  In 
contrast to this close ﬁ t with prepaid group practices, 
disease management must be tacked on to fee-for-ser-
vice, which lacks both the incentive and the ﬁ nancial 
platform.  It is being promoted as an optional pro-
gram to consumers to overcome the fragmentation of 
fee-for-service.  Recent data suggest savings are small, 
with both low enrollment and low follow-through by 
consumers.64  Disease management is potentially very 
important, and should be integral to the health-care 
system, not patched on from the outside.
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is an attempt to 
synthesize the scientiﬁ c literature and detailed health 
records to determine which treatments work un-
der which circumstances and to steer the practice of 
medicine toward those treatments.  It is important 
and could improve care, reduce medical uncertainty, 
and save money.  But those results are not guaran-
teed.  Th ere must be incentives to practice EBM and 
m  However, IT potentially could be a valuable tool for the doctor to use in managing chronic disease patients.
n  Th is process was a part of the so-called California Delegated Model, under which doctors practice in groups and in independent clinics linked 
through Independent Practice Associations (IPAs).  As noted, the doctors involved receive most of their compensation through annual per-person 
fees, or capitation.  Th ese physician organizations therefore bore some of the risk for resource use, and the bonuses computed using P4P provided an 
added incentive.
o  Th e best measurement of outcomes would be adjusted for risk; such measurement would be even more diﬃ  cult.
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monitoring systems to make it happen, along with 
incentives to choose economical guidelines.  Research 
shows that mere publication of guidelines has no eﬀ ect 
on physician behavior.65
Tort Reform could help reduce expenditures and is 
surely well worth doing on its own merits.66  Research 
by Kessler and McClellan suggests that, at least in the 
case of fresh heart attacks, reform could save ﬁ ve to ten 
percent of costs if there were any incentive to reduce 
expenditures.67  Five to ten percent is surely signiﬁ cant. 
However, this may prove to be a one-time change in 
the level of expenditures, with no long-term reduction 
in their growth rate.  
Th e goal of Tiered High Performance Networks 
(THPN) is to route all patients to high-quality, low-
cost physicians.  Th ose physicians (usually specialists) 
are identiﬁ ed using data on the costs and results of 
episodes of care (usually acute care) from insurance 
claims.  While promising, this approach has impor-
tant limitations.  THPN obviously is designed as a 
cost-saving device for individual employers or insur-
ers; it has much less relevance to attaining system-wide 
savings.  For example, superimposing THPN on a 
single-payer system would be totally contrary to the ex-
perience of Medicare, under which policymakers have 
zealously guarded the right of every patient to choose 
any physician.
It may be misleading to assign every episode of care to 
one physician, because there is always some collabora-
tion in complex cases, and there are diﬀ erences in the 
severity of those cases.  Even assuming that the analy-
sis yields sound results, THPN will do little good if 
employers are unwilling to create suﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial 
incentives to induce patients to switch to economical 
doctors.  Perhaps most importantly, THPN focuses on 
specialists and acute-care episodes, and ignores the im-
portant roles of primary care and prevention.  Tiered 
high performance networks could end up with high 
volumes of preventable medical problems, which even 
if handled eﬃ  ciently would not reduce cost.  THPN 
could do more good if insurance plans gave people real 
incentives to choose economical doctors, and still more 
good if plans had strong systems for primary care and 
prevention that used the data to guide patients to qual-
ity cost-eﬀ ective specialists, and to oversee the appro-
priateness of treatments and procedures.  
Transparency is also cited as a potential overall solu-
tion.  Transparency is an attribute of all well-function-
ing markets.  Advocates of transparency in health care 
argue that consumers, not just insurance company or 
medical group managers, should know what hospitals 
charge.  Of course, purchasers who are using their own 
money or their company’s money need to know the 
cost of the things they are buying, and contracting be-
tween insurance companies and providers is now a well 
developed, if imperfect, art.  But one wonders what the 
ordinary insured consumer with a $2,000 deductible is 
going to do with such information.  Th e doctor says:  “I 
must admit you to the hospital.”  Th e consumer thinks: 
“Th ere goes my $2,000!  Now bring on the technology: 
More scans.  More tests.  Do anything that might con-
ceivably help me.”  If people have reason to believe they 
are likely to reach their annual deductibles, as would 
be the case with pregnancy, a costly chronic condition, 
or any hospitalization, mere $2,000 deductibles will 
provide no cost-reducing incentive.  And much higher 
deductibles are likely to make care unaﬀ ordable for 
average-wage people.68
Conclusion
Th is history of “Band-Aids” and their latest successors 
shows that there are no easy, simple reforms – things 
that sound good and have popular appeal – that would 
solve America’s health-care problem.  Th ese ideas are 
attempts, sometimes useful, sometimes not, to control 
spending without the “heavy lifting” of reforming the 
market and the delivery system.  Excess expenditure 
growth is too fundamental, too pervasive, and is driven 
by forces that are too powerful for any such superﬁ cial 
change to be eﬀ ective.
In contrast, in an eﬃ  cient health-care market, all con-
sumers would have informed cost-conscious choices of 
delivery systems.  Under such consumer choice, cost-ef-
fective delivery systems would prosper and have strong 
incentives to improve eﬃ  ciency, quality and service, 
which would drive the entire market toward better 
performance.  Such a market would naturally align the 
incentives of providers with the interests of patients in 
high-quality aﬀ ordable care.  Th e next chapter explains 
how such an eﬃ  cient health-care system would diﬀ er 
from the prevailing patterns today.
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Th e above analysis of the current employer-based 
health insurance system is troubling.  Costs are rising 
faster than incomes.  Firms that have borne a signiﬁ -
cant share of those costs are threatened ﬁ nancially, es-
pecially if they are subject to competition from foreign 
ﬁ rms that are not so burdened.  Employees, especially 
those who earn modest wages or already have health 
problems, are in danger of losing their coverage – if 
they have not already.  Th e history of employer-based 
insurance is replete with attempts to patch the system, 
with results ranging from minimal beneﬁ t to nil to 
outright harm.  Options currently on the table, as 
described in the preceding chapter, will fare no better.
To approach this apparently dismal prospect from a 
diﬀ erent angle, what would a successful delivery system 
look like?  As we argued in discussing the single-payer 
option, we do not believe that an eﬃ  cient health-care 
system can be managed through a command-and-
control mechanism.  Rather, the best approaches to the 
many dimensions of health-care delivery can emerge 
only through a process of competition.
Just as competition has produced unpredictable results 
in every other industry, so it would in health care.  In 
fact, the answer would change constantly, because the 
process of innovation and improvement would never 
stop.  Th us, the object of health-system change is not 
to anoint any one delivery model from today’s land-
scape as the deﬁ nitive answer, but rather to unleash 
the forces of competition through structured ﬁ nancial 
incentives to work their will.  In time, the successful 
systems might even be signiﬁ cant improvements of 
models that today appear outdated, or alternatively 
might be models that do not yet exist.  Th e one certain 
thing is that the systems that succeed in a fair, com-
petitive environment will be those that best meet the 
needs of the population at large.
Despite the uncertainty, some reasonable general 
inferences can be drawn on the basis of delivery 
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systems that appear more eﬃ  cient within what limited 
competition today’s health-care market imposes today.  
Th eir attributes also meet the apparent requirements 
for a system that would respond to America’s needs for 
greater quality, aﬀ ordability and access.
Th is perspective is far more encouraging.  Th ere are 
systems in place today whose attributes, taken to-
gether, provide an attainable vision of higher-quality, 
more-aﬀ ordable health care.  Th ese characteristics 
would amount to a fundamental transformation of the 
health-care delivery system.  Th eir beneﬁ ts would be 
felt in better health for Americans, as well as dollars-
and-cents resource savings.
Goals
First, to resolve the problems of health-care cost, qual-
ity and access, our goal should be a delivery system that 
is moving toward the attributes of the modern ﬁ rm 
in virtually every other sector of the economy: from 
unaccountable to accountable; from uncoordinated to 
coordinated; from wasteful and inﬂ ationary to eﬃ  cient 
(seeking maximum value for money for patients), 
with incentives for value-enhancing innovation; from 
provider-centric to patient-centric; a system focused on 
keeping people well, at work, and out of the hospital; 
in short, a system committed to improving health 
outcomes and reducing health system expenditures, 
bringing expenditure growth into line with growth in 
incomes.69  Delivery systems that approximate most 
of these attributes do exist.  True competition among 
insurers and providers will encourage the entire health-
care sector to improve in all of these dimensions.
Second, because many people lack health insurance, 
society must ensure that everyone has aﬀ ordable access 
to a ﬁ nancially sustainable health insurance program.  
To motivate innovation in health-care organization 
and ﬁ nance, everyone should have the purchasing 
power needed to buy insurance, and informed, 
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responsible, cost-conscious choices of delivery systems 
and providers.a
Th is chapter reviews the attributes of a health-care 
ﬁ nancing and delivery system that would meet Amer-
ica’s needs, which are closely related and interact with 
one another:
• Aﬀ ordability, or in the sense of the entire system, 
sustainability;
• Quality and eﬀ ectiveness; and
• Access.
Sustainability
For at least the past 40 years, health expenditures have 
grown faster than incomes and tax revenues.  Health-
care’s cost has grown on average about 2.5 percentage 
points per year faster than the GDP, and therefore 
consumed an ever-increasing share of the GDP.
Businesses have responded by shifting more of the cost 
to their employees, in the form of higher shares of pre-
miums and reduced coverage, including the introduc-
tion of high deductibles.  In recent months, the states 
have tried to play a role – again, with structures that 
often include higher deductibles to minimize costs.  
However, the new “reform” plans – the Massachusetts 
plan, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s plan, the 
proposal of the Health Coalition for the Uninsured – 
are purely ﬁ nancing plans designed to gather together 
available resources and rearrange them to cover 
everyone.70  Because of the resource constraints on the 
states, they cannot address the structural incentives 
that drive the delivery system and its inﬂ ationary 
nature.  Th ese plans will not be sustainable over 
time unless the growth rate of health expenditures is 
brought much closer to that of the GDP.
Achieving that goal will require a fundamentally 
reformed delivery system – one that takes advantage 
of modern management tools, allocates resources 
eﬃ  ciently, uses information technology productively, 
and aligns the incentives of providers with the needs 
and wants of consumers and patients for high-
quality aﬀ ordable care.  Only market forces, with the 
appropriate design and oversight, can drive innovation 
and competition among alternative delivery systems 
to serve cost-conscious consumers and increase value 
for money.  Without such structural reform, recent 
eﬀ orts by business and the states will at best postpone, 
and in the long run may worsen, the current crisis, 
postponing as well eﬀ orts to establish a more eﬃ  cient 
system that is better focused on prevention of chronic 
conditions and maintaining health.
A sustainable system must build on the eﬀ orts of busi-
ness and the states to achieve better care at a lower cost 
that grows at a rate closer to the pace of the nation’s 
incomes.  Some key attributes of such a sustainable 
system are explained below.
Incentives Alignment and Eﬃ  ciency.  Today, most 
people insured through employment are not likely to 
know what their insurance costs, and even if they do, 
they have little choice or incentive to act on the infor-
mation.  Eﬃ  cient alternatives may exist, but people 
usually have no opportunity to choose them and keep 
the savings.  Eﬃ  cient delivery systems will not be 
developed unless there is a market for them – that is, 
a demand for eﬃ  ciency.  Th ere is virtually no demand 
for eﬃ  ciency today.  If all or most people had a reason 
to choose eﬃ  cient systems, care providers, to succeed, 
would need to create and oﬀ er them.
As explained in detail in Chapter One and Appendix 
B, the incentives in today’s dominant fee-for-service 
system are often perverse.  Th is model punishes 
economizing behavior.71  Senator Charles Grassley, 
then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, was 
quoted in the New York Times as saying, accurately, 
that “Medicare now pays the same amount regardless 
of quality.”  He added that Medicare “rewards poor 
quality” by paying doctors to treat complications 
caused by their own mistakes.72  Fee-for-service also 
discourages teamwork, because it pays separately for 
the actions of individual members of the care team.
Health-care systems could produce better care at less 
cost if provider incentives were aligned with the needs 
and wants of the American people for high-quality 
aﬀ ordable care.  In the broadest sense, every member 
of a health-care team must have an incentive to develop 
a  Geography, especially in rural areas, can be a signiﬁ cant barrier.  However, where rural residents have the reliable purchasing power to buy insur-
ance, insurers and providers have sought ways to deliver care.
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and follow the most-eﬀ ective, evidence-based care pro-
cesses.  Providers must make comprehensive judgments 
of the best treatment, rather than piece-by-piece deci-
sions on what items and prices the insurer will approve. 
To bring these broad principles to life, payments could 
be set for more-globally-deﬁ ned “products” – say, the 
complete treatment of a particular illness or injury – 
rather than for the individual items of care – like one 
pharmaceutical tablet delivered in a hospital.b  Salaried 
physicians with signiﬁ cant bonus payments for quality, 
patient satisfaction, eﬃ  ciency and teamwork might 
be more in keeping with this goal.  An insurance plan 
with prepaid capitation, and ideally with risk adjust-
ment as well, would be one way of achieving this goal, 
but there may be others – including even some as yet 
unknown restructuring of the fee-for-service model, 
perhaps driven by digital technology.c 
Conﬂ icts of interest – the quintessential misalign-
ment of the interests of patients and providers – are 
widespread in treatment and procurement decisions in 
medicine.73  An important part of incentives alignment 
must be rigorous policies to minimize such conﬂ icts 
of interest.  Physicians who decide which item of 
equipment or technology or which pharmaceutical to 
use should not have ﬁ nancial links with suppliers.  As 
George Bernard Shaw observed 101 years ago, the 
contemporary fee-for-service model – tellingly, essen-
tially unchanged over those 101 years – is inherently 
a conﬂ ict of interest.d,74  Alternative ﬁ nancing systems 
can reduce conﬂ icts of interest and produce strong 
incentives for quality improvement, error avoidance, 
disease prevention, and eﬃ  cient treatment choices. 
In any case, incentives alignment, engaging both 
patients and providers, is a necessary condition for an 
eﬃ  cient delivery system.
Continuous Improvement and the Learning Organiza-
tion.  Th e concepts of continuous improvement and a 
learning environment should become core competen-
cies of every delivery organization.  Providers should 
integrate these activities into actual care delivery, and 
extend continuous improvements from the larger 
headquarters organizations into their local practices.  
Because there are more new clinical trials and studies 
than any single physician could possibly absorb while 
still seeing patients, successful delivery systems in a 
cost-conscious market would devote some of their 
manpower to devising practice guidelines and ensur-
ing, with the assistance of information technology, that 
they are followed.  Physicians, like all other workers, 
do not enjoy being monitored, but performance 
measurement is used in virtually every other industry 
because it works: it yields better performance.
Integration and Coordination of Care.  American 
medicine is a fragmented non-system.  Institutions 
and settings in which patients receive care are like 
separate “silos,” with poor communication among 
them.  Doctors practicing in community hospitals are 
mostly free agents with interests that conﬂ ict with 
each other and with the hospitals.  An important and 
remarkable feature of the uncoordinated FFS system 
is that, for the most part, it does not keep records in 
usable form.  As a result, Americans are receiving just 
over half of recommended care, and errors of omission 
are widespread.75
To remedy these failings, successful health systems 
must continually evaluate and redesign work processes 
to improve eﬃ  ciency and take full advantage of IT.  
Providers must keep continuous, comprehensive, 
longitudinal medical records, analyze them, and feed 
the results back into practice improvement.  Th ey 
must follow patients over time and learn what works 
and what does not.  Th ey must deploy and use health 
information technology to create caregiver support 
tools such as shared comprehensive electronic health 
records, guidelines, prompts, and reminders, to moni-
tor performance and to take corrective action, where 
appropriate, to assure optimal care.76  Doctors can be 
better informed about each patient, electronic pre-
scribing can reduce errors, and secure doctor-patient 
b  Th e Dutch, for example, pay hospitals for complete inpatient cases including all associated physician services.  Th e British National Health Service 
is moving in the same direction.
c  Risk adjustment, sometimes called risk equalization, is a process that measures relative expected health expenditures in diﬀ erent enrolled groups, 
and compensates those health plans that enrolled a more costly group at the expense of those that enrolled a less costly group.  All individuals, 
regardless of their medical condition, see and pay the same premium; premium revenue is transferred behind the scenes from insurers who enroll pro-
portionately fewer risky patients to insurers who cover relatively more of the risky patients.
d  Th e Doctor’s Dilemma, written in 1906.  “Th at any sane nation, having observed that you could provide for the supply of bread by giving bakers a 
pecuniary interest in baking for you, should go on to give a surgeon a pecuniary interest in cutting oﬀ  your leg, is enough to make one despair of po-
litical humanity.  But that is precisely what we have done.  And the more appalling the mutilation, the more the mutilator is paid.”
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communication by email or mobile phones can lead 
to better-prepared doctor visits and reduce the need 
for visits as well.  Th e integrated-delivery systems are 
far ahead of the traditional FFS sector in deploying 
IT.77  It is apparent that the beneﬁ ts of IT – reducing 
the need for hospital days, doctor visits and diagnostic 
tests – are not in the interest of individual FFS 
providers.78
Delivery systems that are responsive to cost-conscious 
consumers would integrate and coordinate the contin-
uum of care – at home, the doctor’s oﬃ  ce, the hospital 
and the outpatient setting – to improve both quality 
and eﬃ  ciency.  Costs can be reduced when doctors 
and hospitals are part of the same team with common 
interests.  Care should be delivered in the least-costly 
appropriate settings, considering total system costs, 
not just costs and revenues associated with one setting.3 
Quality can be increased with smooth transitions and 
hand-oﬀ s between care settings, so that, for example, 
outpatient providers are well-informed on inpatient 
care (and vice versa).  Automated tracking should fol-
low actual practice versus the standard, with a message 
sent to the appropriate provider to inquire about any 
deviations.
Match Resources Used to the Needs of the Population 
Served.  Because the traditional model involves sepa-
rate payments for each item after the fact, it cannot 
use a “budget” to plan or to allocate resources.  It does 
not practice some of the elementary principles of good 
management, such as matching the resources supplied 
to the needs of the population served, or the services 
produced.  Successful systems could reduce costs by 
deploying physicians in the numbers and types needed 
to provide high-quality care to their enrolled popula-
tions.  Specialty imbalances contribute to the large 
ineﬃ  ciencies often observed in American medicine.  
Too many surgeons can lead to too much surgery, and 
to surgery done by non-proﬁ cient surgeons.79
Cost-conscious systems would select and train physi-
cians and other health professionals for quality and 
willingness to work in teams, establishing programs to 
keep them proﬁ cient and well-informed.  Physicians 
must be committed to the delivery model used by their 
systems; no health plan can succeed or even survive 
in a competitive environment if its providers are not 
dedicated to its objectives and methods.  Th at objec-
tive could be met in at least some plans with salaried 
physicians with signiﬁ cant bonus payments for quality, 
patient satisfaction, eﬃ  ciency and teamwork.  Trained 
non-physician personnel can perform additional ser-
vices, reserving physicians for where they are needed.  
Equipment can be deployed in appropriate quantities 
for eﬃ  ciency and economies of scale.
Supply-Chain Management.  Hospitals compete for 
doctors who bring them patients.  One way they do so 
is to cater to each doctor’s preferences for particular 
types of equipment.  Accordingly, hospitals often use 
several diﬀ erent types of devices from diﬀ erent sup-
pliers for the same purpose, thus diluting their pur-
chasing power and adding to cost, complexity and the 
chance of error.  Eﬃ  ciency and quality would improve 
if the doctors in each specialty in each institution 
would collectively study the available products and 
recommend the product lines that oﬀ er the most value 
for money, so that the hospital could concentrate its 
purchasing power on the selected suppliers.f
Market Reorganization to Streamline Administra-
tion and Customer Service.  Th e administration of our 
employment-based health insurance is unnecessarily 
costly.  Th e typical large health-insurance company 
spends between 15 percent and 20 percent of revenue 
on administrative expenses (and proﬁ ts).  Billing and 
insurance-related costs in California for acute health 
care, including doctors and hospitals, have recently 
been estimated at 19.7 percent to 21.8 percent of 
spending.80  Th e optimum administrative expense is 
far from zero, as noted above in the context of Medi-
care, but fee-for-service payment generates unnecessary 
expense.  Health-care quality and decision-making 
would improve if systems utilized per-capita prepay-
ment, or set prices for complete inpatient cases rather 
than individual services.  Such streamlining would also 
drastically reduce administrative costs.
e  Integrated delivery systems now engage in such planning better than disaggregated providers.  Other providers, for example multi-specialty group 
practices, hospital-medical staﬀ  organizations, physician-hospital organizations, insurer partnerships with provider networks, individual practice as-
sociations, etc., might plan eﬀ ectively if given appropriate tools and incentives.
f  See also the above remarks about conﬂ icts of interest.
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Universal health insurance based on competition could 
reduce administrative expenses even further.  A good 
example is provided by the experience of the health 
insurance program of the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS), which brokers cover-
age for about 1.2 million California state and local 
government employees, retirees and dependents.  Once 
a year, Kaiser Permanente signs one contract with 
CalPERS to cover over 400,000 persons.  CalPERS’s 
administrative expenses are less than one percent of 
the premium.  Similarly, universal health insurance, 
working through a central broker such as CalPERS 
or the FEHBP, would eliminate underwriting and 
contracting expense for individuals and ﬁ rms.  All 
beneﬁ ciaries would pay the same price for the same 
coverage, regardless of health status.  Biased risk se-
lection can be avoided by risk equalization for whole 
populations, computerized behind the scenes; insurers 
already accept and practice risk equalization in some 
existing health-insurance systems.  Health insurance 
contracts would be standardized, reducing cost and red 
tape.  Employers could eliminate the health insurance 
component of their beneﬁ ts management departments 
(except to the extent that they chose to provide infor-
mation and support to their employees), while CEOs 
would be freed to spend many hours on their core busi-
nesses rather than on health-insurance costs.
Health plans would face much greater competition 
in a transparent market serving cost-conscious indi-
vidual customers, which would give them an incentive 
to squeeze out unproductive administrative expenses 
and reduce proﬁ t margins to competitive levels.  Th us, 
the consolidation of health-insurance purchasing into a 
universal competitive system with a central broker can 
reasonably be expected to yield substantial administra-
tive savings, while also creating ongoing competition 
among delivery systems.
Quality and Effectiveness  
Th e incentives in the current health-care ﬁ nancing sys-
tem drive health providers away from both quality and 
aﬀ ordability.  To give a sense of what could be achieved 
in both of these dimensions, following are some of the 
major improvements of organization of health-care 
delivery systems that would result from market-driven 
alignment of incentives.
Reorganize Around Medical Conditions, Not 
Medical Specialties
Reorganize for Chronic-Care Management.  As was 
documented above, chronic conditions are now a ma-
jor – perhaps the major – driver of health-care costs.  
And yet, today’s health-care and payment systems are 
still designed to manage and pay for acute episodes, 
not chronic conditions.  Insurance plan designs, and 
the thinking that goes into them, are too close to the 
casualty-insurance model, rather than encouraging the 
maintenance of health.
Th e New York Times reported in a series of articles on 
diabetes that “Insurers, for example, will often refuse 
to pay $150 for a diabetic to see a podiatrist, who can 
help prevent foot ailments associated with the disease.  
Nearly all of them, though, cover amputations, which 
typically cost more than $30,000.”81  Such a system 
is an anachronism.  Fee-for-service generally pays for 
episodes such as doctor visits or procedures.  Th ere is 
no incentive to provide on-going preventive and chronic 
care such as counseling sessions.g,82
Appropriately trained non-physician personnel such as 
dieticians can perform important chronic-care services, 
reserving physicians for where they are needed.  Better 
designed payment systems – perhaps insurers making 
ﬁ xed periodic payments to hospitals and their medical 
staﬀ s for comprehensive care of patients with chronic 
conditions – would encourage chronic disease manage-
ment programs, including monitoring patients; adjust-
ing medications as timely and appropriate; educat-
ing patients on how to do their part to manage their 
diseases; and removing ﬁ nancial barriers to patients’ 
obtaining necessary care.  Such incentives would not 
necessarily require comprehensive integrated delivery 
systems.  Risk-adjusted premiums would ensure that 
delivery systems that attract and care for patients with 
chronic conditions are paid appropriately.
g  As was noted in Chapter One, some hospitals have found it cheaper to oﬀ er low-income persons with acute diseases resulting from poorly managed 
chronic conditions free chronic disease management on an outpatient basis, because of the savings in reduced uncompensated emergency care.
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Health Promotion and Disease Prevention.  Chronic 
disease often arises from the failure to engage in good 
health behaviors – such as obesity-prevention, exer-
cise, diabetes-control, smoking-cessation, and appro-
priate prevention methods such as cancer screening.83  
Costs could be reduced in the long run by systems that 
change patient behavior and emphasize primary care, 
disease prevention, and early detection and treatment.  
One of the negative consequences of fee-for-service is 
that it generates the greatest income opportunities for 
doctors in specialties such as oncology and radiology, 
and poor pay for primary care – leading progressively 
fewer graduates of American medical schools to seek 
careers in primary care.  Primary-care physicians pro-
vide coordination and continuity of care, health promo-
tion counseling to patients, and a medical home for care 
based on continuous healing relationships.  Success-
ful health-care delivery systems must educate patients 
to avoid lower back and other injuries, stop smoking, 
and pursue proper diet and exercise.  Our unhealthy 
lifestyles begin far before the reach of the health-care 
delivery system; public-health measures, school-based 
programs, work-site programs and more are needed.  
But it could help a great deal if the health-care delivery 
system, with all its resources in intelligent, well-educat-
ed personnel, technology and money, ﬁ rmly pursued 
improving people’s health.84
Regional Centers for Complex Care.  Far too many 
complex medical procedures are performed in facilities 
that work in ineﬃ  cient and dangerously low volumes.85  
Fee-for-service payment rewards such choices.  Both 
economy and quality require concentrating complex 
care in regional centers of excellence.  Eﬃ  cient incen-
tives would drive delivery systems to create their own 
centers or subcontract the work to centers outside their 
systems, based on rational “make-buy” calculations.  
Th us, the eﬃ  ciencies that are attainable in chronic care 
can also be achieved at the other stages of the contin-
uum of care (procedures and catastrophic care), given 
sound incentives.
End-of-Life Care.  Although the share of health 
spending on patients in their last year of life has often 
been exaggerated, it is still signiﬁ cant, accounting for 
about 30 percent of Medicare, while Medicare accounts 
for about 17 percent of national health expenditures.  
Elliott Fisher and his Dartmouth colleagues recently 
examined Medicare spending per beneﬁ ciary (adjusted 
for regional price diﬀ erences) in the last six months of 
life, and found substantial regional variation, with the 
high-spending regions spending 60 percent more per 
patient than the low-spending regions.  Th ey reported, 
“Neither quality of care nor access to care appear to 
be better for Medicare enrollees in higher-spending 
regions… Medicare enrollees in higher-spending 
regions receive more care than those in lower-spending 
regions but do not have better health outcomes or 
satisfaction with care.”86
A recent RAND Health study found that “Th e exist-
ing health care system generally classiﬁ es patients by 
disease and setting of care, but this method is becoming 
less eﬀ ective because it works poorly for the increas-
ing number of elderly individuals who have multiple 
diseases and need care in more than one setting…End-
of-life care should be organized according to the kinds 
of services that groups of people need, rather than by 
disease diagnosis or where patients receive care…Pal-
liative care and conventional medical treatment should 
be thoroughly integrated rather than viewed as sepa-
rate entities.”87  Again, these recommendations support 
greater continuity and integration.  Integration of end-
of-life care, including integrated billing, would reduce 
the incentive to over-utilize ultimately fruitless special-
ist and intensive-care services, and encourage more-
humane alternatives.
Core Competencies That Are Not Encouraged by 
the Traditional Model Are Urgently Needed
Th e modern ﬁ rm, especially in the service sector, treats 
capital investment in information technology as a criti-
cal core competence.  Rather than focusing solely on 
automation of individual client records, they use those 
front-line data in every aspect of their work.  A health-
care system reorganized along the lines of medical 
conditions, as suggested above, would naturally pursue 
numerous improvements, some (but by no means all) 
of which are explained below.
Eﬀ ectiveness.  John E. Wennberg and his Dartmouth 
colleagues have documented very wide practice varia-
tions among doctors in diﬀ erent parts of the country, 
and even variations among doctors in the same com-
munity that cannot be explained by variations in medi-
cal need.  Wennberg ascribes much of this variation 
to medical uncertainty, to supply-side factors (such as 
too many surgeons), and to idiosyncrasies in practice 
39
style.88  Several eﬀ orts are underway to identify the 
best standards for care delivery, under the headings 
of “evidence-based medicine” and “guideline develop-
ment.”  Th ese processes could speed the transfer of 
scientiﬁ c discovery into medical practice.  
It is extraordinarily diﬃ  cult to manage the huge ﬂ ow 
of medical information.  Over 10,000 randomized 
trials are published each year.  Th is massive literature 
exceeds the grasp of solo or small-group practitioners.  
To provide aﬀ ordable, quality care to cost-conscious 
consumers, this information must be translated into 
up-to-date science-based best-practice guidelines by 
physicians with a serious interest in economical prac-
tice, and made conveniently available to doctors.  A 
consortium of medical groups in Minnesota called the 
Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement, and the 
Kaiser Permanente Care Management Institute, are 
pursuing this task.89  Th e Veterans Health Adminis-
tration has a similar program called the Quality En-
hancement Research Initiative.90  Such programs, com-
bined with monitoring and feedback, should greatly 
reduce the medical uncertainty that contributes to the 
very wide variations in medical practice.
Getting practice organizations to implement these 
guidelines will be a major challenge.  Th ough experi-
ence suggests that such guidelines are best applied by 
multi-specialty group practices with organizational 
missions of eﬃ  cient high-quality care, other small 
groups of practitioners who choose to focus on a niche 
service could have similar goals.
Building on this best-practice research, the health-
care system must move away from “ﬂ at-of-the-curve” 
medicine – that is, practices whose marginal health 
beneﬁ t is very small and uncertain relative to the cost.  
It must evaluate new technologies and use them only 
where evidence supports that they are beneﬁ cial to 
patients.  Such evaluation involves technology assess-
ment, including cost-eﬀ ectiveness or value for money 
in actual practice over time, and not just in controlled 
trials.  Fair regulators must create a legal framework 
under which health insurers can oﬀ er policies that do 
not cover some technologies because of cost, to make 
insurance more aﬀ ordable.  Doing so will be exceed-
ingly diﬃ  cult, but such restrictions may be necessary 
to achieve long-term sustainability.  At the same time, 
we must not shut down valuable life-saving innovation.
Genomics oﬀ ers exciting opportunities for better care 
– and also large challenges to the health-care system.  
Th ere are hundreds of genetic tests now available, 
some quite costly.  Genomics oﬀ ers opportunities to 
diagnose people at high risk of disease and to develop 
targeted therapies.  Eﬀ ective use of these resources will 
require systematic approaches, including evaluation of 
who should be tested, and what prevention strategies 
and therapies they should be oﬀ ered.  Legislation to fa-
cilitate market entry by companies that want to create 
and sell generic substitutes of very costly biologics once 
the patents held by the original developers have expired 
will also be needed.
Th ere has been considerable work to measure the 
quality of care and service in health plans and medical 
groups.  Th e National Committee for Quality As-
surance, a non-proﬁ t organization dedicated to this 
purpose, undertakes a well-tested survey and publishes 
ratings of health plans on quality of service and ac-
cess; performance of preventive services such as cancer 
screening and immunizations; and helping people to 
stay healthy, get better, and live with chronic illness.  
Such information is now on the Internet.91  If it is con-
veniently available to people choosing health plans, it 
will give those plans a powerful incentive to improve.
Access to Quality Coverage
We need humane coverage – coverage that is com-
prehensive, protecting everyone from severe ﬁ nancial 
hardship related to medical expenses, and also secure, 
so that people do not lose their coverage when they 
lose their spouses or change their jobs, divorce, become 
sick, or retire before age 65.  People need the right to 
stay with their preferred delivery system so long as 
they do not move out of its service area.  Insecure cov-
erage is a major problem in our health-care economy 
today, because many people are just a layoﬀ  away from 
economic insecurity and uncovered health-care costs.
We also need very broad risk pools, because some 
treatments that society seems unwilling to deny to 
those who need them have become extremely costly.  
Risk-spreading among competing delivery systems can 
be accomplished by risk adjustment and reinsurance 
for very-high-cost cases.
Finally, we need a more vigorous and eﬀ ective an-
ti-trust policy including breaking up any regional 
40
provider monopolies created by mergers whose main 
purpose is to achieve market power.h
Conclusion
Th ese attributes of existing successful health-care sys-
tems, taken together, would radically reshape health-
care delivery, yielding both higher quality and lower 
cost.  Yet each of these expectations is reasonable on its 
face.  None is more than what is already expected of a 
well-run, world-class competitive company in any other 
sector of the economy.  
Th is transformation of health-care practices cannot be 
imposed by the government top down, or even by em-
ployers.  It would be very diﬃ  cult to deﬁ ne such a sys-
tem in legislation, and no one knows exactly what the 
best system for health-care delivery is, or what it will 
become as health technology continues to evolve.  But 
the market forces of informed cost-conscious consumer 
choice can drive a successful transformation.  Better 
systems can emerge only by success in a competitive 
market.
Could such restructuring solve the problem of unsus-
tainable cost growth?  Th ere is no guarantee, just as 
there is no guarantee with any other system.  But it 
is eminently reasonable to conclude, at least, that the 
system reforms outlined here could reduce the level 
of health expenditures.  Given the range of premium 
costs among insurance plans using diﬀ erent delivery 
systems at this time, people who would move from the 
most- to the least-expensive plans would cut their costs 
by as much as half.i  As more-costly plans respond to 
competition, savings would accrue across the board.  
Th e motivation of competition would also appear to 
be our best chance to counterbalance the expenditure-
increasing eﬀ ects of expanding technology and the 
proliferation of chronic conditions, and thereby reduce 
the rate of growth of costs as well – facilitating quality 
and sustainable coverage for all.
Th ere remains the task of ﬁ nding the policy steps that 
can implement such a sweeping transformation.  Th e 
next chapter will address that task.
h  In its important report, Crossing the Quality Chasm: a New Health System for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2001), 
the IOM put forward a shorter list of ideal health-system attributes that is well worth considering carefully.  Th e paragraph headings of their list 
were: 1. Care based on continuous healing relationships.  2. Customization based on patient needs and values.  3. Th e patient as the source of control.  
4. Shared knowledge and the free ﬂ ow of information.  5. Evidence-based decision making.  6. Safety as a system property.  7. Th e need for transpar-
ency.  8. Anticipation of patient needs.  9. Continuous decrease in waste.  10. Cooperation among clinicians.  Th e ideas are completely compatible 
with the views expressed above.
i  Based very roughly on the diﬀ erences between the most and least expensive premiums charged where employees do have responsible choices among 
competing plans.
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Chapter Four: Essentials of Market-Based Universal 
Health Insurance with Consumer Choice of Health Plan
So if the single-payer or consumer-directed approaches 
will not solve the problems of high levels and growth of 
expenditure, not to mention the uninsured, poor qual-
ity, and poor disease management, what will?a  Th ere 
are no easy, simple solutions.
And there are no guarantees.  Th e nation cannot simply 
decree a reimbursement reduction for health-care pro-
viders: doing so would discourage the supply of health 
care.  As has been the case in stopgap reimbursement 
cuts in the federal Medicare program, doctors and hos-
pitals would respond by performing more individual 
services to maintain their total billing amounts.  Like-
wise, the nation cannot decree an arbitrary limit to the 
volume of medical services provided; that could prevent 
the delivery of needed services.  An arbitrary halt to 
the development of medical technology would inhibit 
innovations that could beneﬁ t people enormously, and 
would prevent the discovery of cost-reducing, as well as 
cost-increasing, treatments and therapies.  And there 
are no clear models from overseas.  Virtually all the in-
dustrialized countries are facing similar unsustainable 
expenditure growth rates, though from lower levels of 
spending than ours measured as percentages of GDP.
Th us, there likely is no strategy that would yield a 
precisely measurable, accurately predictable amount of 
health-care cost savings.
However, there are feasible changes that might make a 
large diﬀ erence and, in the long run, move the system 
in the right direction.  Th e heart of the solution is 
ﬁ nancing reforms to create competition to serve cost-
conscious buyers, which will build incentives for pro-
viders to develop and run high-quality, but aﬀ ordable, 
health-care delivery systems.  
Th e only way to achieve sustainable, quality health care 
is to obtain from the health industry the same level 
of process and eﬃ  ciency improvement that we have 
come to expect from other sectors of our economy.  
Merely shifting the nominal responsibility for the 
cost from one party to another (say, from business to 
government), when the cost is growing faster than the 
capacity of the economy as a whole to pay it, obviously 
will not suﬃ  ce.  But as the earlier chapters of this 
report have suggested, a systemic restructuring of the 
health-insurance system, with sharpened incentives for 
cost-conscious behavior on the parts of both individuals 
and providers, could reduce both the level and the rate 
of growth of costs while improving quality.
Competition motivates innovation and eﬃ  ciency.  For 
virtually the entire non-health-care economy, competi-
tive pressures have increased quality and tempered 
prices in unpredictable ways.  Consumer choices have 
signaled price standards and preferred product and 
service attributes to the marketplace, and suppliers 
have improved their processes and methods to meet 
and then to surpass those standards, thereby setting 
new ones.  Even given the unique nature of health care, 
some elements of competition provide the best hope for 
a more cost-eﬃ  cient health-care system.  
What would a competitive system do?  Clearly, we 
need a fundamental change that would give almost 
everyone a serious personal interest in seeking and 
choosing a quality, economical health-care delivery 
system.  Th e earlier discussion of CDHPs expressed 
doubt that consumers could drive health-care eﬃ  ciency 
by shopping for lower prices for individual treatments 
and therapies for serious illnesses.  However, consum-
ers could have meaningful inﬂ uence on the health-care 
market by shopping in a more deliberate fashion for 
cost-eﬃ  cient health-care plans.
Such systems exist.  Th e University of California oﬀ ers 
employees a range of choices including both FFS and 
group practices, with a ﬁ xed-dollar contribution set 
at the risk-adjusted premium of the low-priced plan, 
which, like all plans, must meet quality and coverage 
a  See the discussion of the single-payer and CDHP options in Chapter Two.
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standards set by the University.  Th e state of Wisconsin 
has a similar system for its employees, and the Neth-
erlands has recently enacted its own national reform 
along these lines.92  In such arrangements, every con-
sumer can beneﬁ t ﬁ nancially from choosing a lower-
priced plan, and the low-priced plan can protect its 
market share by maintaining or widening the gap be-
tween its premium and those of its competitors.  Em-
ployees make their choices at an annual enrollment at 
which the prices are displayed side-by-side, and switch-
ing plans is made easy.  Under these conditions, 81 
percent of the employees of the University have chosen 
the lower-cost plans (in this case, group-practice-based 
HMOs), as have 90 percent of the employees of the 
state of Wisconsin.  Wells Fargo Bank in California has 
a similar model whose enrollment in low-cost group-
practice-based HMOs is 78 percent.b  Th e Federal 
Government does something similar for its employees, 
and 58 percent of Federal employees in California have 
chosen the same HMOs oﬀ ered to employees of the 
University and Wells Fargo.  Th e reform in the Neth-
erlands has been in operation for only one year, but in 
that year has seen a decline in the rate of cost growth.
Under these systems, cost-conscious employee choice 
drives patients to the most-eﬃ  cient providers and 
motivates the others to reduce costs and increase qual-
ity to maintain their competitive positions.  Unfortu-
nately, only a small percentage of employees are in such 
models now.  As explained earlier, most employers do 
not oﬀ er choices, and many of those that do pay all, 
or nearly all, of even the highest premiums for their 
employees.  Th is apparent generosity gives even gener-
ally cost-ineﬃ  cient providers a secure market, with no 
incentive to improve.c  What is needed is for essentially 
everyone, possibly excepting groups such as the dis-
abled and the population undergoing long-term care, to 
receive a regionally based ﬁ xed-dollar payment toward 
his or her insurance premium, accompanied by a menu 
of meaningful choices of insurance plans.
Many people might doubt that the quality and cost 
of health care can be driven by consumer choice of a 
health-insurance plan.  We believe that such doubt 
arises from the distortions in the present markets and 
their negative consequences, as documented earlier.  
However, in this section, we examine an alternative that 
eliminates the current system’s distortions – by oﬀ ering 
consumers choices of diﬀ erent plans, and giving each 
consumer a ﬁ xed-dollar payment to purchase the plan 
of his or her choice.  In this system, consumers have an 
incentive to be cost-conscious.
To attain such a system, CED recommends two broad 
policy steps:
• Create competitive insurance markets and exchang-
es; and
• Provide universal premium credits ﬁ nanced by 
broadly based taxes.*
Th ese two changes to the ﬁ nancing system will lead 
naturally to a dramatic change in the health-care deliv-
ery system:
• Delivery systems and insurance carriers strive for 
quality and aﬀ ordability.
Th e model is based on observation and analysis of the 
success of employers such as the federal government; 
state governments in California, Washington, Wiscon-
sin and Minnesota; and the University of California, 
Stanford University, Wells Fargo and Hewlett-Packard 
in California.  Th ese employers have demonstrated its 
practicality.
Competitive Insurance Markets and 
Exchanges
Th e Need for a Market Organizer.  Th e markets for 
health insurance, or health insurance combined with 
health-care delivery, are unique.  Th eir uniqueness does 
not mean that competition in these markets is impos-
sible, but the nature of these markets does mean that 
the competitive process needs rules – much as do the 
markets for other insurance products or for securities, 
for example – to yield eﬃ  cient and fair outcomes.  Th e 
unique attributes of the health-insurance market are:
• Risk Selection.  When diﬀ erent health insurance 
plans compete for the same people, the health risks 
*See Memoranda, pages 84-86. 
b  Again, these are not cheap or bare-bones “plan designs,” but rather comprehensive coverage associated with large multi-specialty physician organi-
zations that are committed to economical use of resources.
c  What little competition exists in the current system has motivated many doctors who prefer the FFS model to form Independent Practice Associa-
tions (IPAs) that include management controls and enable them to compete.  
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or expected medical costs may not fall equally on 
the diﬀ erent insurers.  Biased or “adverse” selec-
tion can lead to spirals of instability in which some 
plans attract worse-than-average risks, forcing 
those plans to raise premiums, making them even 
less attractive to good risks who then exit the 
plans, leaving even worse risk pools in the plans – 
until the plans become non-viable.  Worse yet, the 
possibility of biased selection can create perverse 
incentives in which the insurers and associated 
providers, for survival, try to avoid enrollment 
by sick people, producing the opposite of what a 
health insurance system is supposed to be: ﬁ nanc-
ing care of the sick.  Th is perverse incentive can 
cause providers to avoid achieving expertise and 
distinction in the care of costly chronic conditions.  
In a completely free market, insurers would inspect 
and underwrite each applicant and reject those 
with high expected costs, which is not compatible 
with widespread or universal coverage, and would 
be costly and time consuming. 
• Moral Hazard.  Most employed Americans today 
do not even have a choice of insurer, or if they do 
have a choice, their employers (and the govern-
ment, through the tax code) pay more on their 
behalf if they choose a more-costly health insur-
ance plan.  Th is lack of competition biases choices 
toward more-costly care.  Moreover, once people 
are insured, their health-care services are free, or 
almost free, and people demand services that they 
would not choose if they had to pay their cost – in 
other words, services that are not worth their cost.  
So insured people choose more services, often of 
limited value, than do people without insurance.  
Th is perverse incentive is exacerbated by fee-for-
service payment to providers – under which both 
patients and providers have incentives to demand 
and provide services they would not choose if 
patients had to pay and providers were not paid 
for each service.  Th ere is no perfect answer to this 
problem.  As explained earlier, high deductibles do 
little to mitigate this problem, because health 
expenditures are highly concentrated on relatively 
few people who will have exceeded their deduct-
ibles and would not pay for additional services 
out-of-pocket.  Th e most eﬀ ective answers include 
incentives for providers to deliver care eﬃ  ciently 
and not over-sell services of doubtful value, and 
consumer cost-sharing for services that are mostly 
consumer-preference items.  However, aside from 
plastic surgery and “lifestyle drugs” such as for 
baldness or erectile dysfunction, drawing the line 
between “necessary care” and “consumer-preference 
care” can be diﬃ  cult. 
• Unusual Complexity.  Health insurance contracts 
– their language and the underlying technology 
– are extremely complex.  Th ere are too many 
possible future events.  Few consumers really 
understand their health insurance policies or 
actually read them.  Even the “simpliﬁ ed” presen-
tations of employee beneﬁ t packages usually take 
40 to 50 lines just to describe the services covered 
or excluded, the limitations, and the co-payments 
or coinsurance rates.  Medical care is even more 
complex.  It generally takes seven or eight years of 
post-graduate education and training to be consid-
ered a qualiﬁ ed physician, plus continuing educa-
tion thereafter.  Although some people can become 
suﬃ  ciently informed to contribute to strategic 
choices in particular cases, the vast majority must 
rely on the advice of their doctors, which makes 
them less than equal participants in a competitive 
market.
• Information.  As discussed in the following chap-
ter, there is a paucity of reliable, understandable 
information on the costs and comparative eﬃ  cacy 
of interventions and technologies.  Merely publish-
ing hospital charges for individual episodes would 
address only a part of the problem.  No matter 
how much information is accumulated and dis-
seminated, and with the exception of a small and 
highly motivated population, the doctor will know 
a lot more about a patient’s medical condition than 
the patient.  Th at is why patients consult doctors, 
and why the doctor’s incentives are important in 
the design of a system.
What the Market Organizer Must Do.  Because of 
these complexities, to establish and enforce rules that 
maintain fair competition and its eﬃ  ciencies for indi-
viduals and families as decided by the employer or the 
legislature, health insurance markets must be organized 
by a neutral third party – an entity with a name such 
as “market organizer,” an “exchange,” a “connector,” a 
“pooled purchasing arrangement,” a “Health Insur-
ance Purchasing Cooperative,” a “Health Market,” a 
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“Health Help Agency,” or a “Sponsor.”  For simplic-
ity, let us call such an entity an “exchange.”  Th ere are 
ample precedents for such a market organizer in the 
federal and state agencies for transactions in securities 
(as well as in the quasi-regulatory functions performed 
by the private ﬁ nancial exchanges themselves) and 
other forms of insurance.
Th e exchange would be the single point of entry for all 
consumers to purchase health insurance; buyers and 
sellers would execute transactions through the ex-
change according to established rules.  Th ere could be 
one national exchange managing insurance choices in 
all regions, or each region could have its own exchange 
(more discussion of that choice is provided below).  Ex-
changes would pool large numbers of individual risks 
and spread administrative overhead so that small-busi-
ness workforces could aﬀ ord insurance.  An exchange 
for health insurance, like a securities exchange, could 
perform much of its service in digital electronic form.
Th e exchange would oﬀ er choices of alternative health 
insurers and providers, who would be free to use al-
ternative delivery system models.  It would be essential 
that wide-access PPO plans be available, so that every-
one who wanted to continue with such coverage and 
with his or her own physician could do so; every con-
sumer could “keep what he or she had.”   Th e exchange 
would either select participating plans for economy 
and satisfaction of consumer choices, or, if there is to 
be free entry and a relatively large number of plans, 
organize the information for consumers with “plan-
chooser” software to make it easy for them to ﬁ nd the 
plans that best suit them.d
Th e exchanges would facilitate individual choices 
and switching among plans during periodic open-en-
rollment periods.  To provide universal coverage, the 
exchange would need to engage in outreach services 
such as advertising, and placing personnel and comput-
ers in public libraries and other locations where people 
– especially low-income people – could enroll easily, 
including online.
Each subscriber would notify the exchange of his or 
her choice of health plan, and the exchange would 
notify the plan, so that the plan had no opportunity 
to screen applicants.  Th is is normal in employment 
settings, but unfortunately is not the case in Medicare 
and Medicaid.
Every eligible person would be covered, and eligibility 
would be guaranteed.e  No exclusions would be allowed 
for preexisting conditions.  Th e same premium would 
be charged for the same coverage regardless of health 
status.  Coverage would be continuous.  Persons 
choosing a plan priced above the low-priced plan would 
pay the premium diﬀ erence with their own money (as 
explained in more detail below).
To make demand price elastic, and therefore to make 
competition eﬀ ective in motivating improvements in 
eﬃ  ciency and quality:
• Th e exchange must enforce public quality-related 
information-reporting requirements, and distrib-
ute information about plans, including their qual-
ity, coverage, performance, and price, in a conve-
nient side-by-side comparison so that people can 
switch plans to save money if they so choose;
• Th e exchange must standardize the ﬁ ne-print 
contract language and reasonably standardize plan 
designs, so that consumers can make meaningful 
price comparisons at a reasonable search and study 
cost, and switch easily and with conﬁ dence at the 
annual enrollment.  Coverage contracts must be 
standardized to focus comparison on price and 
quality, not features, to counter market segmenta-
tion and the use of the coverage contract to select 
risks;f and
• Choice must be at the individual or household 
level, not the employment group level, so that each 
person is free to switch plans regardless of the 
preferences of co-workers. 
Importantly, to prevent the ill eﬀ ects of risk selec-
tion, the exchange must risk-adjust premiums.  Th e 
d  Th is approach has been attempted in Medicare Part D, but the number of plans was so large that it required considerable eﬀ ort to create a system 
for the elderly to study and compare the alternatives.
e   A major issue in creating any system of universal health insurance will be to deﬁ ne who are eligible to be covered through it.  In the United States, 
the most salient issue is likely to be coverage for undocumented aliens. 
f  Th is standardization does not mean identical contracts, but it does mean that ﬁ ne print exclusions need to be the same, that diﬀ erences in some 
key coverages (including mental health and fertility treatments) be minimized to avoid adverse selection, and that variations in front-end cost sharing 
must be reduced to the point that most people can understand the choices.
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exchange would process and analyze information on 
each enrollee to estimate the cost of that person’s cov-
ered medical services.  Estimates in the near future 
will most likely be based on prescription drug use, 
which is recorded in electronic form for most people 
and which indicates the presence of chronic conditions, 
as well as the person’s age, sex and location.  However, 
research continues and continued improvement can be 
expected, especially with public-policy support.  Th ese 
estimates would then be pooled to produce a rela-
tive risk score for each plan’s enrollees.  Th e exchange 
would then transfer some of the premium revenue 
to compensate those insurers that enroll the greatest 
numbers of relatively poor risks, from the revenues of 
those that enroll more relatively good risks.  Th e prices 
that consumers see and pay would be the prices that 
a plan would ultimately receive if it had enrolled an 
average population of risks.  Th e adjustment would be 
a behind-the-scenes computerized process, invisible 
to consumers.  It would eliminate all need for under-
writing individual people.g  Insurers already accept risk 
adjustment in existing systems similar to this proposal. 
Risk adjustment would maintain incentives for plans 
to enroll and care for sick people, not to avoid them, 
and avoid the instability caused by spirals of adverse 
selection. 
Next, should there be one national exchange, or should 
there be separate regional exchanges?  (“Regions” could 
be market areas such as Southern, Central, and North-
ern California; upstate and downstate New York and 
Illinois; etc.)  Should operations – including contract-
ing, enrollment, publication of information on quality 
and patient satisfaction, and analysis and reporting on 
local market conditions – be decentralized to regional 
oﬃ  ces?  On the one hand, a single central operation in 
Washington would be simpler and cheaper, especially 
for plans entering new markets.  One level of approval 
would admit plans to markets anywhere in the United 
States.  Th e federal Oﬃ  ce of Personnel Management 
(OPM) has managed the FEHBP centrally and suc-
cessfully for 47 years, at times managing relationships 
with hundreds of diﬀ erent health plans. 
Alternatively, decentralization to regional exchanges 
would recognize that health care is delivered locally 
and varies widely by region.  Regional exchanges would 
study market conditions in their regions, prepare “Beige 
Books” analyzing the regional performance of health 
care, and report to the national exchange.  Th e regional 
exchanges could work with local non-proﬁ t provider-
sponsored plans to help them enter the market and 
increase competition.  Th e national exchange could 
assign auditing functions to regional exchanges using 
uniform national standards.  Th e regional exchanges 
could represent the system as a whole to people in their 
regions and also represent their regions to the national 
exchange.  In any case, detailed knowledge of diﬀ erent 
localities would be needed somewhere in the system.  
And a Washington-based centralized system might be 
less sensitive to local conditions and less interested in 
working with small local provider-sponsored health 
plans.
Th e system could succeed in either a centralized or a 
decentralized model.  Legislators or the exchange sys-
tem would need to study the issue and make a decision. 
In either case, the boundaries of regions for adminis-
trative purposes should not determine the service areas 
of health plans.  Rather, health plans should establish 
the boundaries of their own service areas.  For a suc-
cessful example, the Wisconsin Department of Em-
ployee Trust Funds, which runs the State Employee 
Group Health Insurance program, invites bids from 
qualifying health plans for each county.  A health plan 
could bid on all 72 Wisconsin counties, or only one 
county, or any combination in between.  In essence, 
each health plan deﬁ nes its own region, which ensures 
that plans have what they believe are strong networks 
of providers.  Employer contributions are then keyed to 
the low-priced plans in each county.93
Th e competitive insurance market that would evolve 
from these policy innovations would be based on price 
competition, but the price in question is the annual pre-
mium for comprehensive health-care services, not the 
price of each individual service.  Th e annual premium, 
including any copayments and deductibles, represents 
the plan’s total annual cost per person.  It gives the 
subscriber an incentive to choose the health plan that 
provides the best combination of quality and cost.  
g  Risk equalization might also include a reinsurance mechanism for very-high-cost cases, designed so as not to weaken the incentives of health plans 
to prevent the onset of high-cost illnesses or to manage the cases eﬀ ectively.
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People can understand and respond to such a choice 
eﬀ ectively, during the annual enrollment when they 
have information, a clearly deﬁ ned menu of alterna-
tives, and the time for consideration.94
Such a competitive insurance market can obtain maxi-
mum value for money for consumers and taxpayers, 
using fair rules derived from rational microeconomic 
principles, and from experience.  Th ose health plans 
with the best combination of quality, low cost, and 
patient satisfaction succeed and have the most sub-
scribers.  Success is decided by the judgment of in-
formed, cost-conscious consumers.  Th e rules must not 
reward health plans for selecting good risks, avoiding 
sick people, refusing costs, or otherwise defeating the 
goals of eﬃ  cient competition.95
Th us, an exchange-based system would provide every 
individual with a menu of choices of health plans that 
meet clear standards for coverage and value.  Every 
individual could change plans during regular open 
seasons to seek better quality and value for money, and 
would be guaranteed coverage by the plan of his or her 
choice.  Prices to individuals would be independent 
of pre-existing conditions; and insurers who covered 
disproportionately high-risk populations would be 
compensated, and would not suﬀ er from adverse selec-
tion.  Th e health-insurance exchange would be half of 
the foundation of a working, competitive market for 
health insurance.
Universal Premium Credits
Th e exchange itself would deliver the second major 
building block of eﬀ ective competition.  Every eligible 
person would receive a credit, which would act as a pre-
mium contribution toward purchase of the plan of his or 
her choice, and also a guarantee of ability to purchase 
insurance from that plan.  Th e payment should equal 
or approximate the price of the lowest-priced plan 
that serves the enrollee’s area and meets comprehen-
sive standards.  As already is the case for the state of 
Wisconsin, the University of California and the Federal 
Employees Health Beneﬁ ts plans, only quality plans 
with broad coverage may compete.  If an individual 
chooses to buy a more-expensive option, he or she must 
pay the diﬀ erence, which creates a powerful incentive 
for people to choose eﬃ  cient systems – that is, systems 
that they believe oﬀ er the best value for their money.  
Experience shows that more-cost-eﬃ  cient systems do 
very well in such competitive, cost-conscious environ-
ments.  Providers would then have a corresponding 
incentive to create and join eﬃ  cient systems.
With a credit that was signiﬁ cantly lower than the 
price of the low-priced plan, many people would choose 
not to pay the diﬀ erence to enroll.  In 2007, only 82 
percent of workers oﬀ ered health insurance by their 
employers actually accepted the oﬀ er.96  A premium 
support payment of 100 percent of the low-priced 
plan provides a logical incentive for full participation 
without complex mandates or other enforcement, and 
without costly means-testing.  Funds for these pay-
ments should come from broadly based tax revenues 
raised through, for example, a payroll, value-added or 
environmental tax.h  Employers are not in this picture, 
other than, should they so choose, helping their 
employees to make their choices (and possibly, depend-
ing on the program design, collecting employee pay-
ments and forwarding them to the exchanges).i
Funding through a broad-based tax would enable 
enormous simpliﬁ cation.  Th ere would be no question 
whether a particular individual qualiﬁ ed for coverage.  
Because everyone in the society would participate in 
the broad-based tax, everyone would have paid, and 
would be eligible.  Payment of the tax, whatever its 
form, would meet the standards of personal responsi-
bility that are appropriate for coverage.  Th ere would be 
no need to enforce any individual mandate to purchase 
coverage.  Such enforcement could involve signiﬁ cant 
additional complexity under the individual income tax, 
or through some new freestanding administrative 
apparatus.  Th ere would be no need to collect premi-
ums for the low-priced plan.  Should some individual 
fail to enroll in a plan at the inauguration of the system 
or at subsequent ﬁ rst eligibility, that person would 
already have paid for coverage; the only question would 
be that person’s choice of plan.j
h  Th is question is discussed in more detail below.  Another revenue source would be the elimination of the current income-tax exclusion for
employer-paid health-insurance premiums.
i  Employers might choose to continue dental insurance and coverage for other services not covered by the universal health insurance program, but 
probably without the beneﬁ t of tax subsidies.
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Health-Care Financing and Delivery 
Systems Pursue Quality and Affordability
Together, establishing a health-insurance exchange 
and the availability of ﬁ xed-dollar contributions would 
lead naturally to a competitive marketplace for health-
care providers and insurance plans.  Every consumer 
would have health insurance through the ﬁ xed-dollar 
premium credits, but more importantly would have an 
incentive to choose the plan that he or she believed to 
be the best combination of quality and value for money, 
because he or she would pay any cost beyond the ﬁ xed-
dollar credit with after-tax dollars.  Consumers could 
change plans freely at annual open seasons if they were 
dissatisﬁ ed.  Th erefore, to attract and to keep custom-
ers, plans would have to pursue eﬃ  ciency and quality.  
Th is system might be called “market-based universal 
health insurance.”
Th is design would focus competition on value for 
money in the informed best judgment of consumers, 
and not in any way pick winners and losers in advance.  
Th e competitive market would do that, over time.  Th e 
system should encourage diﬀ ering delivery modes to 
foster competition and innovation.k  It should in-
clude plans with fee-for-service organization and wide 
choices of physicians, so that those who currently use 
such systems and want to continue to do so can keep 
what they know and prefer.  In the end, some existing 
models might succeed in the competitive marketplace, 
or the winners might be entirely new, as-yet-unimag-
ined models.  One thing would be certain: the outcome 
would be better than today because the incentives and 
opportunities for consumers to choose quality, aﬀ ord-
able care would be enormously increased.
At this time, the health-care institutions that appear 
most to embody the attributes of eﬃ  ciency include the 
various integrated delivery systems based on multi-
specialty group practices, and network models link-
ing multi-specialty group practices .l  Experience in 
California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Washington and 
Massachusetts, and in the FEHBP, including all of 
these models, shows that relatively eﬃ  cient organized 
delivery systems do exist, their performance can be 
measured, they can and do improve, and they have the 
potential to deliver better-quality and more-cost-eﬃ  -
cient care.97
As was noted above, there is an existing model of what 
the whole market for health-care ﬁ nancing and deliv-
ery could be, in the choices presented to a University 
of California or a Wisconsin state employee: a menu 
of quality competing health plans, with information 
on quality and patient satisfaction, and a responsible 
ﬁ nancial choice – that is, the employer pays the price of 
the low-priced plan, and the employees who want plans 
that cost more pay the diﬀ erence.
A similar suggestion by some prominent elected 
oﬃ  cials from both political parties is to use the 
FEHBP as a model for everyone.  Th e FEHBP oﬀ ers 
employees and retirees a wide range of choices and a 
semi-ﬁ xed-dollar employer contribution.  Th e FEHBP 
is a large and nationwide system and serves as another 
good metaphor, although it should correct several sig-
niﬁ cant design deﬁ ciencies, either for serving its exist-
ing population, or as a national model.m
j  Note that an individual who failed to enroll in a timely way, and subsequently, upon needing care, chose to participate in a plan more expensive than 
the low-priced plan, would rightly be responsible for the incremental cost of that more-expensive plan since the last open enrollment.
k  One valid concern about such a model is that it could encourage a “race to the bottom,” under which insurance carriers would attempt to lower 
prices by reducing value rather than increasing eﬃ  ciency.  Such a development must be prevented, and it would be a part of the role of the exchange to 
do so.  (In the FEHBP, the federal Oﬃ  ce of Personnel Management (OPM) already plays this role.)  One obvious way for insurers to try to cut prices 
would be to introduce and increase deductibles.  To prevent such manipulation, we believe that insurers that oﬀ er high-deductible health plans must 
be required to fund, out of their premium revenue, health savings accounts in the amount of the deductibles.  Advocates of HDHPs with HSAs in 
the current employer setting have argued that they are cost-eﬀ ective to the employer, even with employer contributions to HSAs.  If that is true, then 
a requirement for insurers to fund HSAs should not prove an unfair handicap to the HDHP plan design.  FEHBP is discussed further in the follow-
ing chapter.
l  See Appendix C for a discussion of existing health-care delivery models, and how they might adapt.
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The Cost of a Reformed Health-Insurance 
System
Some features of the system that we propose would re-
duce total health-care spending; others would increase 
it.  As coverage increases and approaches the univer-
sal, more people would seek care.  On the other hand, 
there would be savings over time as newly covered 
people receive preventive care, and engage in healthier 
lifestyles as a result.  More fundamentally, cost-con-
scious consumers would gradually migrate toward 
less-expensive plans; and all plans would respond by 
seeking eﬃ  ciencies to reduce their premiums.  Some of 
these changes might occur sooner, while others might 
materialize in the future; some might aﬀ ect costs on a 
one-time basis, while others could change the rate of 
growth of costs over a longer period.
CED plans further research, to include a detailed ac-
tuarial analysis of our recommendations.  However, we 
can draw some tentative conclusions from estimates for 
similar legislation proposed by Senators Ron Wyden 
(D-OR) and Robert F. Bennett (R-UT).n,98  Th ose es-
timates indicate that total national spending on health 
care would be less than what it would be if the current 
system remained in force – by (assuming for purposes 
of analysis that the plan had been eﬀ ective this year) 
$4.5 billion (which is a very small percentage) in 2007, 
and by $336 billion (or 7.7 percent) in 2016.  Th e sav-
ings in the ﬁ rst year would be a net total that would in-
clude $49.0 billion of additional services for the newly 
insured, $54.9 billion of savings from the incentives of 
price competition for consumers and insurers, and net 
savings in administration (with costs of the new “ex-
changes” oﬀ setting reductions in insurer and employer 
costs) of $29.8 billion (plus other, smaller line-items).  
Th e annual growth rate of national health spending is 
estimated to be reduced by 0.86 percent.
In other words, if the nation could use the resources 
that are now devoted to health care – by employers, 
households, and governments – under a system of 
responsible, cost-conscious consumer choice, then it 
could aﬀ ord coverage for all – with money left over.  
Furthermore, the amount left over, relative to the re-
sults under the status quo, would grow over time.
However, mobilizing the resources now used for 
health care would be a non-trivial task.  For reasons of 
fairness, eﬃ  ciency and administrative simplicity, we 
believe that the federal government should ﬁ nance the 
premium credits for every consumer to pay private in-
surers for coverage, and so employers, individuals, and 
state and local governments, who now pay much of the 
cost of health care, would no longer need to.  For the 
federal government to obtain each of those dollars now 
spent on health care, it would need to tax employers 
and individuals – which is never popular – and impose 
“maintenance of eﬀ ort” requirements on state and local 
governments – which are always inexact and politi-
cally divisive.  Keeping employers’ premiums ﬂ owing to 
health care would raise the issue of whether ﬁ rms that 
do not now purchase insurance – often, arguably, be-
cause they cannot aﬀ ord it – should be made to pay; or, 
alternatively, whether ﬁ rms that now do pay for their 
own employees should be made implicitly to pay for 
other ﬁ rms’ employees as well.  Some households now 
pay nothing for their health insurance, because their 
employers pay in full; they might resent any assessment 
for health care.o  Individuals and households that now 
m  Speciﬁ cally:  (1) Th e employer contribution is not a true ﬁ xed-dollar amount.  It is set at 70 percent of the average premium of some of the largest 
plans.  But if a plan were to oﬀ er a premium lower than the contribution amount, the employee choosing the plan would get to keep only 25 percent 
of the savings.  Th at amounts to a 75 percent tax on eﬃ  ciency and a strong disincentive for any plan to oﬀ er a premium below that average, which 
drives up the average.  Th e Congress should provide that if any plan oﬀ ers a premium below the average (subject to a limitation mentioned next), 
the employee choosing it can keep 100 percent of the savings.  (2) Th e program should specify a standard uniform minimum package that all plans 
must cover, but let competitors come down to that standard.  Establishing a standard minimum package would help to prevent problems of adverse 
selection (if, for example, one plan were to oﬀ er coverage for fertility treatments while another did not, the former systematically would attract some 
very expensive risks).  (3) Th ere ought to be risk adjustment of premiums using state-of-the-art methods, analogous to what is done in Medicare 
Advantage.  (4) Instead of national uniform pricing that does not take account of regional diﬀ erences in the cost of doing business, there ought to be 
regional pricing.
n Th e Wyden and Bennett legislation shares the fundamental traits of the CED recommendations, in that it seeks responsible choices of private 
insurance by cost-conscious consumers, through what we call “exchanges.”  Th eir proposal diﬀ ers mainly in that it would organize insurance choices 
at the state level, with an active role for state governments, rather than at the federal and regional level; it would ﬁ nance the insurance choices largely 
through assessments on employers and individual premium payments at the time of annual income tax ﬁ lings, rather than a broadly based tax (or 
taxes); and it would provide premium support through variable income-conditioned subsidies, rather than ﬁ xed-value payments.  We do not believe 
that these diﬀ erences would have a major eﬀ ect on the overall system cost.
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eschew insurance also might resent being forced to pay 
anything at all, although it is surely arguable that per-
sonal responsibility should require participating in the 
nation’s health insurance risk pool.  Th e requirement 
to purchase auto insurance is a fair analogy.
In sum, though a reformed health-insurance-ﬁ nancing 
system could cut the nation’s total cost of health care 
and slow its growth, it would by no means end disputes 
over who should pay how much of that total, at least in 
the short run.  Although no feasible payment scheme 
could hold every individual and every ﬁ rm harmless, 
we believe that a fair solution is attainable, and plan 
further research on this issue.
Effects on the Health-Care Industry
Th e health-care industry is now about one-sixth of the 
U.S. economy.  Any marked change in the structure of 
the industry would have correspondingly broad im-
pacts.  It is important to understand this process, both 
because of its eﬀ ect on the economy, and because of 
its implications for the political debate on health-care 
reform.
In the broadest sense, improving the eﬃ  ciency of 
health-care delivery would be no diﬀ erent from im-
proving the delivery of any other good or service: the 
economy and the nation as a whole would beneﬁ t.  Pro-
cess improvement in health-care delivery could reduce 
the 16.5 percent of the GDP that is now devoted to 
health care, or the rate of growth of that spending in 
the future, or both.p  Th e savings in purchases of health 
care would be used for other things.  However, the 
aggregate beneﬁ t of any savings would not protect 
everyone in the health-care sector from any loss of 
income.  Every dollar of the current 16.5 percent of the 
GDP that is spent on health care is income to some-
one who works in the industry.  If that share of GDP 
declines, some people’s incomes will decline, and some 
people may lose their jobs altogether.
Society should be sensitive to these eﬀ ects, and should 
cushion them as much as possible.  However, concern 
about those dislocations should not prevent progress 
for all.  Th e deterioration of the current system has left 
growing millions of people without coverage, to the 
detriment of their health and of the health-care system, 
which must provide uncompensated emergency care.  
Inaction would extend that deterioration – and could 
lead even to a sudden collapse of the system, if a major 
corporate bankruptcy cost large blocks of workers and 
retirees their coverage, and induced that ﬁ rm’s compet-
itors to try to abrogate their similar commitments to 
remain cost-competitive.  Th e current system is simply 
not sustainable, and the ill eﬀ ects of the status quo far 
exceed the dislocations of a carefully phased transition 
to a sustainable system.
Care Providers.  Many segments of the health-care sec-
tor would beneﬁ t from reform.  Physicians and other 
practitioners, hospitals, pharmaceutical ﬁ rms, and pro-
viders of health-care devices would be better oﬀ , in that 
having more people covered would mean more users of, 
and reliable payers for, their products and services.  At 
the same time, of course, those ﬁ rms and individuals 
would be subject to greater competition, and to more 
examination of the eﬃ  cacy of treatments and proce-
dures.  Some practitioners and hospitals might need to 
change their practice styles to match more closely what 
cost-conscious individual purchasers demand.  Sellers 
of pharmaceuticals and medical products might ﬁ nd 
that cost-conscious providers of health care – doctors, 
hospitals, and integrated group practices – would be 
more mindful of demonstrated performance and would 
drive harder bargains, though perhaps for higher vol-
umes because more persons would be covered.  How-
ever, over the long run, the outlook for stability and 
growth in the health-delivery sector would be much 
improved under a system of sustainable and universal 
coverage.  Th ose individuals and ﬁ rms that are willing 
to compete should welcome reform of the nature that 
we recommend.
Insurers.  Health-care restructuring could be diﬃ  cult 
for some parts of the insurance industry.  Th e avail-
ability of insurance to all through exchanges would 
increase the number of customers.  However, it also 
would obviate the need for underwriting and insur-
ance sales to ﬁ rms.  Some persons who work in those 
o  Such employees and their employers will face a bargaining issue over whether any employer’s net savings (if its broad-based tax liability is less than 
its prior health-insurance premiums) should be passed through to its employees in higher cash wages.
p  Of course, society could choose to spend more, although more eﬀ ectively, on health care.
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ﬁ elds would be needed for the presentation of in-
surance products to individual consumers through 
the exchanges, and for the work of the exchanges in 
risk-equalization of premium revenues.  However, the 
numbers of such new jobs would be relatively small.  
Insurance ﬁ rms themselves would be subject to greater 
competition, which would favor those ﬁ rms that are 
most able to improve quality and hold down costs.
Employers.  Many employers see health care as an im-
portant part of their workers’ lives, and want to be in-
volved and support them in maintaining care and good 
health.  For employers with highly skilled, highly paid 
employees, health-insurance premiums might still be a 
relatively small share of labor costs, and might still ap-
pear manageable.  However, the trends documented at 
the outset of this statement are inexorable: a declining 
percentage of U.S. employers oﬀ ers health coverage, 
and a declining absolute number – not just a percent-
age – of American workers and their dependents have 
employer coverage.  Th ose workers who have coverage 
face declining employer premium contributions and 
rising deductibles and co-payments.  With health-care 
costs rising faster than incomes, this situation will not 
improve.  With all the good will in the world, employ-
ers as a group cannot maintain aﬀ ordable, quality 
health insurance for their employees under the current 
ﬂ awed system.
Some employers might ﬁ nd health insurance to be 
administratively simple enough, because they buy 
“full-replacement” coverage, under which one carrier 
provides insurance for all of a ﬁ rm’s employees.  Insur-
ers prefer this approach as well, as protection against 
“slice business.”  However, as explained earlier, this 
type of coverage is inherently inﬂ ationary.  Th erefore, 
all things considered, employers who seek to provide 
coverage should be pleased at the establishment of a 
large and stable risk pool, with employees choosing the 
care they want, and the entire administrative burden 
assumed by the exchange.  Employers also should be 
relieved that the growing burden of insurance costs is 
lifted from them, and that they can direct their eﬀ orts 
more at competing in their own markets and less at 
managing health care.
Managers of some ﬁ rms might believe that they have 
special expertise at providing health insurance and that 
their plans provide a worker-recruitment advantage; 
such ﬁ rms might regret health reform.  However, the 
number of such ﬁ rms must have shrunk markedly over 
the last 20 years.  Furthermore, such ﬁ rms could use 
the savings from more-eﬃ  cient health care to recruit 
employees in other ways.  Firms that have not sought 
to provide coverage for their employees might resist 
making any contribution toward health care, even 
if the same responsibility is placed on all employers.  
Within employing ﬁ rms, there would be fewer human 
resources devoted to health care – which has been a 
growing activity for many years.  Firms could choose to 
continue to provide information and decision-making 
support to their employees.  New ﬁ rms might arise 
to provide such support either directly to individual 
households or through employers.
Labor Unions.  On the other side of the labor market, 
workers should be relieved to have guaranteed health-
care coverage.  Th e last few years have demonstrated 
clearly that even the apparently most-secure coverage 
can be at risk.  At the same time, insurance-market 
competition could be a substantial change for many or-
ganized workers.  Unions typically have bargained for 
their employers to pay the full cost of health insurance. 
As explained above, such arrangements lead directly 
to health-cost inﬂ ation.  It would be in the long-term 
interest of organized workers to bargain for cash wage 
increases equal to their employers’ net savings from no 
longer paying 100 percent of health-insurance premi-
ums, net of any health-insurance-earmarked tax in-
creases, and then use the higher wages to choose their 
own cost-eﬃ  cient health-care plans.
States and Localities.  Several states already have acted, 
or have begun to act, to reform health-care ﬁ nance.  
However, few if any states would be concerned if the 
federal government should preempt the issue; policy-
makers of the states that have acted invariably have 
said that they did so because the federal government 
had not.  And although state action is welcome, and 
will foster innovation and expand coverage, the states 
clearly are not best positioned to advance strong re-
form.  Th e federal government has the ﬁ rst access to 
the substantial resources needed to do the job properly. 
Left to their own resources, wealthier states will have 
a marked advantage over neighboring, poorer states, 
meaning that the wealthier states may increase their 
advantages as locations for future job creation.  And 
most fundamentally, individual states have insuﬃ  cient 
leverage over the entire U.S. health-ﬁ nance system to 
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achieve process improvement and cost control.  With 
the federal-level reform we contemplate, on the other 
hand, the heavy state responsibility for the Medicaid 
program should ease substantially.  Both states and 
localities, including local public hospitals, should do 
better because of reduced cost to care for the unin-
sured and the low-income population.
In sum, cost-saving economic change has occurred in 
countless sectors of the economy – in shifts from me-
chanical to electronic wrist watches, from ﬁ lm to digi-
tal photography, and from paper to digital information 
transmission, to name only a few.  International trade, 
broadly, ﬁ ts the same mold.  All such changes make 
society as a whole better oﬀ , but entail some disloca-
tion.  In every such instance, economists are nearly 
unanimous that productivity advancements must be 
encouraged, but that those who are dislocated must be 
helped.  Resisting productivity improvements would 
reduce standards of living for the nation as a whole 
and would continue to drain government budgets and 
crowd out other public investments.  In the instance 
of health care, these dangers are already evident, as 
workers receive lower after-health-insurance pay, ﬁ rms 
burdened by health-care costs lose business to competi-
tors from abroad, and state and local governments cut 
education spending to pay for health care.  Health-care 
reform remains imperative even accounting for any 
economic dislocations.
Conclusion
It is unclear whether the nation could move to a radi-
cally improved health-insurance system in one giant 
step.  Th e health-care sector constitutes a massive 
one-sixth of the economy.  It has invested billions of 
dollars in buildings and health-care hardware (such as 
the various diagnostic testing machines), which can-
not instantaneously be liqueﬁ ed and re-cast as diﬀ erent 
health-care instruments that might be more useful and 
eﬃ  cient.  It also includes many thousands of profes-
sionals who have learned particular skills and cannot 
themselves be redeployed instantaneously in other 
specialties to reduce costs.  And, incidentally, health 
care is a growing employer – one of the largest in the 
economy.  Any eﬃ  ciency-improving reform will take 
years of painstaking innovation, and will aﬀ ect the lives 
of many people as workers and investors – not just as 
patients.
Th e next chapter will describe a practical transition 
from where we are to sustainable and more-eﬃ  cient 
medical care.  It will emphasize the need for steady, 
visible progress toward clearly articulated goals, while 
moving at a pace that is manageable for the existing 
industry and its work force.
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Our democracy moves in incremental steps.  Th e polit-
ical process resists sudden, large, discontinuous chang-
es with uncertain consequences.  Quantum change is 
rare in peacetime or in the absence of a major upheaval 
such as deep recession or depression.  Medicare, which 
now spends about $350 billion per year, was started in 
1965 with the thin end of an implementation wedge 
and wildly unrealistic estimates of how much it would 
cost: there was limited awareness of just how momen-
tous a decision it was.  
Th e failings in cost, quality and access in American 
health care today have become extremely serious, and 
the changes needed in our health-care ﬁ nancing and 
delivery system are fundamental and far-reaching.  
Fundamentally reorienting the underlying ﬁ nancial in-
centives of a $2 trillion industry is a huge undertaking.  
Th e industry must change from being cost-unconscious 
and cost-increasing to cost and value conscious.  Some 
see the entire health-care problem as the large and 
growing number of people without health insurance, 
and there is a crying need for universal coverage.  How-
ever, as the analysis above makes clear, there can be no 
secure coverage for anyone unless the growth of costs 
is slowed to a sustainable rate, through a transforma-
tion that optimistically will take a decade of constant 
eﬀ ort and innovation, with attendant dislocation in the 
health-care industry.*
To achieve this fundamental restructuring through 
a political process that values stability, this chapter 
lays out a path of bold – but feasible – incremental 
steps that could produce steady progress, and in the 
end achieve market-based universal health insurance.  
We do not claim that the proposed transition is the 
only way to get our country to universal market-based 
health insurance, or even the best way.  Rather, we be-
lieve that it demonstrates that, given political will and 
support, it would be possible to get there from here.  
It is what mathematicians call “proving an existence 
theorem.”
Th e proposed transition builds on the experience of 
existing models – which in many cases have worked 
well for decades.  It adapts some existing institutions, 
such as the FEHBP, to new roles.  Also, it builds a new 
institution – a “Federal Health Insurance Board” or 
“Health Fed,” patterned on the governance, expertise 
and regional structure of the Federal Reserve System – 
to oversee, regulate and manage the system. 
Phase I: Building the Foundations for 
Responsible Choice
To move from the current health-care system to sustain-
able, aﬀ ordable, quality care for all, CED recommends 
the following transitional policy steps:
• To create an appropriate administrative structure: 
modernize and adapt the FEHBP to make it the 
framework for a national system of health insurance 
exchanges.  Put the FEHBP under the supervision of 
a new agency patterned on the Federal Reserve Board. 
Here we will refer to it as the “Health Fed.”
• To ease market entry across the country, to make 
health care more competitive and less costly, and to 
eliminate conﬂ icts between state and federal regulation 
of health insurance: modernize and simplify health 
insurance regulation by creating an alternative federal 
regulatory system that multi-state health plans can 
choose.  Designate the Health Fed as the regulatory 
agency.
• To provide reliable, objective and authoritative scien-
tiﬁ c information about the value and costs of clinical 
interventions: create a national institute for medical 
outcomes and technology assessment, or build it onto 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Translation-
al Medicine Program which determines the eﬀ ective-
ness of new technology and procedures in the delivery 
system.
Chapter Five:  How Might We Get There? A Path to 
Consumer-Choice-Driven Universal Health Insurance in 
Feasible Incremental Steps
*See Memorandum, page 86
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• To reverse the recent erosion of health-insurance cover-
age, and the consequent growth in the number of the 
uninsured: expand existing safety-net programs, espe-
cially the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP), pending the availability of true universal 
coverage.
First, to adapt the FEHBP to a new expanded mis-
sion, policy-makers must correct some of its features 
that would conﬂ ict with that role.  Th ose steps should 
include:
• Replace the present employer-contribution amount 
(70 percent of the average of the largest plans) 
with a genuine ﬁ xed-dollar contribution, region-
ally adjusted, so that those who choose plans that 
cost less than the contribution keep 100 percent of 
the savings, not the 25 percent they now may keep. 
Today’s model gives little incentive to any health 
insurer to oﬀ er a plan priced below the contribu-
tion amount, and instead tilts the ﬁ nancial incen-
tives in the direction of higher prices.
• Risk-equalize premium revenue, similar to what is 
done in Medicare, nationwide in the Netherlands, 
and in similar delivery systems in the United 
States.  As explained earlier, risk equalization is 
essential to getting incentives right – and particu-
larly to avoiding uncompensated adverse selection.
• Establish a minimum beneﬁ t standard for all 
plans, allowing them to oﬀ er broader coverage at 
their own choice.  Otherwise, there would be an 
endless “race to the bottom,” as plans would raise 
deductibles so that they could attract a better risk 
mix.  For Federal employees now, and later for 
citizens in general, there must be a ﬂ oor under the 
beneﬁ ts that must be covered – especially to pro-
tect people with modest incomes.  Today, under 
the FEHBP, the OPM has the authority to decide 
whether a proposed beneﬁ t plan is adequate. 
• Health plans in the FEHBP today quote the same 
prices wherever they operate, rather than charging 
diﬀ erent prices in diﬀ erent regions.  Instead, plans 
should set regional market prices reﬂ ecting costs 
in each geographic area.  Single national prices 
distort market signals.  For example, with uniform 
national pricing, a national plan with signiﬁ cant 
operations in low-cost areas may be able to use 
the proﬁ ts gained there to undercut local delivery 
systems in high-cost areas.  Insurers should not 
compete on the basis of market strategies to take 
advantage of geographic diﬀ erences, but instead 
should organize better care at less cost.  In turn, 
the government’s premium credits or ﬁ xed-dollar 
contribution payments should be adjusted for 
regional costs and prices, as in Medicare’s prospec-
tive payment system for hospitals.  National pric-
ing is unnecessarily expensive: good coverage costs 
less in Minnesota than in Massachusetts.
Th e FEHBP is a sound model because it has a success-
ful history of more than 40 years; it is well known at 
least to Members of Congress and their staﬀ s, who use 
it to obtain their health insurance; and several promi-
nent current and former Senators of both parties have 
spoken favorably of opening up the FEHBP, at least 
to small employers.99  Building on the FEHBP would 
demonstrate that the proposed system would work.  
For Federal employees, this step could increase choices 
and competition centered on satisfying employees.  It 
might also ease the strain on the Federal budget.
Using the FEHBP as a model would give new exchang-
es a rich experience base.  Actually adding non-federal 
workers to the FEHBP might cause federal employees, 
including Members of Congress, to fear a worsening 
of their risk pool, saddling them with higher premi-
ums.  One solution would be to manage two separate 
risk pools: federal employees and private-sector-group 
employees.  However, as proposed, private employers 
might bring in younger, less-costly employees.  In any 
case, this problem could be measured and appropriate 
adjustments made, and it would seem fair for Members 
of Congress and Federal employees to live under the 
system that serves the American public.
Th e FEHBP should be put under the supervision of a 
new Federal Health Insurance Board or “Health Fed,” 
modeled on the Federal Reserve Board.  Th e Health 
Fed would oversee a network of regional exchanges 
and direct their operation, and become the regulator 
of health insurance for insurers choosing the national 
regulatory option (described below).  Like the Federal 
Reserve, the Health Fed Board would make judgments 
about complex issues such as the speciﬁ c details of cov-
erage contracts and acceptable business practices.  Also 
like the Federal Reserve, the Health Fed would be fee-
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funded and thus not subject to annual appropriations.a  
One potential funding source is a small percentage of 
all health insurance premiums; for example, in 2006, 
a one percent assessment on premiums would have 
yielded over $6 billion.
Th e Health Fed would be semi-independent.  Its gov-
ernors would be appointed for fourteen-year terms.  
Th ey would not be drawn as ex-oﬃ  cio, but rather 
would be the best candidates with knowledge of the 
complexities of health care, without personal conﬂ icts 
of interest.  Th ey would be supported by an expert 
staﬀ  that could be drawn from the existing agencies of 
Congress and the executive, such as the Medicare Pay-
ment Advisory Commission, the Agency for Health 
Research and Quality, and perhaps the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, as well as from state 
governments.  Th e board and its staﬀ  could build on 
the work of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC), which has been successful in 
moving to national ﬁ nancial standards.  It could seek 
input broadly to establish the regulatory framework for 
those insurers who choose national accreditation.
If a network of independent regional exchanges was 
chosen to manage the regional markets, the Board 
would establish their locations and responsibilities.  
Regional exchange presidents or chairs could be se-
lected by the national Health Fed Governors, while 
the remaining oﬃ  cers could be elected from among the 
appropriate stakeholders.  Th e Health Fed would es-
tablish standards to be used by all regional exchanges.  
Th e standards would ensure that the exchanges oper-
ated fairly, transparently and uniformly, that the plans’ 
oﬀ erings were easily understood, and that the plans 
met ﬁ nancial, quality and service standards.  Regional 
exchanges could have both regulatory and research 
staﬀ s to understand and evaluate innovative programs.  
a  Th e Federal Reserve is funded by the interest on its portfolio (mostly U.S. Government securities) and fees for its services to banks.  It returns the 
excess above its expenses to the U.S. Treasury.
b  more extensive discussion of the management functions of the Health Fed is presented in Appendix D.
c  An example is regulation of managed care in California, which was created in the aftermath of a scandal with respect to Medicaid in the 1970s, and 
endures and becomes increasingly complex even though it bears no relation to established prepaid group practices or other health insurers, and mar-
ket conditions have changed dramatically.
d Th e NAIC’s greatest success has been in the development of uniform ﬁ nancial standards – for example, risk-based capital standards, standard 
statutory accounting principles, and uniform ﬁ nancial statements.  Th ose standards are enforced through a detailed system of accreditation, which 
all but one state (New York) follow.  Th e NAIC has also developed uniform ﬁ nancial examination and market-conduct examination procedures, and 
encouraged multi-state examinations to achieve consistency from state to state.
Risk equalization methods would be set forth by the 
Health Fed, informed by the experience and insights of 
the regional exchanges.b
Create an alternative federal regulatory system that 
participating multi-state health insurers can choose.  
Designate the Health Fed as the regulatory agency.  
Health insurance, like all other forms of insurance, is 
regulated by the states – and was so even before the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1946 codiﬁ ed their au-
thority.  Regulation by the states is costly, complex 
and various.100,c  It is a barrier to ﬁ rms entering new 
states, and a cause of conﬂ ict between federal and state 
laws.101  Health insurance is now a national industry, 
and public policy should encourage established health-
care ﬁ nancing and delivery systems to expand to other 
states in the interest of greater competition, by oﬀ ering 
them an option of uniform national regulation – espe-
cially in a national system of health insurance.    
State insurance regulators recognized the diﬃ  culty 
of individual states dealing with very large national 
and international insurers.  To develop appropriate 
tools and standards, they created a private entity, the 
NAIC, which promotes uniform national standards.d  
But no matter how sophisticated these standards, state 
regulators have been unable to facilitate and acceler-
ate market entry.  To market a new national insurance 
product, an insurer must go hat-in-hand from state to 
state to secure approval.  Beyond the sheer red tape, 
each state imposes unique standards, such as diﬀ erent 
minimum beneﬁ t requirements.  Most states, further-
more, regulate health insurance rates, further delaying 
market entry.  Contrast this with a federally chartered 
banking product or a mutual fund: once approved by 
a federal regulator, the new product can be marketed 
throughout the United States.
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Particularly in the health-insurance market, however, 
insurers do not uniformly oppose state regulation.  
Many Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans are one-state cor-
porations and would not choose to supplant state regu-
lation with a federal regulatory system.  It would make 
sense, therefore, to consider an optional federal charter 
for health insurance: dual federal and state regulation 
of health insurance similar in concept to the dual regu-
latory structure for banking.  Th rough Medicare, Med-
icaid, the FEHBP, the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act, the Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA), and the 
HMO Act, the federal government already actively 
regulates health insurance.  A federal regulatory op-
tion would enhance simplicity and consistency. 
It is timely to rethink regulation today.  Th e situation 
now – especially as it would be with consumer choice 
and universal health insurance – is very diﬀ erent from 
1977 or even 1997.  Th e regulatory framework today 
should reﬂ ect new conditions and public-policy goals. 
First, in a regime of consumer choice, many earlier 
concerns about insurer behavior would be lessened 
or eliminated.  For one example, the earlier backlash 
against managed care, which sparked much regulatory 
activity, was concentrated among the people who were 
assigned to such plans by their employers, without 
choice and without visible savings for themselves.102  
Also, physicians were upset that managed care was 
spread coercively.  However, more recently, the leaders 
of the American Medical Association have proposed 
universal coverage through a system of subsidized, 
responsible individual consumer choice of health plan 
quite similar to our proposal.103  Finally, the very high 
market shares, approximately 80 percent, of managed 
care in groups with responsible choices belies the no-
tion that the American people do not like managed 
care plans that they themselves can choose. 
• Furthermore, in the proposed universal health 
insurance model, every person would be in the 
“large-group” market that would be far more cus-
tomer-friendly than today’s markets for individuals 
and small groups.
• A consumer-choice-of-plan model gives people a 
more convenient outlet for expressing dissatisfac-
tion than contacting a regulator.  Th ey can simply 
“vote with their feet” at the next annual enroll-
ment, and the oﬀ ending plans would have to 
respond to those concerns to survive.
• More so than 20 years ago, there is now an urgent 
need to improve value for money and limit cost 
growth to sustainable rates.
Given these changing concerns, and under the pro-
posed new health-care market, the following guidelines 
for national regulation of health plans are appropriate:
• Regulation should be uniform toward all types of 
health plans.  No plan model should have restric-
tions or permissions not applied to all others.  A 
patients’ bill of rights and responsibilities should 
apply to all plans equally. 
• Regulation should allow reasonable cost-beneﬁ t 
tradeoﬀ s.  Technologies that confer small marginal 
health beneﬁ ts at great costs should not be 
required in a system that strives to make health 
care aﬀ ordable. 
• Because innovation to improve value for money is 
a central goal of policy, there should be an optional 
single source of regulation at the federal level to 
speed new product approval, spread cost-reducing 
innovations from one state to another, and slow 
health-expenditure growth to a sustainable rate.
• Regulation should encourage large multi-state 
insurers to enter many or all regional markets with 
risk-bearing plans, to increase competition. 
• Regulators should recognize that an informed-
choice system would obviate the need for much ex-
isting regulation, so that diﬀ erent delivery-system 
designs, including those that share cost-reduction 
gains with providers, can challenge one another in 
the marketplace to spur eﬃ  ciency.
Th is Health Fed is a ﬁ tting model for the agency that 
would modernize and simplify health-insurance regu-
lation, and also provide an alternative federal regula-
tory system.  It is based on a trusted semi-independent 
governmental agency: the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors.  Th e Federal Reserve model would convey 
impartiality, expertise, freedom from narrow political 
interests, stability, and a long-term perspective with a 
board of governors serving long terms.
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Although health care is both diﬀ erent from and more 
complex than banking, it already is a shared responsi-
bility of the state and federal governments – like the 
banking industry since 1913, when the ﬁ nal legisla-
tion establishing the Federal Reserve was enacted.  
Th at law was a political compromise, which echoes the 
health-care environment today.104
Create a national institute for medical outcomes and 
technology assessment.105 In contrast to the dynamism 
of other industries, the health-care delivery system is 
largely unevaluated after more than 50 years of stag-
nant business practices and third-party payment.  
Th ere is a paucity of reliable and objective scientiﬁ c 
information about the value and costs of clinical 
interventions, even while costly technologies are widely 
deployed because the Medicare law in eﬀ ect forbids 
cost consideration in approving new technologies, 
and private insurers are reluctant to deny coverage of 
technologies for reasons of cost.  Most patients assume 
that their doctors are up-to-date on widely accepted 
standards of care; but the data on practice variations 
among apparently well-qualiﬁ ed doctors raise serious 
doubt.  Much is spent on services of little or no value, 
as evidenced by the lack of demonstrably better out-
comes in the United States compared with countries 
that spend much less on health care.
Th e lack of authoritative evaluation has led to highly 
publicized, costly, and bitter political and legal 
disputes.e  History illustrates a lack of knowledge of 
comparative eﬀ ectiveness, with high dollar and human 
costs.f  We need a widely respected institution to 
sponsor the needed research and oﬀ er authoritative 
judgments. 
For decades, there have been calls for more systematic 
assessment of medical technologies, clinical interven-
tions, and outcomes – and more recently, similar calls 
for formalized comparative eﬀ ectiveness studies.106  
Yet federal support has been limited and seemingly 
haphazard.  Existing organizations cannot objectively 
evaluate medical technologies and practices, because of 
inadequate resources and fragmented eﬀ orts.g  In one 
well-publicized case, a federal agency that did such a 
study suﬀ ered severe budgetary retaliation from dis-
gruntled surgeons who did not like the ﬁ ndings, and 
who took their disagreements to Congress.107  Private 
entities have tried to ﬁ ll the gap, but their work has 
been limited and rarely targeted towards the needs of 
the general public.
Th e health-care system urgently needs a new entity, 
which might be called the Institute for Medical Out-
comes and Technology Assessment (IMOTA), to as-
sess the eﬀ ectiveness, cost and overall value of health 
interventions and practices – including drugs, devices, 
diagnostic tests, and medical practices and procedures.  
IMOTA could make recommendations for how to 
integrate new drugs or devices into the delivery sys-
tem to realize savings – that is, process redesign.  For 
example, it might consider how a new product enables 
improved processes.
IMOTA would need a stable budget, large enough for 
its complex mission, to provide thorough insulation 
from short-term political pressures.  It must be rigor-
ously protected from conﬂ icts of interest, and account-
able to the public.  One potential model would be to 
make IMOTA, like the health-insurance exchange 
e  One example is the battle over High Dose Chemotherapy combined with Autologous Bone Marrow or Stem Cell Transplant (HDC/ABMT) 
therapy for metastatic breast cancer.  Th is treatment was very costly ($150,000 or more if complications occurred) and hastened the deaths of some 
patients.  At least one health plan suﬀ ered a $77 million punitive damages award, and an $89 million total awarded to the plaintiﬀ , for not providing 
or paying for it.  Under intense Congressional pressure, the Oﬃ  ce of Personnel Management (OPM) reversed its previous policy of waiting for evi-
dence of eﬃ  cacy and directed all health plans for Federal employees to cover it.  Randomized clinical trials published in 1999 found that it conferred 
no survival value, and the procedure is no longer used.  More than 30,000 women received the treatment, shortening their lives and adding to their 
suﬀ ering.  See R. A. Rettig et al., False Hope: Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Michelle 
M. Mello and Troyen A. Brennan, “Th e Controversy Over High-Dose Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer,” 
Health Aﬀ airs 20, no. 5 (2001): pp. 101-117; David Atkins, Joanna Siegel, and Jean Slutsky, “Making Policy When the Evidence Is in Dispute,” Health 
Aﬀ airs 24, no. 1 (2005): pp. 102-111.  A later development in the same general ﬁ eld, causing similar controversy, is computer-aided detection, or 
CAD, in mammograms for breast cancer. Gina Kolata, “Study Questions Computerized Breast Cancer Detection,” New York Times, April 5, 2007, 
p. A14.
f  A new vivid example of the uncertainty about eﬀ ectiveness is a dispute over the use of two diﬀ erent drugs, one relatively inexpensive, one enormous-
ly costly (ironically manufactured by the same ﬁ rm), to treat macular degeneration in elderly persons.  Marilyn Chase, “Genentech’s Big Drug for 
Eyes Faces a Rival,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2007, p. A1.
g For example, the entire budget of the Agency for Health Research and Quality is less than 0.025 percent of total health spending – $500 million 
compared with $2 trillion.
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system, a part of the Health Fed.  Like the Federal 
Reserve Board, IMOTA should be freestanding and 
semi-autonomous.  Its board should resemble the 
Federal Reserve in selection of members, numbers 
and terms.  Th e board should set priorities, approve 
research, oversee staﬀ  and operations, coordinate with 
outside health groups, and ensure integrity and inde-
pendence.  Th e director should brief Congress periodi-
cally.  Like the funding of the Health Fed, funding for 
IMOTA should come from the health-care ﬁ nancing 
system without annual appropriations.h 
IMOTA would provide analyses, evaluations and ﬁ nd-
ings.  It would not itself make decisions about coverage.  
Rather, such decisions would remain with the same 
agencies and private insurers now responsible for them.i
Expand existing safety-net programs, especially the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program. Th e 
primary motivation for health-care reform is to ensure 
secure protection for every American.  It follows that 
special early eﬀ ort is required to protect those who 
currently have no protection at all – even though 
cost-reducing restructuring ultimately will be needed 
to make all coverage sustainable.  Th e State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) has successfully 
extended Medicaid coverage to children in households 
with incomes below 200 percent of the poverty 
threshold in most states.108  Further eﬀ orts could raise 
the income limits, extend coverage to the now-eligible 
children’s parents, or otherwise provide Medicaid 
coverage to reduce the number of the uninsured pend-
ing the provision of true universal coverage.  Th is is an 
eﬀ ort similar in spirit to the various state reform plans, 
and it should be widely accepted as an interim step in a 
comprehensive program to provide universal access to 
private health insurance.
Phase II: Progressively Expand Coverage
As the second phase of transition to market-based uni-
versal health insurance, CED recommends:
• Extending the availability of a wide range of respon-
sible choices of insurance carriers and delivery systems 
within the employment-based health insurance system 
by including all small employers (of up to 50 or 100 
employees) in the new exchange system.
• Progressively expanding participation in the new 
system until all employers are included.  Include the 
self-employed.  Th e system could, and perhaps should, 
be open to entire states at the request of the governors 
and legislatures.j
• When all employees have a wide range of competi-
tive plan choices, creating employee cost consciousness 
in plan choices, and saving billions of tax dollars for 
subsidies for health-insurance purchases by low-income 
people by capping the tax exclusion for employer 
health beneﬁ ts at the level of an eﬃ  cient health plan 
premium in each region.
• Expanding the functions of the “Health Fed.”
Include all small employers in the new exchange-based 
system.  Small employers could more easily secure 
aﬀ ordable, reliable health insurance if included in 
large, balanced, and stable risk pools in the regional 
exchanges.
One key to sustainable health-insurance coverage is 
a stable risk pool.  Creating such a pool is not easy.109  
Seven states, including California, Florida and Texas, 
tried to create voluntary purchasing exchanges for 
small employers.  None succeeded; none achieved a 
large enough market share to have signiﬁ cant econo-
mies of scale.
h  Another approach would be to attach IMOTA to the Translational Medicine Program of the NIH, whose mission includes measuring the com-
parative eﬀ ectiveness of new delivery-system technology.  Th at program integrates eﬀ ectiveness comparisons into new product development, and its 
work could be seamlessly added to delivery science.  However, the NIH lacks the secure funding and political independence of the Health Fed.  Inde-
pendent funding would enable IMOTA to meet the needs of the public even when it threatens powerful political interests.
i  Th is point is the key diﬀ erence between what we recommend and the similar British National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), 
which in the nationalized British system is perceived to have greater control of actual practice decisions.  For a more extensive discussion of the func-
tions of IMOTA, see Appendix E.
j  Th e Employee Retirement Income Security Act would have to be changed by Congress and the President to allow states to make such decisions for 
all their residents.  
59
Th ese purchasing exchanges encountered numerous 
barriers.  Contrary to expectations, employers did not 
ﬁ nd the approach particularly attractive; oﬀ ering com-
peting choices of health insurers has rarely been a high 
employer priority.k  Th e exchanges also had structural 
defects.110,l  Finally, such eﬀ orts are highly vulnerable 
to adverse selection, witness particularly the experience 
in California.111,m
Despite this troubling experience, it is in the long-
term interest of every small employer – even one with 
a low-risk group – to be in a large, stable pool and buy 
through the proposed exchanges.  A low risk today 
may become a high risk tomorrow, with no guarantee 
that aﬀ ordable insurance will remain available when 
an employee becomes seriously ill.  Furthermore, all 
groups buying through an exchange would have greatly 
reduced administrative costs, more-stable premiums, 
and choice for every employee. 
Th us, the community at large is far better oﬀ  as health-
insurance risk pools become larger and more stable.  A 
large part of the deterioration of secure health-insur-
ance coverage over the last 50 years has been the onset 
of “cherry picking” of comparatively large, young and 
healthy employment groups by aggressive insurers, 
which leaves increasing numbers of small groups out in 
the cold.  Reestablishing a large risk pool is essential to 
aﬀ ordable health-care security for every American.  A 
public-policy initiative is required to attract numerous 
individual smaller groups to band together and stay 
together, to form a viable risk pool.
k  In California, participating PPOs were driven from the exchange by adverse selection, and many company owners then left because they apparently 
wanted the PPO for themselves, but were willing to pay only for HMOs for their employees.  Agents did not like the exchanges and did not try to sell 
them, because the exchanges at ﬁ rst did not pay agent commissions.  When the exchanges did start paying commissions, their administrative costs 
increased.  Insurers did not like the pools because they do not like “slice business,” with its higher administrative costs and possible adverse selection.
l  For example, at least some pools did not have master contracts, thus necessitating separate contracts between each health plan and each employer, 
and thereby precluding hoped-for savings.  Th e exchanges had a social mission – making insurance available to small groups – but had to compete in 
a business environment.  Th e small-employer exchanges attracted a disproportionate share of tiny groups (two or three), which tend to buy coverage 
because someone in the group needs expensive medical care.  Th e Health Insurance Plan of California (HIPC) did not participate in this market, 
because competing carriers were able to price good risks more favorably outside the exchange.  And apparently, exchanges could not compel employ-
ers to make ﬁ xed-dollar contributions.
m  Th e HIPC, started in 1993 on a small budget, was transferred to the ownership of Paciﬁ c Business Group on Health (PBGH), a large employer 
coalition, in 1999.  In 2006, PBGH closed the exchange because one of the participating carriers was persistently losing money, apparently because of 
adverse selection  Another voluntary small employer pool, California Choice, has survived.  It is a private for proﬁ t business, not encumbered by rules 
requiring it to underwrite more generously than the market in general.  Its managers believe that they cannot require participating employers to make 
ﬁ xed-dollar contributions, so price competition within the pool is attenuated. 
n  Th is follows the thinking behind the Managed Competition Act, H.R. 5936, 102nd Congress, 2nd session, September 1992, introduced by 
Congressmen Cooper, Andrews and Stenholm plus about 80 cosponsors from the Conservative Democratic Forum.  Th ere are likely to be serious 
administrative and enforcement problems with using the number of employees as the basis for deciding which employers get into a pool and which do 
not.  Do part-time employees count?  And what about employers whose workforces ﬂ uctuate?  Th ese problems would be more severe if the intent were 
to stop the process at employers of 50 or 100.  Th ey should be less severe if this is part of an overall plan to cover everyone through exchanges.  Th e 
reason for starting with small employers is that they need exchanges more, being less likely to provide insurance now.
Although a purely voluntary risk pool would not suc-
ceed, there is an enduring American preference for 
voluntary action over compulsion, so strictly manda-
tory risk pooling is unwelcome.  However, the present 
“voluntary” health insurance system is actually much 
less voluntary than it appears.  It is motivated by huge 
tax subsidies.  Th e Federal Government ﬁ rst takes 
from taxpayers nearly $200 billion per year, and then 
gives it back in the form of tax remission if they or 
their employers purchase health insurance.  Th ese tax 
subsidies impose their own powerful conditions; in 
particular, they are much more generous if insurance 
is provided by employers, and they are open-ended.  
Th us, these subsidies unfortunately encourage the pur-
chase of more-costly rather than less-costly insurance, 
and steer people toward insurance provided by their 
employers, which has had the eﬀ ect of limiting choices.  
So it seems reasonable to reshape the tax subsidies to 
encourage more, and more-economical, choices, and 
broader-based pooling.
One way to accomplish those objectives would be to re-
quire all employers of 50 or fewer (or 100 or fewer) em-
ployees to buy their insurance through the local region-
al exchange to continue to receive the tax exclusion.n  
Th is incentive would motivate the good risks to join 
with the bad risks in a large and stable pool.  A 100-
employee cutoﬀ  would create a pool of about one-third 
of the labor force, which would be more than large 
enough to absorb and spread the risks of even the less-
healthy employees of small ﬁ rms – given that healthy 
groups would participate to receive the tax exclusion 
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and the advantages of the exchange.  A similar incen-
tive is at work today, because employer contributions 
are usually available only to employees who enroll in 
the plan the employer sponsors.  A Federal employee, 
for example, cannot escape the FEHBP pool without 
forfeiting the large employer contribution.  Th us, the 
tax exclusion already is a powerful incentive to pool 
risks.  Th is same incentive could motivate pooling in 
exchanges.  
Starting with small ﬁ rms would help them to maintain 
insurance at stable premiums.  One serious illness can 
cause small-group premiums to skyrocket.  Th e tax 
break should be enough incentive to get a representa-
tive sample of risks from many small ﬁ rms into the 
exchange.  Also, participating ﬁ rms must be required 
to make ﬁ xed-dollar contributions, not to exceed the 
price of the low-priced plan.  Participating ﬁ rms that 
outgrow this size class could be allowed to continue in 
the exchange, subject to some underwriting rules that 
protect the pool from adverse selection, if necessary.  
Th e exchange could also combine contributions from 
multiple employers if members of a household have 
part-time jobs, or jobs that otherwise do not support 
family health insurance. 
When the new system is up and running, demonstrat-
ing its success, the ﬁ rm-size threshold should be raised 
progressively to 200 employees, then 500 employees, 
and so on, until all employees are covered.  Exchanges 
could cover size-qualifying smaller branches of large 
national employers who would like to participate, with 
any necessary underwriting conditions to protect the 
new system.  Alternatively, entire states could be al-
lowed or encouraged to opt into the exchange system. 
Th e self-employed could join the system at this point, 
if not sooner, equalizing the tax treatment of health 
insurance among the self-employed, other individu-
als, and recipients of employer-based health insurance 
(as President Bush proposed in his ﬁ scal year 2008 
budget).  Th e exchanges could oﬀ er the self-employed 
guaranteed coverage, provided they enroll promptly 
and stay enrolled.  Exchanges should create rules, such 
as an individual mandate or an additional tax incen-
tive, to deter the self-employed from opportunistic 
switching in and out of coverage.
Individuals and ﬁ rms would be, of course, entirely free 
to buy and sell health insurance outside of the ex-
change framework, but in that case they would not be 
eligible for the tax subsidies. 
Th ird, to build universal cost consciousness in the choice 
of a health plan, and also to free resources to subsi-
dize access for low-income people: once all employees 
have choices of plans, limit the amount of the employer 
contribution to employee health insurance that can be 
excluded from the taxable incomes of employees and 
from employer taxable incomes.  Th e President’s Ad-
visory Panel on Federal Tax Reform recommended a 
limit on the exclusion from employee taxable incomes, 
though it was initially for an amount likely to be higher 
than the needs of an eﬃ  cient plan.112  President Bush, 
in his 2007 State of the Union address, proposed a 
version of this limit to help ﬁ nance a tax incentive for 
people without employer-based health insurance to 
buy in the individual market.  Some objected to this 
proposal because employed people who are not oﬀ ered 
eﬃ  cient choices by their employers could not respond 
to the new incentive.  Th e market for individual policies 
would not help those employees, because in most states 
that market has no community rating or guaranteed 
issue, and the many people with chronic conditions 
would not have access to aﬀ ordable coverage – or pos-
sibly any coverage at all.  However, with market-based 
universal health insurance including consumer choice, 
everyone would have guaranteed issue and the same 
price for the same class of coverage regardless of health 
status.  Th erefore, a limit on the tax preference would 
be an important and necessary step to create incentives 
for economical choice and fairness.  Why should tax-
payers continue to subsidize more-costly choices, when 
good-quality, less-costly choices are available?
Th e limit on tax-free contributions would prevent em-
ployees from demanding supplemental payments from 
their employers that would subsidize more-expensive, 
ineﬃ  cient health plans, and undermine competition 
to attract cost-conscious consumers.  To the same end, 
employers should be required to make ﬁ xed-dollar 
contributions as a condition of employees receiving 
the exclusion of employer contributions from taxable 
income.o
o  Th is follows from the HMO Act and the Managed Competition Acts of 1992 and 1993, H.R. 5936, 102nd Congress, 2nd session, September 15, 
1992.
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Fourth, expand the functions of the “Health Fed.”  Re-
search on the progress of Phase II should begin with 
its inception.  Th e Health Fed should integrate data 
from the exchange system and other national agen-
cies.  Like the Federal Reserve, it should issue periodic 
“Beige Books” to describe available plans and their 
aﬀ ordability, and the performance of the plans and 
providers.  Th is would facilitate public discussion of 
the aﬀ ordability of health plans, what services should 
be covered, and targets and strategy for performance, 
eﬃ  ciency, and quality improvement with universal 
coverage.  If health expenditures continue to grow un-
sustainably, the Health Fed should analyze the causes, 
and report to the Congress with recommendations. 
Phase III:  Achieve Market-Based Universal 
Health Insurance
As the ﬁ nal stage of the transition to market-based uni-
versal health insurance, CED recommends:
• To complete the transition to universal health insur-
ance: replace all employer contributions with univer-
sal ﬁ xed-dollar credits ﬁ nanced by broad-based tax 
revenues.
• To help ﬁ nance these credits: eliminate any tax break 
for employer-paid health insurance or health-care 
beneﬁ ts.
Completing the transition to MB-UHI.  At the end of 
Phase II, the transformation to UHI would remain 
incomplete.  Health insurance would still be based 
on employment, although there would be economies 
of scale in administration, near universal access to 
choices, and transparency in prices.  Th e inability of 
employers to create competition would be overcome.113  
However, those left out of the present employer-based 
system – including non-poor individuals not eligible 
for Medicaid, such as pre-Medicare widows; those not 
poor but not employed; other non-employed, unem-
ployed, self-employed uninsurable persons, and oth-
ers – would still lack coverage unless other remedial 
actions, perhaps ﬁ nanced by the proceeds of the cap on 
the tax exclusion of employer-paid health insurance, 
were taken in the meantime.114,p  With such initiatives, 
the exchange infrastructure could create a platform to 
expand coverage to more and more people.  It could do 
a lot of good even short of complete UHI. 
How would we get from there to market-based uni-
versal health insurance?  At some point, all employer 
contributions should be replaced by ﬁ xed-dollar con-
tributions (or “premium credits”) paid for by broad-
based taxes, supplemented by the large savings to the 
federal and state budgets from phasing out the many 
tax subsidies and programs that would be supplanted 
by UHI.q,115 
Existing federal health-insurance programs might be at 
least partially replaced by the universal health insur-
ance program.  Medicaid should be left alone until the 
new program is up and running.  Th en, some Medic-
aid beneﬁ ciaries, including lower-income non-elderly 
families, might be given a choice of the new system or 
Medicaid.  Medicaid pays for nursing home arrange-
ments and other custodial care that would not ﬁ t into 
health insurance as we know it; such services clearly 
need to be continued.  Detailed analysis is needed.  
Similar analyses would be needed for Defense Depart-
ment programs for the military and their families, and 
for veterans. 
Medicare, to remain ﬁ scally viable and to complete 
these reforms, must eventually evolve into an eﬃ  cient, 
competitive system along these lines, possibley as an 
p  Programs to help such uninsured people could include the insurance continuity under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(known as COBRA continuity), administered by the exchanges without a time limit and with possible government subsidies, and other subsidies 
for low-income people.  Th e COBRA continuity could be to membership in the exchange, with freedom to change plans at the annual enrollment.  
Unemployment insurance could include a health-insurance subsidy, similar to the Health Coverage Tax Credit of the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
program.
q  First in the list of redundant programs would be the large federal and state tax subsidies to employment-based health insurance, estimated at $209 
billion in 2006.  Th e portion of Disproportionate Share payments to hospitals to compensate for serving large numbers of uninsured people would 
be replaced by insurance reimbursement.  SCHIP would be replaced by MB-UHI.  Th e new system also could and should replace Federal and state 
employees health beneﬁ ts programs.  Perhaps some billions could be saved in substance abuse and mental health services, Indian health, and some 
programs from the Health Resources and Services Administration, whose costs and services would be included in the MB-UHI estimates.  Further 
CED research will present estimates of the costs and revenues of some of the main possibilities.
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extension of the Medicare Advantage program, but 
with competitive pricing by plans.  Th e new MB-UHI 
system could absorb Medicare by allowing people, as 
they reach age 65, to remain in the plan and delivery 
system of their choice, with appropriate federal premi-
um support and risk-adjusted pricing.
As mentioned earlier, as a funding source for the ﬁ xed-
dollar contributions, a payroll tax could be seen as 
replacing employer contributions to health insurance 
without drastically changing money ﬂ ows or being seen 
as a “new tax.”  Also, the administrative processes for 
collecting payroll taxes already exist.  Many employers 
who now insure their employees might prefer a payroll 
tax that is a deﬁ ned and predictable amount, rather 
than their commitment to today’s soaring health insur-
ance costs.  (Today, employer-based health insurance 
acts like a head tax.)  But there are other possibilities, 
including a broadly based consumption tax that would 
not tax productive eﬀ ort, and likely would be harder to 
evade by people working “oﬀ  the books.”116  Environ-
mental protection and reduced dependence on foreign 
oil might be served by a tax on carbon or gasoline.  
One way partially to phase out the subsidy of the pre-
mium credit without increasing marginal income tax 
rates would be to include the credit in taxable income.
As an alternative to our recommended ﬁ nancing sys-
tem, which provides a ﬁ xed premium credit to every-
one, premiums could be collected through the income 
tax system, with subsidies for low-income people 
phased out with increasing income.  Th ere could be 
individual mandates to require that everyone partici-
pate in the risk pool.  Phasing out subsidies, of course, 
raises implicit marginal tax rates; and individual man-
dates are still taxes with their own administration and 
enforcement problems.  In any case, the urgent need 
for a reformed health care system should not be held 
hostage to the details of the tax mechanism to sup-
port it.  Th e ﬁ nancing step from Phase II to Phase III 
would not be large in the lives of most people, but the 
coverage step would be very important in enhancing 
the health and ﬁ nancial security of all Americans.
Conclusion
Th e program outlined here has the greatest prospect 
of achieving the three goals of restraining health-care 
cost, achieving universal insurance coverage, and im-
proving quality.  Without signiﬁ cant process improve-
ment in the health-care industry, even the current cov-
erage and quality of service – for both private insurers 
and public programs – will become increasingly unaf-
fordable, as it has consistently for decades.
Merely extending coverage under the current system – 
even to universal coverage, such as oﬀ ered by “Medicare 
for all” – would not solve the problem.  It would signiﬁ -
cantly increase total costs, even after whatever savings 
might be achieved by expanding preventive care and 
reducing administrative expense.  More importantly, it 
would not slow the unsustainable growth of health-care 
expenditures, and so would force rationing, cutbacks in 
coverage, or other unsatisfactory policies.  Alternatively, 
“consumer-directed health plans” – with high deduct-
ibles, possibly oﬀ set by health savings accounts – would 
provide no incentive to providers to increase eﬃ  ciency 
with respect to the vast bulk of health spending that 
is beyond reasonable deductibles.  CDHPs also would 
leave many persons of low or modest income with un-
insured deductible costs that they could not aﬀ ord, and 
with little or no tax beneﬁ t to help them.
If the United States is to achieve sustainable, quality, 
aﬀ ordable health care, the health sector must achieve 
the improvement in eﬃ  ciency that has become 
commonplace in virtually every other sector of the 
economy.  Th is necessarily will entail some change in 
the way care typically is delivered.  Under the proposed 
system, those who prefer today’s dominant fee-for-
service model of care will be able to keep it, if they 
are willing to pay any diﬀ erence in price.  However, 
most people with choices have proven happy to 
consider new, evolving, and improving delivery modes 
with more emphasis on maintaining health through 
preventive care and healthy behavior, early intervention 
against and sustained control of chronic diseases, and 
better use of contemporary digital technology and 
communications.
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Th e health-insurance model presented here relies on 
incentives for individuals to choose both plans and 
providers that oﬀ er what those individuals judge to be 
the best combination of quality and price.  Exposing 
the health-care sector to such competitive forces will 
create a new dynamic toward improvement.  Without 
such an incentive, health-care delivery has trundled 
along essentially unchanged, and prices have grown 
much faster than average incomes in the economy – 
leaving growing numbers of people who cannot aﬀ ord 
coverage at all.
Before those unsustainable trends advance even 
further, at ever-mounting cost to reverse, the nation 
must change course.  Command-and-control systems 
have a poor track record in modern economies; and 
health care is too complex to devolve all authority to 
the individual patient.  Market-based universal health 
insurance, with individuals choosing the health plans 
and delivery systems that they deem best, shows great 
promise – much greater than any alternative.
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CED’s 2002 statement on health care contains many 
sensible and important recommendations for business 
and government.117  For example, for employers:
1. Demand transparent quality information and 
adherence to best medical practices; use compara-
tive performance information to select plans and 
providers; incorporate accountability for cost and 
quality into contract speciﬁ cations.
2. Oﬀ er wide, responsible health plan choices to 
employees in exchange for their greater ﬁ nancial 
responsibility.  Such plans would incorporate con-
tribution policies that encourage workers to choose 
eﬃ  cient, high-quality plans…help to establish, 
operate, and manage regional purchasing coopera-
tives that oﬀ er aﬀ ordable plans to small ﬁ rms.
For government:
1. Restructure Medicare on the model of the Federal 
Employee Health Beneﬁ t Program (that is, a wide 
range of responsible choices).
2. Cap the currently open-ended federal tax exclu-
sion of employer contributions to promote cost 
discipline and equity; this could also provide some 
funding for policies to expand access.
3. Provide vehicles, funding, and technical assistance 
to establish purchasing cooperatives for small 
employers.  
We have seen very little progress towards these recom-
mendations.  Transparent quality information based 
on results or outcomes is diﬃ  cult to come by, despite 
some ongoing eﬀ orts.  Many opportunities have been 
missed, such as extending to the whole nation the re-
search being done by the state of New York and a few 
other states on risk-adjusted outcomes for cardiology 
procedures.118  We need guidelines on best medical 
practices, and then information systems to measure 
adherence to the guidelines.  Toward these ends, lead-
ing integrated delivery systems like Health Partners in 
Minnesota and its cooperating medical group practices 
had created the Institute for Clinical Systems Improve-
ment; businesses have worked together in the Leapfrog 
Group; Kaiser Permanente had created their Care 
Management Institute to deﬁ ne practice guidelines 
before 2002; the Veterans Health Administration had 
created a similar Quality Enhancement Research Ini-
tiative.  But aside from these examples, there has been 
little progress.
Th e availability of wide, responsible employee health-
plan choices is diﬃ  cult to judge because it is not mea-
sured in regular surveys.  Th e two most important sur-
veys were done in 1997 and 2000.  Th e earlier survey 
found that the employers of 77 percent of employed in-
sured Americans did not oﬀ er a choice of carriers, and 
only 28 percent of establishments that oﬀ ered a choice 
gave employees an incentive to make a cost-eﬀ ective 
choice by contributing a ﬁ xed-dollar amount.  Th is 
leaves only about 6.4 percent (23 percent of 28 percent) 
with both a choice and a ﬁ xed-dollar contribution.119  
Th e later survey found that fewer than 10 percent of 
Fortune 500 employees combined a choice of carrier 
and a ﬁ xed-dollar contribution.120
Th ere have been no subsequent surveys, and there is 
little evidence that this situation has improved.  On the 
positive side, both Wells Fargo and Hewlett-Packard, 
which previously oﬀ ered choices, have recently adopted 
a ﬁ xed-dollar contribution for their employees.  How-
ever, these examples are practically the only indication 
of progress.121,a
Appendix A: CED’s 2002 Policy Statement – 
Has It Made a Difference for Health-Care Reform?
a  Th e Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust publish an annual Survey of Employer Health Beneﬁ ts, which 
touches on the subject of employee choices.  Unfortunately, they survey and report on “choice of plan,” meaning “plan designs.”  Th eir survey would 
report that an employment group oﬀ ering one carrier, with three plan designs (for example, HMO, PPO, POS (Point of Service) or High Deduct-
ible Health Plan) all providing insured access to the same networks of FFS providers, would be oﬀ ering three plans.  But this “choice” is competition 
neither at the insurance-carrier level nor at the delivery-system level, and so does not bring about delivery-system competition.  And even by that 
defective measure, the survey shows little change in the frequency of oﬀ ering a “choice of plan.”
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Chapter One explains that employers that consider 
oﬀ ering choices are inhibited by concern over admin-
istrative costs, the possibility of adverse selection, and 
insurance company preferences to be the sole carrier 
for the group.  Th e CED report recommended form-
ing large multi-employer exchanges, like the California 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), to 
pool large numbers of employers and therefore create 
an attractive market for many carriers.  Th at approach 
would require sustained collective action by employers.  
Unfortunately, employers ﬁ nd it diﬃ  cult, if not impos-
sible, to organize collectively, because their interests 
and priorities are so diverse: some are large, some are 
small; some have foreign competition, some do not; 
some are unionized (and most, but not all, unions de-
mand that employers subsidize more costly choices), 
some not; some have mostly high-paid employees, 
while some have mostly low-paid workers (for whom 
health-insurance costs are a larger percentage of total 
compensation); some are concentrated in one or few 
locations, like universities, while others are scattered in 
many small groups.  Multiply this diversity by the myr-
iad views and understandings of what health care is all 
about – plus the fear that some other employer would 
increase the riskiness of the pool – and the diﬃ  culty of 
collective action becomes understandable.  
In the summer of 2006, the Paciﬁ c Business Group 
on Health announced that PacAdvantage, a voluntary 
pooled-purchasing arrangement for small employers of 
two to 50 workers, was closing because one of its insur-
ance carriers was persistently losing money.  If pooled-
purchasing arrangements are wholly voluntary, and 
without a strong incentive for a large representative 
sample of employers to participate, a spiral of adverse 
selection against the pool is almost inevitable.  Only 
strong incentives, such as access to tax exclusions, can 
hold such pools together.b  A system of reinsurance of 
very-high-cost cases could help, though not without 
causing its own problems.c  Creating competition is a 
collective-action problem.  One employer oﬀ ering re-
sponsible choices will not get the beneﬁ t of a reformed 
competitive delivery system.  Concerted action by 
many employers is needed.  If employers are unable to 
collaborate to create an eﬀ ective competitive market, 
some public-policy response to the problem of soaring 
costs of insurance will be necessary.
As to the recommended government action, the idea 
of restructuring Medicare to work like the FEHBP 
has attracted some rhetorical support, but progress 
has been limited.  Th e Congress did take an impor-
tant step forward in the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) 
by providing that Part D of Medicare would be or-
ganized through price-sensitive individual choice of 
prescription-drug insurance plans from among many 
alternatives.  Th e new competitors in the Medicare 
Advantage program, such as regional PPOs and private 
fee-for-service plans, have added a competitive dynam-
ic, but they will participate only so long as underlying 
payment levels are attractive.  Th e shift in the program 
from administered-pricing to quasi-competitive-bid-
ding by plans could create a new competitive force – 
limited by the retention of statutory pricing to deter-
mine government payments.  More important will be 
any move toward quality-based payment for providers 
and health-care organizations that rewards both ef-
ﬁ ciency and good outcomes.  
In 2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Re-
form recommended capping the tax exclusion of em-
ployer health-insurance contributions to induce cost-
consciousness.  President Bush proposed it in his 2007 
State of the Union message, but no action is pending.d  
Purchasing cooperatives for small employers are, for 
the most part, closing rather than proliferating.e
b  Th e problem may be mitigated, and possibly solved, by the use of a risk-adjustment procedure under which groups with predictably higher costs 
pay proportionately more, relieving employers of comparatively healthy employees of the burden of sharing in the costs of the more costly groups.  
Technology exists to do this.  However, this would work against the ideal of broadening the risk pool and evening out costs and risks so that everyone 
could aﬀ ord insurance.
c  Any reinsurance of high-cost cases must be carefully designed to provide incentives for insurers to control very high costs, and to avoid incentives 
artiﬁ cially to categorize more-moderate risks as high cost so as to oﬄ  oad that expense onto the reinsurance program.
d  Th e Congress has not considered serious proposals to condition continued access to the tax exclusion on the oﬀ ering of choices and ﬁ xed-dollar 
contributions, which might induce small employers to form or join pooled arrangements to achieve economies of scale.
e  Th ere is a successful broker-created multiple choice arrangement for small employers that oﬀ ers, in Southern California, a choice of six or eight 
delivery systems to employees of participating employers, called California Choice.  It covers 170,000 lives and is growing.  It is not entirely clear how 
this survives and prospers when PacAdvantage could not.  Apparently, California Choice has stricter underwriting criteria.
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Some recent changes have been in the wrong direc-
tion.  For example, the emphasis on high deductibles, 
despite the best of intentions, could weaken primary 
care, disease prevention and disease management, 
thereby lessening the already insuﬃ  cient market forces 
of competition.f
Conclusion
In short, CED proposed a private, voluntary path to-
ward creating an eﬀ ective market for competing health 
plans and delivery systems.  We remain conﬁ dent that 
such ideas, if adopted widely and vigorously, could 
work.  However, there is little or no evidence that these 
ideas are being acted upon in a timely manner.  It is 
now not at all clear that constructive change to create 
an eﬀ ective market model will happen before national 
health expenditures reach 20 percent of GDP, fam-
ily premiums reach 40 percent of the earning power of 
the median household, and the number of uninsured 
reaches 60 million to 80 million.  At that point, des-
peration could break out, creating a fertile ground for 
simplistic “solutions” that do not work, or indeed do 
more harm than good.
f  Chapter Two addresses the merits of the high-deductible approach in greater detail.
And yet, there is the potential for a better health-care 
system at the same or lower cost.  As was noted at the 
outset, patients today are treated at considerable cost, 
but receive only about half of what best practice would 
deﬁ ne as appropriate care.  U.S. health-care spending 
is the highest in the world as a percentage of GDP, but 
U.S. health-care outcomes are far below the average 
– suggesting strongly that better practice would yield 
better health and lower costs down the line.  In the 
same vein, reputable studies have identiﬁ ed excessive 
and inappropriate treatment and expense, suggesting 
opportunities for savings that would have no cost in 
terms of health.  Th us, our health-care system could 
deliver better care at low additional cost or even sav-
ings – without the feared necessity of withholding ben-
eﬁ cial care in the interest of cost.  Th e nation should 
pursue greater eﬃ  ciency in the existing system before 
contemplating limits on care. 
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Th e growing number of uninsured Americans is truly 
troubling.  Th is problem is surely driven in substantial 
part by high and rising health expenditures and the 
cost of health insurance.  For years, health-care expen-
ditures have been growing two and a half percentage 
points per year faster than incomes.  If we could control 
cost growth, it surely would ease our coverage problem, 
at least somewhat.  So we must ask the question:  Why 
are health-care costs growing so fast?
Medical practice in the United States is dominated 
by the fragmented, uncoordinated fee-for-service 
model of health-care organization and ﬁ nance, based 
on solo or small single-specialty group practices.  It is 
important to understand this model, its origins, and its 
consequences for health expenditure in this country.  
Th e dominance of this model is not the natural conse-
quence of market forces.  Rather, it has been sustained 
by inertia and the absence of normal competitive forces 
in the health-care market.  It must be subjected to 
competition from better-organized systems to serve 
informed, ﬁ nancially responsible consumers.  In those 
limited instances when competition is at work today, 
alternative health-care delivery systems perform much 
better.
How the Fee-for-Service Model Works
Th e traditional fee-for-service, solo-practice model of 
medical organization and ﬁ nance is as old as medical 
science itself.  In the early days of this country, when 
there was only one doctor for wide swaths of the 
frontier, solo practice was inevitable.  For years there-
after, the body of medical knowledge was suﬃ  ciently 
narrow that there was no such thing as a “specialist;” 
apart from diﬀ erences of individual skill, one physi-
cian was interchangeable with any other.  Again, solo 
practice was the inevitable result.  Health insurance 
did not exist, and so people paid for each service when 
they needed the doctor.  Fees and costs were restrained 
by the limits of patients’ willingness and ability to pay.  
Appendix B: The Traditional Fee-for-Service-Indemnity 
Model of Health-Care Finance Is a Major Cause 
of Rising Costs
Th e patients were using their own money and went 
without care they could not aﬀ ord unless they were 
poor enough to be considered charity cases.
Similarly, in those days, retailing began with the “gen-
eral store.”  Th ere was not a suﬃ  cient range of goods 
to justify more than one store for many, or even most, 
of the geographic regions of the country.  Competition 
between stores was unheard of.
Now, of course, the general store is a vague memory for 
all but the most rural parts of the United States.  It has 
been overtaken by technological advancement in goods 
themselves, in organization, in transportation and 
distribution, in ﬁ nancing, and in countless other areas.  
Although this quaint and warmly remembered institu-
tion is gone, the vast majority of the population surely 
believes that they are better oﬀ  today with the fruits 
of competition and the resulting innovation: greater 
eﬃ  ciency, lower prices (relative to typical incomes), and 
a wider array of up-to-date choices.
But even though the general store and most other 
economic institutions of that era are gone, rendered 
obsolete by organizational and technological improve-
ments, fee-for-service solo-practice medicine persists 
– even though the nation’s health-care system is widely 
regarded to be in crisis.  Why?  Th e answer is largely 
inertia – because the existing institution was never 
challenged, as the general store was, by meaningful 
competition from alternative forms of organization.
No one can know what the results of greater competi-
tion in health-care delivery would be – and of course, 
one can speak only of the results of competition at any 
one moment, because further innovation and change 
go on endlessly.  It is even possible that future innova-
tions would breathe new life into the FFS solo-practice 
model.  Th e one thing that we do know with certainty 
is that the cost of the status quo is rising unsustainably, 
threatening access and quality for every American.  
We cannot continue on this path.
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FFS solo-practice medicine came to be based on the 
following principles:122
• “Free choice of doctor” at all times.  Th at means 
that the insurer that pays the bills has no bargain-
ing power with the doctor because it cannot inﬂ u-
ence whether or not the patient goes to any par-
ticular doctor.
• “Free choice of treatment,” that is, nobody “in-
terferes” with the doctor’s treatment decisions and 
recommendations.  Th is means that there is no 
monitoring of compliance with established practice 
guidelines, no utilization management, no quality 
management and no peer review.  Process, organi-
zation and management innovations such as these 
have been the lifeblood of progress in virtually 
every other industry in the developed economic 
world.
• “Fee-for-service payment,” which means that the 
doctor can always earn more by doing and pre-
scribing more treatments, and more-costly treat-
ments, whether or not they signiﬁ cantly beneﬁ t 
the patient’s health – a conﬂ ict of interest for the 
doctor.
• “Direct doctor-patient negotiation of fees.”  Th e 
patient is in a very weak position to bargain or 
shop because he or she depends on the good will of 
the doctor and lacks information about the under-
lying medical science, what other doctors charge, 
how capable they are, or how many visits or pro-
cedures they would take to solve a given problem.  
Insurers, on the other hand, have a great deal of 
such information and could use it in the patient’s 
interest, but they are not allowed to do so in the 
FFS model.a
• “Solo (or small single-specialty group) practice.”  
Th e idea of physician autonomy is deeply ingrained 
in medical culture.123  In today’s world of com-
plex modern medicine, that idea is dysfunctional.  
Teamwork is essential, with other physicians and 
also with many allied health professionals.  Doc-
tors depend on other doctors for referrals.  Within 
a multi-specialty group practice, primary care 
doctors can refer patients to their own specialist 
partners, thus eliminating potential pressure from 
outside doctors who would want referrals.  Th is 
puts multi-specialty group practices in business 
conﬂ ict with solo primary-care practitioners.
Th is traditional FFS model maximizes autonomy and 
economic beneﬁ ts for physicians.  Arguably, it is not 
the best model, and probably not even a sustainable 
model, for our society.  It does not meet the important 
and legitimate need for aﬀ ordable care and insurance.  
It has survived, and its performance has been taken as 
the standard for the health-care system, in large part 
because of the lack of eﬀ ective competition to test it 
and force it to improve.  
After years of patients using their own money and go-
ing without care they could not aﬀ ord, employment-
based health insurance became widespread during and 
after World War II.  Most health insurance was FFS 
by Blue Cross and Blue Shield (“the Blues”).  Hospital 
and physician associations created the Blues to assure 
payment on terms acceptable to them.  Th ere were 
agreed-upon fees, but providers sat on both sides of the 
bargaining table where the fees were determined.124 
Insurers set FFS indemnity payments for each par-
ticular service or group of services that they would 
provide to insured patients.  Following FFS principles, 
there was no contract between doctors and insurers.  
Doctors often charged more than the indemnity pay-
ments, but under pressure from employees who did 
not want to pay the diﬀ erence, employers instructed 
insurers to raise indemnity payments, and the indem-
nity payments chased the fees.  Under the community 
rating that was then dominant, higher claims costs 
were distributed across all participants, and so no one 
increased payment seemed to have any meaningful 
consequences.  Employers often backed up indem-
nity insurance with “major medical insurance” that 
paid most of the patient’s out-of-pocket cost not paid 
by indemnity insurance.  Insurance left patients with 
little or no reason to care what services cost.  Th e old 
restraint of the patient’s ability and willingness to pay 
was removed or greatly attenuated by insurance.  
In the FFS model, the doctor decides what he or she 
wants to do and what he or she wants to charge, and 
a  Th is aspect of the model has been superseded by Medicare fees and by the wide-access PPO in the private sector.
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the patient’s role is merely to pay and then seek reim-
bursement from his health plan or employer.  Th is 
is a model that leaves employers and employees with 
minimal control over the costs of health care – and the 
employees with minimal concern about the costs in the 
ﬁ rst place.  Now, as costs have soared, the FFS model 
has been strained to the breaking point.  
Inappropriate Care and Variation in Practice 
Patterns
Under FFS, providers are not held responsible for the 
cost of care and face little economic restraint on fees.  
PPOs negotiate fees, but because they commonly of-
fer wide access – that is, practically every provider in 
town is in the network – the PPO has little bargain-
ing power.  It cannot oﬀ er providers more volume in 
exchange for a better price.  A doctor who keeps his or 
her patients in the hospital longer than other doctors, 
for the same condition and case severity, is rewarded 
with more money and the esteem of the hospital ad-
ministration for generating more revenue.  
Studies by the UCLA Medical School-RAND Cor-
poration team and by others have documented large 
amounts of inappropriate surgery and hospitalization, 
where “inappropriate” means the patient would have 
been better oﬀ  without it, cost not considered.  Other 
studies found a great deal of “unnecessary surgery.”125 
Th ere were and are very wide variations in medical 
practices from one community to another and even 
among doctors in the same community.  John Wen-
nberg, M.D., Professor of Medicine at Dartmouth 
Medical School and director of Dartmouth’s Center 
for the Clinical Evaluative Sciences, documented varia-
tions of ten-fold and more.126  Doctors in some parts 
of Vermont did ten or more times the per-child rate 
of tonsillectomy as in others.  Such variation suggests 
doctors were following their own practice patterns, 
perhaps doing what they were told in their training 
programs years ago, rather than following up-to-date 
science.  Wennberg’s ﬁ ndings bear quotation at length.  
Most people view the medical care they receive 
as a necessity provided by doctors who adhere 
to scientiﬁ c norms based on previously tested 
and proven treatments.  When the contents of 
the medical care “black box” are examined more 
closely, however, the type of medical service pro-
vided is often found to be as strongly inﬂ uenced 
by subjective factors related to the attitudes of 
individual physicians as by science.  Th ese sub-
jective considerations, which I call collectively 
the “practice style factor,” can play a decisive role 
in determining what speciﬁ c services are pro-
vided a given patient as well as whether treat-
ment occurs in the ambulatory or the inpatient 
setting.  As a consequence, this style factor has 
profound implications for the patient and the 
payer of care.
For example, the practice style factor aﬀ ects 
whether patients with menopausal symptoms, 
with hypertrophy of the tonsil, with hyperpla-
sia of the prostate, with mild angina, or with 
a host of other ailments receive conservative 
treatments in an ambulatory setting or un-
dergo a surgical operation in a hospital.  It also 
aﬀ ects whether patients with relatively minor 
medical conditions such as bronchitis or gas-
tro-enteritis, or who need minor surgical pro-
cedures such as cystoscopy, teeth extractions, 
sterilization, or breast biopsy receive their care 
in a hospital or elsewhere.  Th e practice style 
that favors inpatient treatment greatly aﬀ ects 
the demand for hospital care and has serious 
implications for eﬀ orts to constrain costs.
Some of the diﬀ erences in opinion arise be-
cause the necessary scientiﬁ c information on 
outcomes is missing.  For other conditions, the 
practice style factor appears unrelated to scien-
tiﬁ c controversies.  Physicians in some hospital 
markets practice medicine in ways that have 
extremely adverse implications for the cost of 
care, motivated perhaps by reasons of their 
own or their patients’ convenience, or because 
of individualistic interpretations of the require-
ments for “defensive medicine.”  Whatever the 
reason, it certainly is not because of adherence 
to medical standards based on clinical out-
come criteria or even on statistical norms based 
on average performance.  In some markets, 
a substantial proportion of hospitalizations 
are for cases that in other markets are usually 
treated outside the hospital.  If more conserva-
tive, ambulatory-oriented practice styles were 
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substituted – then substantial cost savings 
and improvements in quality could be realized 
without fear that needed services were being 
withheld.127 
Th ese ﬁ ndings undercut the notion of “medical neces-
sity,” as judged by the individual doctor, and the notion 
that there is a “standard of care.”  Clearly, some people 
were getting more therapies or procedures than were 
beneﬁ cial while others might be getting too few.  Sci-
entiﬁ c evidence-based practice guidelines would help 
to control costs.  Dr. Wennberg has continued this line 
of research and periodically publishes the Dartmouth 
Atlas of Health Care.128  Th e Dartmouth Atlas 1999 re-
ports that in 1996, radical prostatectomy for Medicare 
beneﬁ ciaries was performed 9.4 times as often in the 
hospital referral area with the most such procedures 
than in the referral area with the least.  For carotid en-
darterectomy, the ratio was 7.7.b
Scientiﬁ c, evidence-based practice guidelines, produced 
by teams of doctors and other experts, are clearly 
needed, as are procedures to monitor compliance.  In 
view of the massive amounts of medical literature ap-
pearing every week, the individual doctor – unaided by 
some organized eﬀ ort – cannot possibly keep up and 
also have time to see patients.
Arguably and understandably, many doctors’ decisions 
and behavior are at least inﬂ uenced by the ﬁ nancial 
incentives in FFS, as well as by traditions and training, 
and by loyalty to the physician’s particular specialty.  
Th e Wall Street Journal recently reported an example 
in an article entitled, “Hysterectomy Alternative Goes 
Unmentioned to Many Women.”129
Hundreds of thousands of women go to gyne-
cologists each year with a common condition 
known as uterine ﬁ broid tumors.  When it’s 
severe, a majority of them get the same recom-
mendation: a hysterectomy, or removal of the 
uterus.  In recent years, a less invasive proce-
dure, known as uterine artery embolization 
or UAE, has been growing in popularity.  Yet 
some patients, and even some gynecologists, 
say many gynecologists aren’t telling their pa-
tients about the alternative.  
A study presented at a medical conference in 
2002 found that of 100 UAE patients at Chi-
cago’s Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 79 
had learned about the procedure from a source 
other than a gynecologist.  A survey by Yale 
University School of Medicine in 2003 found 
that 13 of 21 UAE patients had learned about 
the procedure from the Internet.
“It’s sad,” says Juergen Eisermann, a gynecolo-
gist who is medical director of the South Flor-
ida Institute for Reproductive Medicine.  “We 
do a disservice not to mention all the options.”  
Some gynecologists blame the failure to inform 
patients about UAE on the fact that gynecolo-
gists generally don’t perform the procedure.  
Instead, members of a specialty known as in-
terventional radiology do UAE.  When gyne-
cologists lose the chance to perform a hysterec-
tomy, they also lose the roughly $2000 fee the 
gynecologist might have earned.
For the many women for whom the UAE produces a 
better and more desired medical outcome, the more 
costly hysterectomy is not “medically necessary.”  
A good example of a proliferation of unevaluated tech-
nology in FFS is arthroscopic surgery for osteoarthritis 
of the knee, as documented in a 2002 New England 
Journal of Medicine article reporting a clinical trial that 
compared arthroscopic surgery with a pretend or sham 
or “placebo” operation.130  Patients with osteoarthritis 
of the knee were randomly assigned to and received 
“arthroscopic debridement” or “arthroscopic lavage” 
(two frequent operations), or placebo (that is, pretend 
or sham) surgery.  Th e authors concluded that:  “At 
no point did either of the intervention groups [that is, 
those who got a real operation] report less pain or bet-
ter function than the placebo group.”  In other words, 
this operation conferred no medical value.  
But other research has shown that “Postoperative 
thromboembolic events [blood clots] are serious com-
plications, and retrospective studies have reported an 
incidence of 0.2 percent to 7 percent for clinically ap-
parent deep venous thrombosis (DVT) and pulmonary 
embolism (PE).”131  DVTs and pulmonary embolisms 
b  Th ese ﬁ gures are computed on an age-adjusted per-capita basis.  Th e procedure counts are based on the area of residence of the beneﬁ ciaries, not 
where the procedure was performed.
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can lead to strokes, death, and heart damage, and to 
long and costly treatments in and out of hospital with 
anti-coagulation drugs.  According to a report from the 
Baylor College of Medicine: “In the United States, it is 
estimated that more than 650,000 arthroscopic debri-
dement or lavage procedures are performed each year, 
many of these for arthritis, at a cost of about $5,000 
each”132 – totaling $3.25 billion per year, not including 
the costs of treatment of the complications.  As is often 
the case with evaluation of surgical procedures, this 
one was not without controversy.  Th ere are reasonable 
criticisms of the research design, but this reinforces 
the point that the procedure became widespread before 
proper evaluation.133
In this example as in the others, the FFS insurance 
model gives patients no guidance as to the best proce-
dures and the least costly doctors, and little reason to 
care.  All the incentives lead to doing too much care, or 
care of little or no marginal value.
Another important driver of cost inﬂ ation in the FFS 
model is that hospitals compete for doctors – because 
doctors bring in paying patients – by oﬀ ering ameni-
ties such as low-cost convenient oﬃ  ce buildings next to 
hospitals, and by buying the latest and best high-tech 
equipment.  Hospital recruiting leads to a “medical 
arms race” of proliferation of high-tech equipment, 
much of which is not used to full capacity.  Underused 
specialists and facilities can result in a lack of proﬁ -
ciency – and thus, the proliferation of hospitals doing 
costly, complex and inherently risky procedures such as 
open-heart surgery in volumes that are so low as to be 
both dangerous and uneconomic.134
FFS Is Inadequate for Treating Chronic 
Conditions
A recent estimate indicates that 83 percent of health-
care spending is associated with people with chronic 
conditions, and that this share is rising.135  Th e FFS 
model is particularly poorly adapted to this kind of 
care.  FFS is oriented to acute, episodic care.  It pays 
for doctor visits and procedures.  Chronic care needs 
what the Institute of Medicine of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences (IOM) calls “care based on continu-
ous healing relationships” usually performed by allied 
health professionals.136  FFS has a hard time paying for 
nurses to telephone patients to ask them about their 
weight and recommend changes in their medications.  
Error, Fraud and Abuse
Largely because FFS requires millions of individual 
acts to be billed and paid for, improper billing be-
cause of fraud, carelessness, or errors is a huge prob-
lem.  Both governmental and private payers must sort 
through millions of claims and separate the appropri-
ate and legitimate from the inappropriate and false.  
Physician demands for prompt payment do not make 
this task any easier.  Th e insurance industry has had to 
innovate to do this job: perfection is not possible, and 
reasonable approximations must be used.  Otherwise, 
transactions costs would soar even more than they 
have. 
Th e Report on the Financial Statement Audit of the 
Health Care Financing Administration for Fiscal Year 
1996 by the Oﬃ  ce of the Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services esti-
mated that in that year, the Medicare Program made 
about $23.2 billion in improper payments; subse-
quent reports have indicated that such payments have 
continued in somewhat reduced but still substantial 
amounts.137  Th e main reasons the payments were 
judged to be improper were insuﬃ  cient documenta-
tion, no documentation, lack of medical necessity, 
incorrect coding, and non-covered or unallowable ser-
vices.138  As the Inspector General’s Report said:  “Th e 
Medicare program is inherently vulnerable to incorrect 
provider billing practices.”139  Th e same could be said 
of all insurance under FFS.  Malcolm Sparrow’s book, 
License to Steal: How Fraud Bleeds America’s Health 
Care System, provides many examples.140  Abuse that is 
particularly hard to detect is, for purely economic rea-
sons, increasing the volume of services that confer no 
additional beneﬁ t to the patient.141,142,143
Lack of Performance Tracking
FFS has been very slow to adopt comprehensive lon-
gitudinal records.  Th us, doctors have no systematic 
way to follow their patients and track the outcomes of 
diﬀ erent procedures and treatments.  Th ey follow their 
patients who want to come back and be seen, but have 
little knowledge of the others who must be included 
in any analysis of the quality of care or the eﬃ  cacy of 
treatments.
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Appendix C: Potential Alternative Delivery Systems
Th e broad outlines of our recommendation, even with 
several practical examples such as the state of Wis-
consin, the University of California and the FEHB, 
leave important implementation questions.  Some of 
the examples are public, and some are private.  Which 
mode should be chosen?  If it is the private, University-
of-California-type model, why is it that this successful 
model has not spread on its own?  What changes in 
public policy would be needed to scale such a model to 
national implementation?  Also, the private model is 
based on employment.  How could that approach be 
implemented to achieve broader or even universal cov-
erage to attack the problem of the uninsured?  But if 
the public model should be chosen, what would be the 
cost, and how would it be ﬁ nanced?a
Many people ﬁ nd it hard to imagine health-care 
ﬁ nancing and delivery systems other than the domi-
nant, uncoordinated “free choice” fee-for-service small 
practice system.  Th is system is hard to change, and its 
adherents fairly successfully fought oﬀ  the “managed 
care” revolution of the 1990s.  To imagine how it might 
change, it is important ﬁ rst to imagine an insurance 
world in which every individual or household has an 
annual, cost-conscious choice among alternative ﬁ nanc-
ing and delivery systems in a model structured to make 
sure their choice is informed and easy to make.b  How 
would things be diﬀ erent if health insurers had to 
compete for members, not employers?
Experience shows that people would migrate to what 
they perceive to be value for money – not necessarily 
the cheapest plan, but the plan that people believe the 
best combination of price and all other attributes that 
they value.  For such a system to work, the number of 
choices must be manageable for typical consumers.  
Th e experience of employers with 401(K) retirement 
a  One plan along these lines has been introduced in Wisconsin by a bipartisan pair of legislators and can be seen at www.wisconsinhealthproject.org.
b  As noted earlier, this is a state of aﬀ airs that exists, for example, for employees at the University of California and Stanford University, Wells Fargo 
Bank and Hewlett Packard, and Federal and California state employees, but otherwise only in a small minority of employment groups.
plans is that some of their employees become over-
whelmed when confronted with too many options.  On 
one key dimension, however, it is likely that consum-
ers will have to trade oﬀ  price against choice of physi-
cian: plans that have limited integrated networks of 
providers will probably cost less than those that allow 
nearly unlimited selection.  Th us, consumers would 
have a choice between delegating the management of 
their health care to pay a lower price, versus accept-
ing responsibility for that management in all of its 
detail – or some combination in between.  It would be 
important that consumers be oﬀ ered the option of a 
free-choice fee-for-service plan – so that every person 
who is satisﬁ ed with his or her health care could keep 
what he or she had.  However, in the interest of value 
for money, and in particular ﬁ nancial savings, it is 
likely that some consumers would choose health plans 
with limitations on choice of provider that they would 
not have accepted if they could not choose the limited 
group of physicians – if it had been imposed by their 
employers, and especially if that imposition did not in-
clude visible receipt of the attendant ﬁ nancial savings.
One of the most important insights is that there is very 
wide variation in practice patterns among physicians, 
and the most cost-eﬀ ective physicians often achieve 
the best outcomes by “doing it right the ﬁ rst time.”  A 
key step toward a quality cost-eﬀ ective health plan is 
selecting a limited set of providers who are themselves 
cost-eﬀ ective, and committed to coordination and 
teamwork.
Although we cannot forecast which systems would 
prosper in a reformed, truly competitive market for 
health plans, the following are likely candidates.
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Tiered High-Performance Networks (THPN) 
Combined with Capitated Primary Care 
Networks (CPCN)
Th e major health-insurance companies have been de-
veloping extensive database analyses to identify qual-
ity cost-eﬀ ective doctors and to be able to separate 
them from doctors who are high cost and poor qual-
ity.  Insurers usually ﬁ nd several who are in the favor-
able quadrant of the quality-and-eﬃ  ciency space, using 
total-cost-per-episode to measure eﬃ  ciency.  Th e gen-
eral idea would then be to oﬀ er health plans, usually in 
a PPO format, that would require substantially higher 
customer cost sharing if the customer goes to other 
than the designated quality cost-eﬀ ective doctors.  As 
mentioned earlier, there are data analysis issues, such 
as the accuracy of assigning every episode to one physi-
cian, and of correcting for innate diﬀ erences among 
the patients and the episodes.  Also, there are concerns 
that employers might be reluctant to use plan designs 
that include powerful incentives to make people change 
doctors.  Because this methodology is focused on spe-
cialists, where most of the money goes, it ignores the 
important roles of primary care and prevention and ap-
propriateness of care.  THPNs could end up with high 
volumes of preventable inappropriate episodes.  Even if 
these episodes were handled eﬃ  ciently, costs per per-
son might be high.
Th e weaknesses of THPNs might be addressed by 
pairing them with Capitated Primary Care Networks 
(CPCNs).  Starting in the late 1970s, HMO of Penn-
sylvania, later U.S. Healthcare, developed a network of 
selected primary care physicians who were committed 
to the concept of cost-eﬃ  cient medicine, who would 
be paid on a per capita payment basis for all primary 
care services, and who would accept extensive quality 
measurement.  In addition, they would share in the 
savings, if any, in a budgeted pool of money for special-
ist services.  Th is model grew rapidly and was very suc-
cessful, enrolling more than one million members.  It 
was eventually acquired by Aetna, which apparently no 
longer uses it because it does not ﬁ t well with Aetna’s 
“single-source” business model.  But such a Capitated 
Primary Care Network could build in the important 
functions of health education, early detection, disease 
management and management of referrals to cost-
eﬀ ective doctors.  And it could grow rapidly because 
it uses doctors already established in practice.  Th e 
eﬀ ectiveness of the model was limited because it lacked 
the data needed to identify the most eﬃ  cient doctors.  
It is not hard to imagine how such a model could evolve 
toward greater integration as the primary care doctors 
and the health plan could invite the specialists with the 
best records of performance and cooperation to join 
their system.  Eventually these models could become 
more and more like multi-specialty group practices.  
Individual Practice Associations
In the 1970s, doctors in traditional practice in counties 
that also had strong Prepaid Group Practices formed 
Individual Practice Associations (IPAs) through their 
county medical societies.  Th e idea was to preserve 
the traditional model in a format that would allow the 
FFS doctors to oﬀ er the ﬁ nancial equivalent of Prepaid 
Group Practice while preserving their individual- or 
small-practice style.  Th e IPA would be paid capita-
tion, but the doctors would be paid fee-for-service.  
IPAs reconciled the diﬀ erence by imposing manage-
ment controls on their physician members, and usu-
ally withholding payment of some 20 percent of fees 
until the end of the year, and then paying out what was 
left if there was a ﬁ nancial surplus.  Many IPAs failed 
ﬁ nancially in California in the 1990s, often because 
they lacked the commitment of their participating 
doctors and because the fee-for-service incentives were 
too strong.  Many doctors considered IPAs to be “ just 
another insurance company.”  An important weak-
ness of the IPA was its lack of selectivity.  It could not 
trade volume for price or protect its surgeons from the 
surgeon surplus, or otherwise correct specialty im-
balances because all the doctors in the county not in 
prepaid group practices belonged to the IPA.  Another 
signiﬁ cant weakness was antitrust risk, as it was often 
not clear what distinguished an IPA from a price-ﬁ xing 
agreement among doctors.  
But the leading IPA in Northern California, Hill 
Physicians Medical Group, caring for nearly 400,000 
members, has survived and prospered in an environ-
ment where there are strong multi-specialty medical 
group practices.  Th ey contract with the major net-
work HMOs on terms similar to those of the multi-
specialty group practices.  Th ey have more than 3,000 
physicians and other providers in more than 1,300 
practices.  Th ey are developing an electronic medical 
records solution that will make comprehensive patient 
77
records available to participating physicians.  In 2005, 
they paid out $26 million in performance bonuses for 
physicians.  Th ey are deploying other electronic sys-
tems to assist their physicians with appointment set-
ting, patient eligibility, claims status, electronic claims 
processing, etc.  Th ey have the beneﬁ t of strong and 
eﬀ ective management.
Tufts Health Plan in Massachusetts serves over 
560,000 members.  It works through hospitals and 
hospital staﬀ s.  To align incentives and to compensate 
hospitals for revenue loss through reduced hospitaliza-
tion, the hospitals receive a portion of the savings from 
those reduced hospitalizations, preserving what would 
have been their small “proﬁ t” and ﬁ xed overhead por-
tion, but not incurring the signiﬁ cant variable costs.
IPAs could have a strong future if they could attract 
the loyalty, commitment and responsible participation 
of physicians, if they could select physicians to address 
specialty balance and teamwork, and if they could 
achieve a high degree of virtual integration through 
shared electronic medical records and electronic sys-
tems for administration, such as for appointments and 
payments.  Th ey would need to move more toward im-
proving eﬃ  ciency through better integration.  
Prepaid Group Practices
A prepaid group practice (PGP) is an integrated entity 
that includes both a health-care delivery system (doc-
tors, other clinicians, laboratories, clinics, and hos-
pitals) and an insurance function (ﬁ nancing arrange-
ments, beneﬁ t plans, marketing, and customer service 
systems) “under one roof.”  Critical components of the 
PGP include the following:
• A multi-specialty group practice – that is, a group 
of clinicians, including primary care generalists, 
non-physician providers such as nurse practitio-
ners, and specialist physicians, sharing ﬁ nances, 
facilities, equipment, and responsibility for all 
enrolled members and committed to the team 
practice of medicine;
• Any hospitals or other facilities owned by or aﬃ  li-
ated with the multi-specialty group practice;
• A voluntarily enrolled population that contracts 
with the PGP through a sponsor (employer or 
public program) or as individuals;
• Comprehensive health-care services provided di-
rectly or indirectly by the PGP;
• Per capita prepayment;
• Accountability for the quality and cost of the care 
that is delivered; and
• A relationship (usually, but not necessarily, mutu-
ally exclusive) between the delivery system and the 
insurance entity.  
PGPs now cover roughly 12 million people.  Th e main 
examples of PGPs are Kaiser Permanente, now operat-
ing in nine states and the District of Columbia; Group 
Health Cooperative of Puget Sound; Health Partners 
in Minnesota; and Health Insurance Plan (HIP) of 
New York.  Harvard Community Health Plan in Bos-
ton was a PGP until it merged with Pilgrim to become 
a mixed group/IPA model.
Properties and attributes of Prepaid Group Practice 
include the following:  Physicians are paid salaries, 
depending on their specialties and market conditions, 
and usually substantial bonuses for measured patient 
satisfaction, indicators of quality and teamwork.  Th is 
facilitates incentives alignment.  Th e culture empha-
sizes teamwork and shared responsibility for enrolled 
patients.  PGPs emphasize primary care, disease 
prevention, early detection and treatment of disease, 
and chronic disease management.  Th e model facili-
tates development of the infrastructure for chronic 
disease management, and also provides a smooth way 
of transferring savings from the inpatient sector to the 
ambulatory-care sector that prevents the need for hos-
pitalization by superior care for patients with ambu-
latory-sensitive diagnoses.  PGPs feature longitudinal 
comprehensive medical records and analysis of practice 
patterns and outcomes, to determine what works best 
in practice.  Prepaid group practices are among the 
leaders in adopting health information technology.  
In the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, a ran-
domized controlled trial, Group Health Cooperative 
in Seattle delivered care of equal quality for 28 percent 
fewer resources than fee-for-service in Seattle.  And 
they accomplished this in the absence of competition 
in kind from similar delivery systems and, for the most 
part, premium-price-sensitive customers.  
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Large Multi-Specialty Group Practices Evolving 
Toward PGP
Should the market and consumer choices lean in that 
direction, the 175 large (over 100 physicians) multi-
specialty group practices now existing in the United 
States could evolve toward larger integrated systems 
by having a portion of the practice prepaid.  In 2005, 
these practices included 81,600 physicians.  Th ough 
higher concentrations of these entities exist on the 
Paciﬁ c Coast, upper Midwest, Florida and New York, 
at least one exists in all but three states.  Clinics from 
Boston, New Hampshire and Vermont could reach 
out to serve people in Maine, for example.  Many of 
these are quite famous, including the Mayo Clinic; the 
Ochsner Clinic; the Leahy Clinic; the Fallon Clinic; 
the Marshﬁ eld Clinic; the Geisinger Clinic; Scott and 
White; Virginia Mason; Henry Ford Health System; 
and many more.  Many of these have their own aﬃ  li-
ated health plans now, although that activity has been 
receding in the face of unfavorable market conditions.  
Others have had their own health plans in the past, 
and some, such as Leahy, have teamed up with a Blue 
Cross or Blue Shield carrier to produce a joint venture 
product when they thought market conditions were 
receptive.  All could be marketed through network-
model carrier HMOs like Paciﬁ Care and Health Net 
– a move more plans could oﬀ er without major start-up 
costs.  
If a model of universal health insurance based on com-
petition to serve cost-conscious consumers were en-
acted, most or all of these group practices, and perhaps 
some smaller ones as well, would ﬁ nd it in their eco-
nomic interest to create their own health plans again, 
or team up with established carriers to create joint-ven-
ture partnerships for “private-label products” (like the 
Blue Cross Leahy health plan).  One main reason for 
this is that the per capita prepayment that comes with 
having their own health plans facilitates realization 
of many eﬃ  ciencies not available in FFS, such as the 
smooth transfer of resources from the inpatient sector 
to outpatient disease management programs (because 
the disease management programs reduce the need for 
hospitalizations).  It also reduces the need to engage 
in fee-for-service billing and collection.  Th ese cost 
reductions would not be accompanied by reductions in 
revenue as they usually are in FFS.  In the market con-
ditions hypothesized here, these entities could grow 
rapidly, and that growth could trigger innovation on 
the part of all other providers.  
Th ese innovations could move much more quickly if 
their access to customers were not ﬁ ltered through 
employers.  Numerous other promising ideas sur-
faced and were tried in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
that might be tried again in more favorable market 
conditions.
Roles of Academic Health Centers
Leaders of academic health centers (AHCs) have often 
felt threatened by the prospect of competition and 
have opposed creating a truly competitive health-care 
economy.  What would be their roles in a model of 
market-based universal health insurance?  Here are 
some possibilities.
Of course, their unique roles would be teaching and 
research.  Th e products of these services are public 
goods, which are and must be subsidized at their 
appropriate value by government.  Academic health 
centers now often provide considerable care to the 
uninsured poor, to some extent subsidized by Dispro-
portionate Share payments.  With universal health 
insurance, the need for these payments would be 
greatly reduced but not eliminated.
Some AHCs would choose to create comprehensive 
care programs based on per-capita prepayment to com-
pete in the general market for health insurance, though 
such plans usually would not be their core competence. 
Probably all AHCs would compete for regional refer-
rals for complex care from the region’s suppliers of 
comprehensive care, as they do today for organ trans-
plants, neonatology, and “quarternary care” in the grey 
zone between ordinary care and research – such as 
heart surgery in utero.  Th ese eﬀ orts logically would 
be ﬁ nanced by negotiated global condition-based pay-
ments per case.  
And ﬁ nally, AHCs would compete in the market for 
“destination medicine” in which patients in need of 
their care will travel even great distances to receive it, 
as in the case of the Mayo Clinic.  Th ese treatments 
might be on a fee-for-service basis, or paid for by nego-
tiated global condition-based payments.
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Th e proposed system would be managed by the 
“Health Fed” under broad guidelines written by the 
Congress.  Th e Health Fed would insulate the details 
of the health care system from narrow short-term po-
litical concerns and would facilitate continuing policy 
adjustments that would need to move more quickly and 
ﬂ exibly than the legislative process. 
Reconciling the Benefi t Package, the Prices 
of the Low-Priced Plans, and the Government 
Tax-Financed Fixed-Dollar Contributions
Th e beneﬁ t package (that is, the schedule of what is 
covered by insurance, on what terms, and including 
what rates of patient co-payments, coinsurance and 
deductibles), the resulting prices of the low-priced 
plans in each district, and the government’s ﬁ xed-dol-
lar payment to each individual or household to assist 
with purchase of health insurance, will not necessarily 
coincide, being themselves the results of quite diﬀ erent 
processes. 
Th e broad outline of the beneﬁ t package should emerge 
from a political process that produces guidelines from 
the Congress, with more detailed decisions by the 
Health Fed Board to insulate the details of beneﬁ t de-
sign from politics.  Th e beneﬁ t package should be rea-
sonably comprehensive to encourage access to care for 
early detection, screening for chronic conditions and 
disease management.  Importantly, the great major-
ity of health spending is concentrated in relatively few 
high cost cases, and very little is actually spent on un-
necessary primary care visits.  Well-organized systems 
can make that even lower by using paramedical person-
nel and coaching patients on appropriate use of physi-
cian and emergency room visits.  Th us, the scope for 
premium reduction by reducing beneﬁ ts and increasing 
cost sharing is very limited.144  An important contribu-
tion of primary care is early detection of potentially 
serious acute conditions (appendicitis, pneumonia) and 
chronic conditions, and managing them appropriately 
to prevent them from leading to hospitalization. 
Also, the basic beneﬁ t package for medical care services 
must be suﬃ  ciently comprehensive that it will not leave 
a market for supplemental insurance products that 
further insure the same services.  Medicare for many 
years has encouraged a large market for supplemental 
policies, thereby adding both complexity and cost, and 
implicitly and inadvertently forcing Medicare to sub-
sidize those supplemental insurance policies.  People 
who have supplemental policies use signiﬁ cantly more 
Medicare services than similar people who do not, 
because the supplemental policies buy out the coinsur-
ance and deductibles they otherwise would have to pay. 
It is desirable to have the government’s ﬁ xed-dollar pre-
mium payment to individuals coincide with the prices 
of the low-priced plans in each district, so that every-
one can have free access to the low-priced plan, and 
therefore no ﬁ nancial barrier to enrollment.  A higher 
ﬁ xed-dollar payment would destroy the incentive of 
plans to oﬀ er lower prices.  A lower payment would 
leave some amount to be paid by consumers, likely 
causing some not to enroll.  Th e reduced “take-up rate” 
in turn can lead to additional administrative costs (see 
below).  A payment of 100 percent of the low-priced 
plan premium, at least for an individual policy, is made 
at the University of California and Stanford, and for 
state employees in Wisconsin.  Th e Federal Govern-
ment bases its contribution on a percentage of the aver-
age of the premiums of the largest plans in the system.  
Th e state of California now contributes ﬁ xed-dollar 
amounts that are based on a historical path with an-
nual percentage adjustments, generally below the price 
of the low-priced plan. 
If the policy is to set the payment exactly at the price of 
the low priced plan, with the contribution determined 
after the bids are in, the model would be subject to 
some volatility, as some competitors might submit un-
sustainably low bids in an attempt to buy market share. 
Plan administrators might believe that the choice of a 
plan is “sticky,” once individuals began working with 
their doctors, and so might set a low premium price at 
Appendix D: Management of Universal Health 
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ﬁ rst but assume that they could raise premiums later 
without losing enrollees.  For this reason, the state of 
Wisconsin Department of Employee Trust Funds has 
imposed an alternative rule.  Plans are grouped into 
tiers by their quoted premiums.  Tier I includes the 
lowest-priced plans, and employees who choose a Tier I 
plan will have the premium fully paid by the State.  As 
well as greater stability, this approach tends to spread 
the load of caring for people with low incomes among 
several plans.  People who choose higher-priced plans 
are expected to pay the diﬀ erence between the cost of 
Tier I and the higher-priced tier or plan.  It is desirable 
to preserve a model in which a health plan can always 
attract more members by lowering its premium, so 
people who choose plans priced below the Tier I aver-
age should be allowed to keep the diﬀ erence (in cash, 
or in their health spending accounts, if any). 
Th e prices of health plans would be determined by 
competition to serve premium-sensitive customers.  
Th e experience in employment groups suggests that 
premium-price-sensitive consumers migrate to the low-
priced plans, so the competition is likely to produce 
strong incentives for health plans to achieve eﬃ  ciencies 
and reduce prices. 
A plausible way of determining the taxpayer-supported 
ﬁ xed-dollar payment would start with actuaries study-
ing the distribution of actual premiums, estimating 
what a comparatively eﬃ  cient plan would cost, and 
then adjusting the estimate regionally using indices 
of input costs in each region (similar to what is done 
for the Medicare Prospective Payment System for 
Hospitals).  Th en, if plans bid premiums below the 
ﬁ xed-dollar payment, and the Health Fed determines 
that they are realistic and sustainable, individuals and 
households choosing such plans would be allowed to 
keep the diﬀ erence in cash or in their health spending 
accounts (if any), to give the plans incentives to oﬀ er 
lower prices.  If the recipients cannot pocket the beneﬁ t 
from choosing plans with lower premiums, plans will 
simply not charge lower premiums, and competition 
will not drive prices down.  
On the other hand, if, as widely feared, premiums 
grow faster than the tax revenues supporting the 
consumers’ premium credits, a process must be de-
ﬁ ned for dealing with the problem.  For background, 
in 1965, Congress created open-ended entitlements 
in Medicare and Medicaid, which made consumers 
cost-unconscious and gave providers strong incentives 
to provide more services.  Congress has watched each 
year as patients and providers have increased the use of 
services at a rate greater than the growth of total rev-
enues, and in many years has done little to change the 
course of spending, and in few years has done enough 
to make any lasting impact.  So it is not possible to 
make uncontrollable expenditures easily controllable 
right away.  Moreover, recall that the system being rec-
ommended here would give all consumers incentives to 
choose economically, and would allow competition to 
force alignment of provider incentives with the needs 
and wants of consumers for aﬀ ordable care.
If premium growth exceeds growth in available or es-
timated resources, the government might continue to 
pay its ﬁ xed-dollar contributions out of general rev-
enues at the increased amount needed to keep up with 
premium growth.  Th ere might also be pre-planned 
policy changes (spending or taxes) to accommodate the 
shortfall.  Th e Health Fed would be required to ana-
lyze the causes of the problem and present to Congress 
options and recommendations which might include 
stepped up antitrust action or other government ac-
tivities, trimming the package of covered beneﬁ ts, or 
raising the relevant tax rates.  If Congress were not to 
act in a timely manner, some default action could be 
predetermined.  (One such option could be to raise 
consumer cost sharing amounts to the extent needed to 
keep the program solvent.  In all cases of increased cost 
sharing, there would need to be exemptions for people 
with low incomes.)
Managing Wide Regional Variations in Price-
Adjusted and Disease-Adjusted per Capita 
Spending
Dr. John Wennberg and his Dartmouth colleagues 
have identiﬁ ed very wide regional variations in price- 
and disease-adjusted per capita spending.  Medicare’s 
uncoordinated fee-for-service reimbursement encour-
ages such variations and has no built-in incentive or 
management system to correct them.
A reasonable goal is to work toward equalization in 
aggregate per capita spending, adjusted for prices 
and epidemiology (that is, adjusted for age, sex, and 
diagnosis, and for regional costs of living).  A poor 
outcome would be to tolerate the wide variations in 
adjusted per-capita spending not justiﬁ ed by variations 
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in prevalence of illness.  Th at would be inequitable and 
wasteful. 
If the premiums of the low-priced plans in a high-cost 
district exceed the national standard, the Health Fed 
could, under guidelines created by Congress, pay the 
price of the low-priced Tier I plans in the initial year, 
but then institute a 10-year phase out plan in which, 
by year 10, the ﬁ xed-dollar contributions would be 
at the adjusted national average.  Each year that the 
premiums of the low-priced Tier I plans exceeded the 
standard, the Health Fed could increase consumer 
cost sharing to bring the premiums back to target.  
Alternatively, the Health Fed would be charged with 
investigating the causes of higher regional costs, and 
could make speciﬁ c recommendations to the Congress 
and to regional providers, in a manner similar to that 
followed by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commis-
sion.  Dr. Wennberg’s research could be used to put a 
public spotlight on egregious overuse of services.  For 
example, the Health Fed (or the Institute for Medical 
Outcomes and Technology Assessment) might com-
mission studies on the prevalence of inappropriate or 
avoidable hospitalizations, or other indicators of poor 
quality or overuse of services.
However, it is very likely that competition in high-
cost areas will work to eliminate wasteful overuse and 
to bring the health plan premiums down to eﬃ  cient 
levels.
Managing the Problems Created by the Failure 
of Eligible Persons to Enroll in a Health Plan
Despite good outreach eﬀ orts, it is likely that some 
signiﬁ cant number of people will fail to enroll in a 
health plan.  For one thing, some people simply will not 
act until they are sick.  Others may feel that their life 
styles do not ﬁ t in with enrolling in a health plan and 
carrying a card.  What can or should be done about 
that?  Th ere are several approaches.  Th e Health Fed 
might run experiments and demonstration projects 
with diﬀ erent strategies.  To a signiﬁ cant degree, the 
best solutions will depend on the character, incomes 
and life styles of those who fail to enroll, and will also 
depend on the ﬁ nancing mechanism chosen for the 
program.
In the ﬁ rst instance, such problems are likely to 
be moderate in the plan proposed here because 
government would pay an amount equal to the price of 
the low-priced plan (or a “Tier I” plan), and unclaimed 
amounts could be paid to the insurer to which the un-
insured person is assigned.  If a person chooses a plan 
priced higher than Tier I and then fails to make pre-
mium payments, after an appropriate process, the per-
son’s enrollment could be terminated and the person 
could be assigned randomly to a Tier I plan in which 
no further premium payment is required. 
An analogous solution being developed for a similar 
MB-UHI model, the Wisconsin Health Plan, would 
be to assign uninsured people who show up at a provid-
er in need of medical care, randomly, to one of the Tier 
I plans (that is, the lowest-cost plans, which they could 
have for no out-of-pocket premium cost).  Th at plan 
would be paid all the unused back ﬁ xed-dollar pay-
ments that it would have received if the person had en-
rolled on time.  No one to whom this happens should 
be able to complain if the policy was clearly articulated 
in advance.  (In the Wisconsin Health Plan, as in our 
proposed program, all Tier I plans are “free.”145)
Without such a ﬁ nancing plan, failure to enroll could 
be more problematic.  A second approach would be 
simply to create a default insurance plan into which 
everyone without coverage is enrolled.  It could, by 
design, be cheaper than the lowest-price plan by having 
higher cost sharing.  However, such cost sharing might 
not be appropriate for people with low incomes. 
A third approach would recognize that state and local 
government public provider systems of last resort (or 
“safety net providers”) have always been an important 
part of our health-care delivery system.  Public sub-
sidies should be made available to strengthen these 
systems, particularly to strengthen their capabilities in 
primary care, disease prevention and disease manage-
ment.  In eﬀ ect, such systems, under state leadership 
and with federal help, should evolve into comprehen-
sive care organizations, as some have done already.  
Th en when eligible persons fail to enroll in a health 
plan, the default could be that they are enrolled in the 
public system, and the ﬁ xed-dollar contributions to 
which they would have been entitled are directed to the 
public system.146
Alternatively, some have suggested an individual man-
date, which has gained popularity recently.  It is a com-
ponent of the new Massachusetts Health Plan, and 
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Governor Schwarzenegger has included an individual 
mandate in his proposal for universal coverage in Cali-
fornia.  Th e key problem with the individual mandate, 
of course, is enforcement.  California has mandatory 
auto insurance, but many people go without it.  What 
do we do with people who have not purchased insur-
ance?  One approach is to require them to make an 
extra payment on their income tax return.  But many 
of the people most likely to go without insurance are 
not liable for income taxes.  In Massachusetts, the 
mandate is conditioned on the availability of aﬀ ord-
able insurance, and there has been some trouble ﬁ nd-
ing insurance that meets the deﬁ nition of “aﬀ ordable” 
without resorting to deductibles that are unreasonably 
high for low-income persons.  Nationally, only some 82 
percent of employees oﬀ ered health insurance by their 
employers actually take the oﬀ er.  Of course, in the 
model we are proposing, in which ﬁ xed-dollar contri-
butions would approximate the price of the low-priced 
plan, insurance would be aﬀ ordable for everyone.  And 
if the contributions were ﬁ nanced by broad-based 
taxes, there would be no need for an enforcement 
mechanism.
Th e Dutch have mandatory universal health insurance 
based on regulated competition in the private sector, 
with web-based enrollment processes, and also public 
subsidies for low-income people.  What happens if 
someone shows up at a hospital uninsured?  In the ﬁ rst 
instance, the person is liable for his medical bills.  If 
someone does not purchase insurance, this person is 
liable to a penalty of 130 percent of the premium over 
the period of not being insured, with a maximum of 5 
years.  Th e penalty has to be paid to the new insurer, 
who has to transfer this money to the government.  If 
an uninsured person makes use of health care facilities, 
the person is liable for his medical bills.  Alternatively, 
the person can, before getting the treatment, enroll 
with an insurer (for example, by telephone or website) 
who is not allowed to refuse because of the open 
enrollment requirement.
If an individual in the Netherlands is enrolled but does 
not pay the premium, the insurer is legally allowed to 
cancel the contract within a reasonable period of time 
after having sent a warning letter.  Th e open enroll-
ment requirement is a problem for the insurers.  Th e 
insurer who has cancelled the contract is not obliged to 
accept this person in the next ﬁ ve years, but all other 
insurers are not allowed to reject the expelled person.  
If the person enrolls with another insurer and again 
does not pay the premium, the second insurer may 
cancel the contract after some time.  And the person 
might go to a third insurer, etc.  So the insurers fear 
a “merry-go-round,” when an individual would pay 
premiums only when actually in need of care (which, of 
course, defeats the purpose of insurance).  Th e insurers 
agreed not to cancel the insurance contract of default-
ers during a period of 18 months that ended July 1, 
2007.  Th ey are now negotiating with government over 
who should bear the loss of forgone premiums.  Pre-
liminary estimates are that the number of uninsured 
among those who are obliged to purchase insurance is 
1.1 percent.  Th e number of persons who illegally stay 
in the Netherlands (and most likely are uninsured) is 
between 0.5 percent and 1.1 percent.  Th e number of 
defaulters (“no premium paid for at least 6 months”) is 
around 2 percent.147
But again, in a system of ﬁ xed-dollar payments that 
are large enough to purchase a comprehensive low-cost 
plan, such draconian measures should prove unneces-
sary.  Th ose who fail to enroll when ﬁ rst eligible should 
be able to join a low-priced plan later with no adverse 
consequences to the health-care ﬁ nancing system.
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IMOTA might fund clinical trials, but more often 
would assemble information from the published litera-
ture and unpublished data pertinent to its evaluations.  
IMOTA might commission studies, typically to uni-
versities and other nonproﬁ t contractors; but over time, 
full-time staﬀ  should perform a growing portion of its 
work.  IMOTA would need to prioritize among com-
peting objectives.  For example, IMOTA would need 
to anticipate the most likely improvement in outcomes.  
It would have to decide how to prioritize among treat-
ment variations that had little impact on costs and 
large impacts on clinical outcomes, and variations with 
large cost impacts but little clinical diﬀ erence.  Its eval-
uations should be comprehensive, systematic, credible, 
and widely disseminated in accessible forms.
In addition to prioritizing, IMOTA should make sub-
jective judgments needed for comparative eﬀ ectiveness 
analysis.  Here are three examples of these issues:
• How should evidence from diﬀ erent types of data 
be addressed?  For example, researchers and stake-
holders will need assistance in assessing compara-
tive eﬀ ectiveness when evidence for one treatment 
(a drug) comes from a randomized trial and evi-
dence for an alternative treatment (a device) comes 
from registries.
• How should diﬀ erential impacts on morbidity and 
mortality be addressed?  How should stakeholders 
compare eﬀ ectiveness for a treatment that extends 
life, but with greatly diminished quality, against 
a treatment that improves quality of life without 
extending it?
• How should treatments with diﬀ erential impacts 
over time be addressed? 
Appendix E: Functions of the Institute for Medical 
Outcomes and Technology Assessment (IMOTA)
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Page 27, Harold M. Williams
While I prefer our plan, I am not convinced that 
government-run single-payer health systems are 
inherently less eﬃ  cient than market-oriented health 
systems.  While a government-run single-payer system 
may not be compatible with our culture and ideology, 
a market-oriented health system that doesn’t provide 
access to 45 million people is not compatible with 
our culture or societal values either.  Much of what 
we recommend could be implemented as well under a 
single-payer system.
Studies show that Americans are not healthier nor are 
they living longer than people in industrialized nations 
that spend much less per capita than we do.  Despite 
having the most costly system in the world, the United 
States consistently underperforms on most dimensions 
of performance relative to other industrialized coun-
tries that have government-run universal health plans.
In health, our country rates 33rd and 32nd in the world 
respectively for longevity of males and females and 40th 
in child mortality.  Measured in terms of purchasing 
power, we spend nearly two-and-a-half times as much 
per capita as the United Kingdom, almost twice as 
much per capita as Canadians and Germans and half 
again more than the Swiss even though both Germany 
and Switzerland have much older populations.
Page 42, Michael Chesser
While this proposal purports to make fundamental 
changes in the health care delivery system, the primary 
proposals are related to the ﬁ nancing of the program.  
Th e proposal does not show a clear set of changes that 
would lead to fundamental change in the health-care 
delivery system.
Th e report does an excellent job of noting that the 
fragmentation in the current system of providers and 
fee-for-service based programs are a core issue.  To 
change this, as noted, the practice of medicine needs to 
change focus from medical specialty to the patient.  Yet 
in none of the proposals is there a concrete migration 
from the existing system to the proposed system.  Th e 
issues of monopolies in rural areas are not addressed, 
yet the report indicates that this is one of the problem 
areas.
Delivery issues are at the heart of the health-care 
debate.  Regina Herzlinger, a Harvard business school 
professor, has put forth strong and well researched 
analysis of changes in the delivery system that are 
needed to bring eﬃ  ciency into the health-care arena.  
Th is CED report fundamentally does not address 
the core issues of changes in the health-care delivery 
system.
Th ere are two fundamental changes that the program 
proposes.  First, using a broad based federal tax rev-
enue to fund health care through insurance credits is 
proposed.  Second, creating insurance pools that make 
access to insurance universally available is suggested.
Without fundamental delivery system changes, the 
sustainability of the program is in question.  In ad-
dition, there are serious questions about the Federal 
Employee Health Beneﬁ ts Program as it is organized.  
Th e decision to remove employer ﬁ nancing is attractive 
and would make our health-care program more similar 
to other nations’ health-care-program ﬁ nancing.  Th is 
speciﬁ c proposal clearly is a step in the right direction.
Th e issue of universal availability is fundamentally 
an issue of risk management.  Without fundamental 
changes in the underlying delivery system, the pricing 
of these pools will become an issue.  Th e risks underly-
ing an insurance pool, no matter how big, determine 
the costs.  Th e proposal, as noted above, does not 
address that fundamental issue.
It is recommended that this program be disapproved.  
If the analysis could more concretely address the 
issues in the delivery system, then the ﬁ nancing and 
universal-coverage provisions could be very attractive.
Page 42, David R. Nachbar
John Adams wrote in 1770, “Facts are stubborn 
things.”  While few issues draw as much passion as 
the nation’s health-care problem, the stubborn facts 
remain.  As this report shows, we have crossed the line 
from having hope that the system will remedy itself to 
the reality of a problem that needs a cure.
Th e number of uninsured Americans, now over 46 
million, is increasing.  Th e costs of insurance are vastly 
outstripping the rate of growth of American household 
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incomes. Faced with the known needs of feeding the 
family, putting gas in the tank, providing a roof over 
the head or buying insurance against unknown health 
risks, Americans are paying known expenses. Insur-
ance can wait. American households have crossed the 
line.
It is unclear how long American businesses can af-
ford our current system.  As the report indicates, the 
number of business oﬀ ering health beneﬁ ts fell nine 
percent in a recent seven year period.  While other 
countries have made health care coverage statutory, 
the US has relied on American industry, embedding 
health insurance into the costs of goods.  Th is is a 
strong blow to our nation’s competitiveness. American 
businesses have crossed the line.
Th is issue ignores state lines and knows no community 
border. Th e invisible uninsured become visible in our 
emergency rooms and public-health facilities.  Na-
tional health expenses are 16 percent of the GDP and 
the Baby Boom generation has just started to retire. 
American communities have crossed the line. 
To adequately address this issue, I believe that three 
criteria must be met:
• Th ere must be coverage for all Americans, ensur-
ing that no patient is left behind.
• Market forces must be unleashed to counter the 
upward drift of costs.
• Th e plan must be simple and easy to understand.
Th is proposal comes close to meeting those criteria 
and the details need to be worked out in the legislative 
process.
I also support the proposal for its call to action.  
Health care has been a subject of conversation since 
Th eodore Roosevelt.  We need to act not only because 
of the pain inﬂ icted on citizens and communities but 
also because we believe, in the words of Hippocrates, 
the founder of medical philosophy, that “health is the 
greatest of human blessings” and that it is inconsistent 
with our country’s standing as a strong, self-suﬃ  cient 
nation, that this problem should exist for another day.
Moving forward will take hard work and most im-
portantly, political courage.  Such courage is needed 
to oppose forces that defend things as they are and 
scare away change.  Two hundred years after Adams, 
another great American, John Wayne said, “Courage is 
being scared to death – but saddling up anyway.”  We 
have crossed the line and its time to saddle up.
Page 42, Ian D. Spatz
“Quality, Aﬀ ordable Health Care for All: Moving Be-
yond the Employer-Based Health-Insurance System” 
carefully describes many of the problems of current 
health-care delivery in America and accurately pin-
points areas of needed change.  Chapter Four captures 
the necessary elements for creating a consumer-choice-
driven, universal health-insurance system – competi-
tive insurance markets and exchanges; broadly ﬁ nanced 
subsidies for low-income Americans, and reorganized 
delivery systems focused on quality and eﬃ  ciency.  Th e 
report also argues persuasively that government-run 
reform proposals would not achieve desired goals.  
Yet, despite the report’s cogent criticisms of employer-
based insurance (EBI), it remains the most common 
way of providing health insurance in the U.S. today 
and for the foreseeable future.  Th e vast majority of the 
non-elderly insured get their coverage through their 
employers or through employed family members.
Contrary to what some may believe, the evidence does 
not support the view that EBI is disappearing any time 
soon.  According to the 2006 Kaiser/HRET Employer 
Health Beneﬁ ts Surveya, while the percentage of work-
ers covered by EBI has declined somewhat in recent 
years, that percentage is just three percentage points 
lower in 2006 compared to 1999 (59 to 62 percent).  
Nearly all large ﬁ rms (with more than 200 employees) 
oﬀ er EBI (98 percent) and they employ the vast major-
ity of U.S. workers.
Further, just six percent of surveyed ﬁ rms re-
ported that they were very or somewhat likely to drop 
a  Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and Ed-
ucational Trust, Employer Health Beneﬁ ts 2006 Annual Survey (Menlo 
Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation; Chicago: Health Re-
search and Educational Trust, 2006).
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coverage and, among large ﬁ rms, just two percent said 
they might drop coverage.
With the vast majority of those without insurance 
either employed or living in households with those 
who are employed, with the right policies – including 
many recommended in the report – the workplace can 
provide a forum for expanding access to aﬀ ordable 
coverage.
Th is context suggests that the report’s recommenda-
tion to build a new health-care system to replace the 
fundamental role of employers is unnecessary.  Worse, 
it is politically out of tune.  Th e leading eﬀ orts for 
systematic reform at the state level today build on, not 
replace, the current system of EBI.  Notably, the Mas-
sachusetts plan, adopted on a bipartisan basis, seeks to 
strengthen the ability and willingness of ﬁ rms to oﬀ er 
EBI and the ability of employees to enroll.  Similarly, 
the California proposals make EBI the building block 
of reform.  Th ese plans and others under consideration 
at the state level are now sparking signiﬁ cant national 
interest including from Presidential candidates of both 
parties.  
Fundamentally, the health reform the United States 
needs must be a political solution as well as a thought-
ful policy solution.  Th e CED report’s recommenda-
tions to phase out the role of employers in EBI are 
inconsistent with a promising, growing consensus for 
change.  Th erefore, with great respect for the report’s 
authors and contributors, I must dissent.
Page 53, Harold M. Williams
Th e plan we are proposing, if successfully implement-
ed, is one I strongly support.  However, all the interests 
that have resisted the past eﬀ orts to reform the system 
are alive and well and vested in the status quo.  Insur-
ers and providers resist any eﬀ ort that might threaten 
their central role and proﬁ tability, and practitioners 
worry that change could impact how they practice and 
their income.  Americans who have coverage are by and 
large satisﬁ ed with their own care and coverage and 
fear change more than the status quo.  Th e 47 million 
and growing population without health care plus those 
who fear that the insurance they have may become 
unaﬀ ordable are not an eﬀ ective lobbying group.
Much responsibility must rest on employers.  Strug-
gling to contain the spiraling costs of health care and 
remain competitive internationally can provide strong 
leadership for fundamental change.
Even assuming it is ultimately successfully implement-
ed, it will take at least a decade and probably longer 
before we have anything resembling universal coverage.  
Th is is unacceptable.  Our nation is facing a crisis that 
requires immediate attention.  Th ere are some steps we 
can take now that are not inconsistent with the plan we 
are proposing.
In the interim, insurance companies could be autho-
rized to oﬀ er coverage nationally and be required 
to cover everyone with no exclusion for pre-existing 
conditions.
Th e states should be encouraged to continue to explore 
their own solutions to eﬀ ective universal health care so 
we can all learn from their experience.
We should be strongly advocating the reauthorization 
and expansion of the State Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program (SCHIP) – as the report recommends.  
Th e least we can do now is to provide a safety net 
under our children today who do not otherwise have 
access to health care, thereby assuring preventive care 
and reducing future health-care costs.  While we are 
struggling with ﬁ xing the system, at least this genera-
tion could count on realistic access to health care.  
Hopefully, compassion and humanity can prevail over 
ideology.
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Access:  A patient’s ability to ob-
tain medical care, determined by 
factors such as the availability of 
medical services, their acceptabil-
ity to the patient, the location of 
health-care facilities, transporta-
tion, hours of operation, and the 
cost of care.
Acute disease:  Illnesses or health 
problems that are of a short-term 
or episodic nature, from which the 
patient is expected to return to his 
or her normal or previous level of 
activity.
Adverse selection:  A character-
istic of a health plan when a dis-
proportionately high percentage of 
enrollees are more likely to utilize 
health services (and ﬁ le claims for 
reimbursement) because of ab-
normally high health risks, such 
as when a high number of AIDS 
patients all select one health plan 
because it is perceived as having 
better AIDS providers.
Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ):  AHRQ 
was created in December 1989 as 
the Agency for Health Care Policy 
and Research (AHCPR), a Public 
Health Service agency within the 
U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services.   Th e agency was 
reauthorized in December 1999 
under its current name.  AHRQ’s 
mission is to support research to 
improve the outcomes and qual-
ity of health care, reduce its costs, 
address patient safety and medical 
Glossary
errors, and broaden access to eﬀ ec-
tive services.
Allied health personnel:  Specially 
trained and licensed (when neces-
sary) health workers other than 
physicians, dentists, optometrists, 
chiropractors, podiatrists, and 
nurses, who perform tasks which 
must otherwise be performed by a 
physician.
Ambulatory care:  All types of 
health services which are provided 
on an outpatient basis, in contrast 
to services provided in the home 
or to persons who are inpatients.  
While many inpatients may be 
ambulatory, the term ambulatory 
care usually implies that the patient 
must travel to a location to receive 
services which do not require an 
overnight stay.
Ambulatory setting:  A type of 
health care setting at which health 
services are provided on an outpa-
tient basis.  Ambulatory settings 
usually include clinics and surgery 
centers.
Any-willing-provider laws:  Laws 
that require managed-care plans 
to contract with all health-care 
providers that meet their terms and 
conditions.
Appropriate care:  Care for which 
the expected health beneﬁ t exceeds 
the expected negative consequences 
by a wide enough margin to justify 
treatment.
Beneﬁ ciaries:  Persons who receive 
health care beneﬁ ts that are paid 
for by a third-party ﬁ scal interme-
diary, such as Medicare, Medicaid, 
HMOs, indemnity insurance com-
panies, etc.
Beneﬁ t package:  A deﬁ ned array 
of speciﬁ c services or beneﬁ ts that 
an HMO or insurer is obligated to 
provide under terms of its con-
tracts with subscriber groups or 
individuals.
Buyers Health Care Action 
Group (BHCAG):  A coalition 
of 26 self-insured employers in 
Minnesota which emphasizes care 
quality and cost eﬀ ectiveness in 
its program.  Its overall mission is 
to stimulate reform of the health 
care system by building a program 
founded on four principles: 1) 
increased quality; 2) increased pro-
vider competition; 3) increased con-
sumer knowledge and responsibility 
for their own health care decisions; 
and 4) enhanced eﬃ  ciency of health 
care delivery.  BHCAG provides 
its members with a health plan 
that allows the consumer to choose 
among care systems (integrated 
teams of providers) according to 
their cost, their providers, and their 
performance in areas of quality and 
customer service.
Th e BHCAG model is a modi-
ﬁ ed fee-for-service payment system 
which provides incentives for ef-
ﬁ ciency based on utilization.  Care 
systems (see deﬁ nition) submit 
a per capita target rate bid for a 
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speciﬁ ed set of beneﬁ ts each year.  
Th ese claim targets are adjusted 
based upon risk to reﬂ ect diﬀ er-
ences in the illness burden of their 
population from the average.  Care 
systems are evaluated on a quar-
terly basis, and adjustments are 
made to match the annual claim 
target.  Th erefore, if a system’s costs 
exceed the claim target, the pay-
ment amount is reduced for the 
next quarter, and if costs are below 
the target rate, the payment is in-
creased for the subsequent quarter.  
BHCAG began implementation of 
the model January 1, 1997.
Cafeteria beneﬁ ts plan:  An ar-
rangement under which employees 
may choose their own beneﬁ ts, 
allowing employees to tailor their 
beneﬁ ts package to meet their 
speciﬁ c needs.  For example, an 
employee with no dependents may 
forgo life insurance but may pre-
fer more comprehensive health 
insurance.
Capitation:  Per capita payment for 
providing a contractually speciﬁ ed 
set of health services to a deﬁ ned 
population over a predetermined 
period of time.  For example, medi-
cal group practices that contract 
with HMOs usually receive, in 
advance, a negotiated monthly pay-
ment that covers all services ren-
dered by the group for the period, 
irrespective of the actual volume of 
service rendered by the group.
Care systems:  A primary-care 
centered health system with its 
aﬃ  liated specialty, hospital, and 
allied professional arrangements.  It 
is organized to provide (or contract 
for) the full continuum of medically 
necessary services for an enrolled 
population.  Primary care physi-
cians are typically aﬃ  liated with 
only one care system.  Care systems 
may be organized by physicians, 
PPOs or any other entity.
Carriers:  A ﬁ scal intermediary, 
usually an insurance company or 
HMO, which subcontracts with 
HCFA to process and pay claims 
for Medicare Parts A and B ser-
vices, or which performs the same 
services for private purchasers.
Catastrophic care needs:  Service 
needs which are so expensive that 
they are ﬁ nancially ruinous.
Centers for Medicare and Med-
icaid Services (CMS):  Th e gov-
ernment agency within the De-
partment of Health and Human 
Services that directs the Medicare 
and Medicaid programs and con-
ducts research in support of those 
programs.  Formerly known as the 
Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration (HCFA).
Centers of excellence:  Network 
of health care facilities selected 
for speciﬁ c services, e.g., organ 
transplants.
Chronic disease:  A disease that 
has one or more of the following 
characteristics: is permanent; leaves 
residual disability; is caused by 
nonreversible pathological alterna-
tion; requires special training of the 
patient for rehabilitation; or may be 
expected to require a long period of 
supervision, observation, or care.
Claim:  Information submitted 
by a provider or covered person to 
establish that medical services were 
provided to a covered person, from 
which processing for payment to 
the provider or covered person is 
made.
Claims review:  Th e method by 
which an enrollee’s health care 
service claims are reviewed before 
reimbursement is made.  Th e pur-
pose of this monitoring system is to 
validate the medical appropriate-
ness of the provided services and to 
be sure the cost of the service is not 
excessive.
COBRA:  Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 
- A federal budget act which re-
quired that employers oﬀ er depart-
ing employees the opportunity to 
continue in the employer’s health 
insurance plan at the employee’s 
expense.  COBRA provisions were 
updated in HIPAA.  
Coinsurance:  Th e portion of the 
cost of covered services for which 
an insured is ﬁ nancially responsi-
ble.  Usually the amount is deter-
mined as a ﬁ xed percentage of the 
total cost of providing the service.  
Often, coinsurance applies after a 
speciﬁ ed deductible has been met.
Co-morbidity:  A conditions that 
exists at the same time as the pri-
mary condition in the same patient 
(e.g., hypertension is a co-morbidity 
of many conditions such as diabe-
tes, ischemic heart disease, or end-
stage renal disease).
Competitive bidding:  A rate-set-
ting methodology wherein premi-
um rates are determined through 
bids submitted by competing 
health plans or networks, based on 
the information and rules of bid-
ding established by the purchasing 
organization.  Th e purchasing or-
ganization may reserve the right to 
reject all bids, to reject the highest 
bidders, or to negotiate for a lower 
price.  However, bidding remains 
the primary basis for rate setting.
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Complication:  A condition that 
arises during the hospital stay that 
prolongs the initial length of stay.
Copayment:  A payment made by 
an insured at the time that se-
lected services are rendered.  Some 
employer beneﬁ t packages require 
a copayment ranging from $2.00 
to $20.00 for each visit to a phy-
sician’s oﬃ  ce.  Some impose a 
ﬁ xed dollar amount for inpatient 
hospitalization.
Cost eﬀ ectiveness:  Usually con-
sidered as a ratio, the cost eﬀ ective-
ness of a drug or procedure, for ex-
ample, relates the cost of that drug 
or procedure to the health beneﬁ ts 
resulting from it.  In health terms, 
it is often expressed as the cost per 
year per life saved or as the cost per 
quality adjusted life-year saved.
Cost reimbursement:  A pay-
ment method in which providers of 
health services are reimbursed on 
the basis of their cost experience in 
providing the services.  Th e reim-
bursement may be either a per-
centage of cost or cost plus a dollar 
amount.  At one time, Medicare 
reimbursed hospitals and other fa-
cilities on a cost plus basis.
Cost-shifting:  A condition created 
when deﬁ cits resulting from inad-
equate reimbursement to providers 
from one source (e.g., Medicare or 
Medicaid) are oﬀ set through higher 
reimbursement from other public 
or private sources (e.g., indemnity 
insurance plans) for the same or 
similar services.
Deductible:  Th e portion of an 
individual’s insured health care 
expenses that the person must pay 
before payment from the insurer 
commences.
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t:  A type of health 
insurance that assures the enrollee 
that that will receive a speciﬁ c set 
of health services.  Th ese services, 
however, may be conﬁ ned to those 
that are “medically necessary.”
Deﬁ ned contribution:  A type of 
health insurance where the em-
ployer provides the employee with 
a speciﬁ c amount of funding and 
the employee purchases the actual 
health insurance or health services.  
Employers may provide the employ-
ee with discounted provider net-
works, on-line health information 
and tax sheltering in this model.
Department Of Health And Hu-
man Services (HHS):  Th e Federal 
Department of Health and Human 
Services is the agency directed by 
law to administer programs involv-
ing health care, Medicare, Medic-
aid, family and children’s services, 
ﬁ nancial self-suﬃ  ciency programs, 
and other human service programs 
of the Federal government.
Dependent:  An individual who 
receives health insurance through 
a spouse, parent, or other family 
member.
Diagnosis-related groups 
(DRGs):  A classiﬁ cation system 
developed at Yale University using 
490 major diagnostic categories 
based on the International Clas-
siﬁ cation of Diseases, 9th revision 
(ICD-9) code, in which groups of 
patients are classiﬁ ed for measur-
ing a medical facility’s patterns in 
delivery of care.  Th ese classiﬁ ca-
tions are employed to determine 
payments by Medicare for hospital 
inpatient services, and are based on 
primary and secondary diagnosis 
and procedures, age, and length of 
hospitalization.
Disease management (DM):  A 
mechanism to provide cost-eﬀ ective 
long-term case management for in-
dividuals with chronic or expensive 
conditions (e.g. diabetes, asthma, 
burn recovery).
Disproportionate Share (DSH) 
Adjustment:  A payment adjust-
ment under Medicare’s prospective 
payment system, or under Medic-
aid, for hospitals that serve a rela-
tively large volume of low-income 
patients.
Elderly:  Individuals age 65 and 
over.
Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA):  A 
law that mandates reporting and 
disclosure requirements for group 
life and health plans.  Most self-
insured employers’ health plans are 
covered by ERISA.
Enrollee:  A person who is covered 
for health beneﬁ ts under an HMO 
contract.  An enrollee is not neces-
sarily a member in the health plan: 
e.g., an enrollee may be a dependent 
of a member.  Th e terms “enrollee” 
and “member,” therefore, are not 
synonymous in all instances.  An 
enrollee is the equivalent of a ben-
eﬁ ciary in an indemnity insurance 
plan.
Enrollment:  A term used in the 
context of HMOs to mean, (1) 
the process of converting eligible 
members of a subscriber group into 
HMO enrollees, or (2) the number 
of enrollees in an HMO at a given 
time.
Experience rating:  A method of 
determining premiums based on 
the actual utilization of individual 
subscriber groups.
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Evidence-based medicine (EBM):  
Th e use of current best external 
evidence, balanced with the desires 
of the patient and the clinical ex-
pertise of health-care providers, in 
making decisions about the care of 
individual patients. 
Federal Health Maintenance 
Organization Act of 1973 (HMO 
ACT):  A federal law regulating 
HMO activities.  Th e HMO Act 
was modiﬁ ed by the Tax Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 (TEFRA).
Fee-for-service (FFS):  Th e tradi-
tional method by which physicians 
or other providers have charged 
patients for professional services.  
For each professional or diagnostic 
service, a separate fee is applied, 
irrespective of volume.  Under a 
fee-for-service payment system, 
expenditures increase if the fees 
themselves increase, if more units 
of service are provided or if more 
expensive services are substituted 
for less expensive ones.  Th is system 
contrasts with salary, per capita, or 
other prepayment systems where 
the payment to the physician is not 
changed with the number of ser-
vices actually used.
Fee schedule:  A comprehen-
sive listing of fees used by either a 
health care plan or the government 
to reimburse physicians and/or 
other providers on a fee-for-service 
basis.
First-dollar coverage:  A feature 
of an insurance plan in which there 
is no deductible, and therefore the 
plan’s sponsor pays a proportion or 
all of the covered services provided 
to a patient as soon as he or she 
enrolls.
Group contract:  An agreement 
between an HMO and a subscriber 
group specifying rates, perfor-
mance, covenants, relationships 
among parties, schedule of beneﬁ ts, 
and other conditions.  Th e term of 
the contract is generally limited to a 
12-month period.
Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration (HCFA):  An agency of the 
Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), HCFA performs 
many functions including the ad-
ministration of the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs, compilation 
and publication of health care sta-
tistics, development of health policy 
and budgetary recommendations, 
and sponsorship and review of pilot 
service and ﬁ nancial programs.
Health insurance:  Financial 
protection against the medical 
care costs arising from disease or 
accidental bodily injury.  Such 
insurance usually covers all or part 
of the medical costs of treating the 
disease or injury.  Insurance may be 
obtained on either an individual or 
a group basis.
Health Insurance Portability 
and Protection Act (HIPPA):  
Th e Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA), Pub. L. 104-191, some-
times referred to as the Kennedy-
Kassebaum bill, was enacted in 
1996.  HIPAA provides, among 
other things, improved continu-
ity (also called “portability”) and 
availability with respect to group 
health-plan coverage and group 
health insurance provided in con-
nection with employment, and 
insurance coverage in the individual 
insurance market (not connected 
with employment).
HIPAA provisions are designed to 
improve the availability and porta-
bility of health coverage by:
• Limiting exclusions for preex-
isting medical conditions; 
• Providing credit for prior 
health coverage and a process 
for transmitting certiﬁ cates 
and other information con-
cerning prior coverage to a new 
group health plan or issuer; 
• Providing new rights that allow 
individuals to enroll for health 
coverage when they lose other 
health coverage or have a new 
dependent; 
• Prohibiting discrimination 
in enrollment and premiums 
against employees and their 
dependents based on health 
status; 
• Guaranteeing availability of 
health insurance coverage for 
small employers and renewabil-
ity of health insurance cover-
age in both the small and large 
group markets; and 
• Preserving, through narrow 
preemption provisions, the 
States’ traditional role in regu-
lating health insurance, includ-
ing State ﬂ exibility to provide 
greater protections.
Health maintenance organization 
(HMO):  An organization that 
provides both ﬁ nancing for, and the 
delivery of, physician and hospital 
services to an enrolled popula-
tion for a ﬁ xed sum of money, paid 
in advance (prepaid), for a speci-
ﬁ ed period of time.  Th ese health 
services include a wide variety of 
medical treatments, inpatient and 
outpatient hospitalization, home 
health services, ambulance services, 
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and sometimes dental and phar-
macy services.  Th e HMO arranges 
for the provision of health services 
through contracts with providers, 
who may be organized as a group 
model, an independent practice as-
sociation (IPA) model, a network 
model or a staﬀ  model.  With few 
exceptions, enrollees are required 
to use the services of participating 
providers, except in point-of-service 
(POS) HMO plans.
HMO - group model:  (1) An 
HMO contracting for professional 
services with a single medical group 
practice closely related to but le-
gally separate from the HMO, with 
the contracting relationship being 
substantially (or totally) and recip-
rocally exclusive; or, (2) an HMO 
that contracts with a network of 
group medical practices for profes-
sional services, usually on a non-
exclusive basis.  Th e group practices 
are independent from the HMO(s), 
and perform services for other 
health plans, as well as for private 
patients, Medicare and Medicaid 
patients, etc.
HMO - network model:  A net-
work of group practices under the 
administration of one HMO.
HMO - staﬀ  model:  Th e staﬀ  
model HMO is the purest form of 
managed care.  All of the physicians 
are in a centralized site, in which 
all clinical and perhaps inpatient 
services and pharmacy services 
are oﬀ ered.  Th e HMO holds the 
tightest management reins in this 
setting, because none of the physi-
cians traditionally practice on an 
independent fee-for-service basis.  
Physicians are employees of the 
HMO in this setting, as they are 
not in a private or group practice.
Health plans:  Organizations 
which contract with providers to 
deliver health care services to en-
rolled members.  Th ese include, but 
are not limited to, managed-care 
entities.
Hospice:  A health care facility 
that provides supportive care for 
the terminally ill.
Indemnity:  Health insurance ben-
eﬁ ts provided in the form of cash 
payments rather than services.  An 
indemnity insurance contract usu-
ally deﬁ nes the maximum amounts 
which will be paid for the covered 
service.
Indemnity carrier:  An insurance 
company or benevolent associa-
tion that oﬀ ers selected coverages 
within a framework of service deﬁ -
nitions, fee schedules, limitations, 
and exclusions as negotiated with 
subscriber groups.  Insured persons 
are reimbursed after carriers review 
and process ﬁ led claims.
Indemnity insurance:  Traditional 
fee-for-service medicine in which 
providers are paid according to the 
service performed.
Individual (or Independent) Prac-
tice Association Model (IPA):  
An individual practice association 
contracts with independent physi-
cians who work in their own private 
practices, and see fee-for-service 
patients as well as HMO enrollees.  
Physicians are paid by capitation 
for the HMO patients and by con-
ventional means for their fee-for-
service patients.  Physicians be-
longing to the IPA guarantee that 
the care needed by each patient for 
whom they are responsible will fall 
under a certain amount of money.  
Th ey guarantee this by allowing the 
HMO to withhold an amount of 
their payments (i.e., usually about 
20% per year).  If, by the end of the 
year, the physician’s cost for treat-
ment falls under this set amount, 
then the physician receives his en-
tire “withhold fund.”  If it does not, 
the HMO can then withhold any 
part of this amount, at its discre-
tion, from the fund.  Essentially, 
the physician is put “at risk” for 
keeping down the treatment cost.  
Th is is the key to the HMO’s ﬁ nan-
cial viability.
Inpatient:  A patient admitted 
to a hospital and who is receiving 
services under the direction of a 
physician.
Integrated System (IS), Inte-
grated Delivery System (IDS), or 
Integrated Health Care System 
(IHS):  An organization in which 
hospital(s) and physicians com-
bine their assets, eﬀ orts, risks and 
rewards, and through which they 
deliver comprehensive health care 
services.
Job lock:  A situation when an 
employees is forced to remain in a 
job he or she otherwise would leave 
because that job provides necessary 
health-insurance coverage.
Leapfrog Group:  An organiza-
tion of large health-care purchasers 
who seek to use their purchasing 
power to inﬂ uence providers and 
improve patient safety.  Members 
follow a set of purchasing principles 
to recognize and reward providers 
and practices that reduce medical 
errors.
Long-term care:  Services ordi-
narily provided to the inﬁ rm in a 
skilled nursing, intermediate-care, 
personal-care, supervisory-care, or 
elder-care facility.
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Managed care:  Systems that in-
tegrate the ﬁ nancing and delivery 
of health care services to covered 
individuals by means of: 1) arrange-
ments with selected providers to 
furnish comprehensive services to 
members; 2) explicit criteria for 
the selection of health-care provid-
ers; 3) signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial incen-
tives for members to use providers 
and procedures associated with the 
plan; and 4) formal programs for 
quality assurance and utilization 
review.
Managed competition:  A system 
of providing health care where in-
dividuals choose from a number of 
competing health plans or HMOs.  
Th e HMOS compete based on the 
cost and quality of their services.
Mandated beneﬁ ts:  Health 
beneﬁ ts that health care plans are 
required by state or federal law to 
provide to members.
Market area:  Th e targeted geo-
graphic area or areas in which 
a health plan’s principal market 
potential is located.  It may or 
may not be the same as an HMO’s 
deﬁ ned service area.  Frequently, 
a market area overlaps the service 
areas of providers.
Medicaid (MA, Medical Assis-
tance):  A federal program autho-
rized by Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act.  Th e program subsi-
dizes state programs for insuring 
that certain health care services are 
available to individuals who lack 
resources to pay for such services.  
Some states have broader Medicaid 
coverage than others, but certain 
minimum federal requirements 
must be met by all states.
Medical errors:  Errors made by 
practitioners or organizations that 
cause harm to patients undergoing 
treatment.  Errors can include mis-
diagnosis, providing inappropriate 
therapy, or not providing treatment 
when it is required.
Medical protocols:  Medical pro-
tocols are guidelines that physi-
cians may be required to follow to 
have an acceptable clinical outcome. 
Protocols provide the caregiver 
with speciﬁ c treatment options or 
steps when faced with a particular 
set of clinical symptoms or signs or 
laboratory data.  Medical proto-
cols are being designed through an 
accumulated database of clinical 
outcomes.
Medical savings account (MSA):  
A type of health insurance that 
provides a tax-sheltered account 
from which an individual can 
purchase health services.  MSAs 
typically provide 100% cover-
age for preventive care and have a 
high deductible ($2,000 or more) 
catastrophic beneﬁ t.  Savings in 
the MSA can be rolled into future 
years and eventually deployed as a 
tax deferred retirement fund.
Medicare:  A federal health care 
payment program authorized by 
Title XVIII of the Social Security 
Act.  Th e program operates as a 
federally ﬁ nanced health insurance 
program for the aged and disabled, 
and is administered by the Health 
Care Financing Administration 
through contracts with ﬁ scal agents 
in each state.  Part A of the Medi-
care program provides insurance 
coverage for hospital care, and Part 
B for other medical care.  Th e pro-
gram includes Medicare recipients 
who are enrolled in an HMO un-
der a cost, risk, or HCPP (Health 
Care Prepayment Plan) contract.  
(See also “Part A” and “Part B.”)
Medicare+Choice:  A Medi-
care program created by the 
1997 Balanced Budget Act.  
Medicare+Choice allows the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) to contract with a 
variety of diﬀ erent managed-care 
and fee-for-service entities oﬀ er-
ing additional alternative modes 
of care, including managed care, to 
Medicare participants.
Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MEDPAC):  Th is 
federally chartered commission is 
comprised of experts in health poli-
cy and ﬁ nance who advise Congress 
and the Administration on changes 
in payment rates and methods for 
the Medicare program. 
Medigap:  Insurance provided by 
carriers to supplement the monies 
reimbursed by Medicare for medi-
cal services.  Because Medicare pays 
physicians for services according 
to their own fee schedule, regard-
less what the physician charges, 
the individual may be required to 
pay the physician the diﬀ erence 
between Medicare’s reimburs-
able charge and the physician’s fee.  
Medigap is meant to ﬁ ll this gap in 
reimbursement, so that the Medi-
care beneﬁ ciary is not at risk for the 
diﬀ erence.
Member:  A participant in a health 
plan who makes up the plan’s 
enrollment.
Morbidity:  Th e incidence and se-
verity of sickness in a deﬁ ned class 
of people.
Mortality:  Th e death rate at 
each age, calculated from prior 
experience.
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Oﬃ  ce of the Inspector General 
(OIG) of HHS:  Th e investigatory 
arm of the Department of Health 
and Human Services, with juris-
diction over alleged violations of a 
variety of statutes, including Medi-
care and Medicaid fraud and abuse 
laws.
Open enrollment period:  Th e 
period of time stipulated in a group 
contract in which eligible persons 
in a group may choose a health plan 
alternative for the coming beneﬁ t 
year.
Out-of-pocket costs:  Th e share of 
health services payments paid by 
the enrollee.
Outpatient:  A patient who re-
ceives health care services without 
being admitted to a hospital.
Part A:  Also known as “hospi-
tal insurance” (HI), Part A of the 
Medicare program pays for certain 
inpatient hospital, nursing facility, 
hospice and home health services 
for individuals age 65 years or 
older, and certain other individuals.
Part B:  Also known as “supple-
mentary medical insurance” (SMI), 
Part B of the Medicare program 
reimburses beneﬁ ciaries for cer-
tain physician services, outpatient 
hospital services, miscellaneous 
outpatient services, durable medi-
cal equipment, ambulatory surgery 
services, home health services and 
certain diagnostic tests.
Payer:  An organization, such as 
insurance company or HMO, that 
pays or reimburses a provider for 
health care services rendered by 
that provider to a patient or health 
plan member.  A ﬁ scal intermedi-
ary between purchasers and con-
sumers of health care.
Peer review:  Reviewing a prac-
titioner’s practice to determine if 
they meet qualitative standards, 
fall within an acceptable range, 
and employ eﬃ  cacious procedures.  
Peer review is performed by prac-
titioners in the same specialty and 
geographic area.
Peer Review Organization 
(PRO):  A private organization 
that subcontracts with HCFA to 
review the medical appropriateness 
of services and quality of care pro-
vided to Medicare beneﬁ ciaries.
Physician Organization (PO):  A 
generic term for an organization of 
physicians, which technically could 
be a professional corporation, part-
nership, IPA, PPO, foundation, 
etc., as well as physicians organized 
as partially or fully integrated 
group practices.
Point-of-service model:  Some-
times referred to as an “open-
ended” HMO, the point-of-service 
model is one in which the patient 
can receive care either by physician 
contracting with the HMO or by 
those not contracting.  Physicians 
not contracting with the HMO 
but who see an HMO patient 
are paid according to the services 
performed.  Th e patient is given an 
incentive to utilize contracted pro-
viders through the fuller coverage 
oﬀ ered for contracted care.
Practice guidelines:  Explicit 
recommendations for the man-
agement of speciﬁ c clinical prob-
lems.  Guidelines are developed 
from medical literature and expert 
panels and may be endorsed by 
professional societies.  Guidelines 
may be used by insurers to evaluate 
the quality and appropriateness of 
medical care by comparing actual 
practices with a guideline’s recom-
mendations.  Results of such com-
parisons may be used for several 
purposes: reimbursement, provider 
education, provider feedback, and 
credentialing or re-credentialing.
Pre-existing condition:  Any med-
ical condition that has been diag-
nosed or treated within a speciﬁ ed 
period before the member’s eﬀ ec-
tive date of health coverage under 
the group contract.
Preferred providers:  Physicians, 
hospitals, and other health care 
providers who contract to provide 
health services to persons covered 
by a particular health plan.
Preferred Provider Arrangement 
(PPA):  Generally, an arrangement 
in which a payer contracts with 
providers who agree to provide 
health-care services to beneﬁ ciaries 
in exchange for discounted fee-for-
service reimbursement.  Th e term 
is interchangeably used to refer to: 
the relationship between an insurer 
(or other payer) and the beneﬁ -
ciary (i.e., an insurance product); 
the discounted fee arrangement 
between the payer and provider; or 
an organization created to obtain 
discounted fee contracts for provid-
ers (see PPO).
Preferred Provider Organization 
(PPO):  Often confused with a 
PPA, a PPO may represent any one 
of the three deﬁ nitions identiﬁ ed 
for PPA, above.  As an insurance 
product, a PPO is a discounted fee-
for-service indemnity arrangement 
in which members receive ﬁ nancial 
incentives to select their care from 
a panel of “preferred providers” 
(physicians and hospitals).  Mem-
bers may select care from non-panel 
providers, usually at additional cost 
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to the member.  As a “provider” or-
ganization, a PPO is a joint venture 
among physicians that seeks PPO 
contracts with payers; an arrange-
ment developed by insurers to 
induce providers to discount their 
fees; or, an independent enterprise 
that brokers contracts between pay-
ers and providers.
Premium:  Th e price or amount 
which must be paid periodically 
(e.g., monthly) to purchase insur-
ance coverage or to keep an insur-
ance policy in force.  Virtually all 
health insurance programs require 
the payment of a premium by the 
beneﬁ ciary, and/or by someone else 
(such as the employer) on the ben-
eﬁ ciary’s behalf.  Premiums paid to 
HMOs are often called capitation 
payments.
Preventive care:  Health care em-
phasizing priorities for prevention, 
early detection, and early treatment 
of conditions, generally including 
routine physical examination, im-
munization, and well-person care.
Primary care:  Basic or general 
health care focused on the point at 
which a patient ideally ﬁ rst seeks 
assistance from the medical care 
system.  Primary care is considered 
comprehensive when the primary 
provider takes responsibility for 
the overall coordination of the care 
of the patient’s health problems, 
be they biological, behavioral, or 
social.  Th e appropriate use of con-
sultants and community resources 
is an important part of eﬀ ective 
primary care.  Such care is gener-
ally provided by physicians but is 
increasingly provided by other per-
sonnel such as nurse practitioners 
or physician assistants.
Primary-care network:  A group 
of primary-care physicians who 
have joined together to share the 
risk of providing care to their pa-
tients who are members of a given 
health plan.
Primary-care provider:  An as-
signed medical practitioner who is 
responsible for developing the care 
plan, delivering and coordinating 
services and arranging for appropri-
ate use of specialty services.  A pri-
mary-care physician in an HMO, 
or in a group-practice provider to 
an HMO, is the initial provider for 
a patient seeking medical services, 
and controls referrals to other 
specialists, sub-specialists, diagnos-
tic services, and other providers of 
health care, to optimize responsibly 
the utilization of service, thereby 
reduce the costs of care.
Professional Review Organiza-
tion or Peer Review Organiza-
tion (PRO):  An organization that 
reviews the activities and records of 
a health-care provider, institution, 
or group.  Th e reviewer is gener-
ally a physician if a physician is the 
subject of the review; a group of ad-
ministrators, physicians, and allied 
health care personnel if a hospital is 
the subject of the review; etc.  Th e 
PRO can be state-sponsored or 
independent.
Professional Services Agreement 
(PSA):  An agreement in which 
physicians (and possibly other pro-
fessionals) agree to provide their 
services to a person or organiza-
tion.  For example, physicians may 
enter into a PSA with an Integrat-
ed Health care System to provide 
services to the IHS’ patients.
Prospective payment:  A prospec-
tive payment is a payment that 
is received before care is actually 
needed.  It gives the provider orga-
nization a ﬁ nancial incentive to uti-
lize fewer resources, as they get to 
keep the diﬀ erence between what is 
prepaid and what is actually used.
Prospective Payment System 
(PPS):  A payment method used 
by Medicare for hospital inpa-
tient services in which predeter-
mined amounts, based on the 
DRG system, are paid to hospitals 
as reimbursement for their inpa-
tient operating costs for treating 
beneﬁ ciaries.
Provider networks:  An organized 
group of care providers selected by 
a health plan because they meet the 
plan’s standards for eﬃ  cient qual-
ity practice.  Th e network manages 
health care costs through several 
techniques: 
• Credentialing:  Th is process is 
undertaken to document the 
provider’s professional quali-
ﬁ cations and ability to meet 
standards for quality, cost-ef-
fectiveness, and access required 
by the health plan.
• Shared ﬁ nancial risk:  Provid-
ers often share the ﬁ nancial 
risk of health care delivery by 
accepting a capitated payment.  
Alternatively, a percentage of 
provider’s fees may be withheld 
to cover a health plan’s deﬁ cits 
at year end.  Under a withhold-
ing system, providers receive an 
annual payment from the with-
held pool based on the ﬁ nancial 
experience of the plan and their 
own performance.
• Rate negotiation:  Th e health 
plan negotiates lower provider 
fees in exchange for antici-
pated increased volume.  Th ese 
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discounts are then passed along 
to purchasers.
• Consumer incentive:  Th e con-
sumer has a ﬁ nancial incentive 
to use the network because the 
consumer assumes greater out-
of-pocket expense when using a 
provider outside the network.
Providers:  Institutions and indi-
viduals who are licensed to provide 
health care services (for example, 
hospitals, skilled nursing facili-
ties, physicians, dentists, etc.)  May 
also refer to medical supply ﬁ rms 
and vendors of durable medical 
equipment.
Purchasing pool:  Organization 
that groups together workers in 
small businesses, those who are 
self-employed, and other unin-
sured into larger pools that can 
achieve better ratings and deeper 
discounts.  Th ese better rates come 
from being able to spread risk 
over larger numbers of individu-
als.  Besides the economies of scale, 
purchasing pools hope to maintain 
volume purchasing power for their 
members.
Quality improvement:  A continu-
ous process that identiﬁ es problems 
in health care delivery, examines 
solutions to those problems, and 
regularly monitors the solutions for 
improvement.
Rating - community rating:  A 
rating method in which actuarial 
statistics are used regarding a total 
population to determine a uniform 
premium.
Rating - experience rating:  A rat-
ing method in which actuarial sta-
tistics are used regarding a speciﬁ c 
group (e.g., age, sex, etc.) to deter-
mine the premium.
Referrals:  Based on client need, 
a process of arranging appropri-
ate services to ensure coordination, 
follow-up, non-duplication of ser-
vices, and communication between 
providers.  Th is process may or may 
not include authorized payment for 
services.
Reimbursement:  A payment to a 
provider in exchange for the per-
formance of health services.  Th e 
term more technically is applicable 
to payments made to providers by 
Medicare or Medicaid.
Reinsurance:  Protection pur-
chased by insurers including 
HMOs, IPAs or PPOs from insur-
ance companies that specialize in 
underwriting risks that substan-
tially exceed basic or conventional 
limits of liability.
Resource-Based Relative Value 
Scale (RBRVS):  A HCFA pay-
ment method by which physicians 
receive an amount set forth in a 
fee schedule based on the relative 
prices and values of the procedures.
Revenue:  Th e gross amount of 
earnings received by an entity for 
the operation of a speciﬁ c activity.  
It does not include any deductions 
for such items as expenses, bad 
debts, or contractual allowances.
Risk:  Th ere are two distinct types 
of risk: ﬁ nancial risk and insurance 
risk.  All three levels of government 
have ﬁ nancial risk in the fund-
ing of health and human services.  
County government has both a 
direct responsibility to its resi-
dents to manage ﬁ nancial risk to 
county property tax revenues and 
responsibilities under statute as a 
subdivision of state government, 
which involve ﬁ nancial risk.  Th e 
challenge is to determine how each 
level of government should contrib-
ute to sharing the ﬁ nancial respon-
sibilities and ﬁ nancial risk, which 
involves consideration of the appro-
priate tax to provide the funding.
Insurance risk, or risk-bearing as a 
term of art in the insurance indus-
try, is speciﬁ cally in reference to the 
business of insurance and is regu-
lated by government.
Risk adjustment or risk equaliza-
tion:  A means of adjusting capita-
tion rates paid to prepaid plans in 
order to reﬂ ect more accurately the 
expected cost of providing health-
care services to an individual.  Th e 
Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical 
Groups (ACG) case-mix system is 
one method currently being used.
Risk pool:  A deﬁ ned patient pop-
ulation to be covered by insurance, 
from which revenue and expenses 
are determined.
Self-insured:  An organization 
(usually an employer) that assumes 
the ﬁ nancial risk of its members’ 
health beneﬁ ts’ costs, rather than 
purchasing insurance from an in-
surance company, HMO, or other 
ﬁ scal intermediary.  Also, a hospital 
may self-insure for malpractice in-
surance, rather than purchase from 
an insurer.
Service area:  A geographical 
territory that an HMO or other 
provider organization designates 
for oﬀ ering and providing enroll-
ment or service to members.  Since 
reasonable access to the health 
care services is a primary objective 
of HMOs and providers, a com-
mon standard is that members or 
patients should not have to travel 
more than 30 minutes in order to 
reach a service site.
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Single-payer system:  A health 
care system in which all payments 
for deﬁ ned beneﬁ ts or services are 
paid from a single source, typically 
the national government.  Most of 
the western industrialized nations, 
with the exception of the United 
States, have some form of a single-
payer system.
Skilled nursing facility (SNF):  
Typically an institution for con-
valescence or a nursing home, the 
skilled nursing facility provides a 
high level of specialized care for 
long-term or acute illness.  It is an 
alternative to extended hospital 
stays or diﬃ  cult home care.
State Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program (SCHIP):  SCHIP 
was enacted as part of the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 as the new 
Title XXI of federal statutes.  It 
provides funds for states to expand 
health insurance to children of low-
income families.  Each state has a 
unique SCHIP program.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982 (TEFRA):  Th e 
federal law that created the current 
risk and cost contract provisions 
under which health plans contract 
with HCFA and the Medicare 
program.
Technology assessment:  Th e 
term used to describe the evalu-
ation process for new or existing 
diagnostic and therapeutic devices 
and procedures.  Technology as-
sessment evaluates the eﬀ ect of a 
medical procedure, diagnostic tool, 
medical device, or pharmaceutical 
product.  In the past, technology 
assessment meant primarily evalu-
ating new equipment, focusing on 
the clinical safety and eﬃ  cacy of an 
intervention.  In today’s health-care 
world, it includes a broader view of 
clinical outcomes, such as the eﬀ ect 
on a patient’s quality of life, and the 
eﬀ ect on society.
Tertiary care:  Tertiary care is 
administered at a highly special-
ized medical center.  It is associated 
with the utilization of high-cost 
technology resources.
Th ird-party payer:  An organiza-
tion that pays for or underwrites 
coverage for health care expenses.
Total Quality Management 
(TQM):  A method originally de-
veloped by W. Edward Deming for 
examining systems and processes at 
medical group practices to identify 
and remedy ineﬃ  ciency, error, or 
redundancy in operations or the 
total patient care experience.  Th e 
system is based, in part, on obtain-
ing information and comments 
from staﬀ  and patients in order to 
evaluate and resolve procedural or 
service deﬁ ciencies.
TRICARE:  Th e health-care pro-
gram for members of the military, 
eligible dependents, and military 
retirees.  TRICARE was former-
ly called CHAMPUS (Civilian 
Health and Medical Program of 
the Uniformed Services).
Uncompensated care:  Service pro-
vided by physicians and hospitals 
for which no payment is received 
from the patient or from third-
party payers.  Some costs for these 
services may be covered through 
cost-shifting.  Not all uncompen-
sated care results from charity care.  
It also includes bad debts from 
persons who are not classiﬁ ed as 
charity cases but who are unable or 
unwilling to pay their bills.
Underinsured:  People with public 
or private insurance policies that 
do not cover all necessary medical 
services, resulting in out-of-pocket 
expenses that exceed their ability 
to pay.
Underwriting:  In insurance, the 
process of selecting, classifying, 
evaluating, and assuming risks ac-
cording to their expected costs.  Its 
purpose is to ensure that the group 
or individual insured has the same 
probability of loss and probable 
amount of loss, within reasonable 
limits, as the universe on which 
premium rates were based.
Uninsured:  People who lack pub-
lic or private health insurance.
Utilization:  Th e frequency with 
which a beneﬁ t is used, a service is 
performed, or a referral is made.  
For example, HMO utilization of 
inpatient (hospital) services is com-
monly expressed as the number of 
inpatient days per year per thou-
sand members.  Th e relative rate of 
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CE  Circulo de Empresarios
  Madrid, Spain
CEAL  Consejo Empresario de America Latina
  Buenos Aires, Argentina
CEDA  Committee for Economic Development of Australia
  Sydney, Australia
CIRD  China Institute for Reform and Development
  Hainan, People’s Republic of China
EVA  Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies
  Helsinki, Finland
FAE  Forum de Administradores de Empresas
  Lisbon, Portugal
IDEP  Institut de l’Entreprise
  Paris, France
IW  Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Koeln
  Cologne, Germany
 Keizai Doyukai
  Tokyo, Japan
SMO  Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming
  Th e Netherlands
SNS  Studieförbundet Naringsliv och Samhälle
  Stockholm, Sweden
CED Counterpart Organizations
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and independent, nonpolitical research 
organizations in other countries. Such counterpart groups are composed of business executives and scholars and 
have objectives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods. CED cooperates with 
these organizations on research and study projects of common interest to the various countries concerned. Th is 
program has resulted in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as energy, assis-
tance to developing countries, and the reduction of nontariﬀ  barriers to trade.
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